CARTER, Justice.
Plaintiffs, Galen C. Grabill, Michael W.
Nichols, James A. Petersen, and Jeffrey L. Petersen, participants in
auto races at the Adams County Speedway in Corning, and Jayne Petersen, spouse
of Jeffrey, appeal from a judgment establishing that they had released the
racing promoters and others from any claim for injuries arising from a
fireworks demonstration at the speedway.
The defendants are Adams County Fair and Racing Association, Gail Hampel,
Karen Hampel, and Roger Ruchti. After
reviewing the record and considering the arguments presented, we conclude that
a release signed by all plaintiffs except Jayne Petersen is a complete defense
to their action seeking recovery for personal injuries against all of the
defendants. Because Jayne Petersen did
not sign the release in question, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
on her claim was improper. The grant of
summary judgment on the other claims is affirmed. The judgment on Jayne Petersen’s claim is reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings on her claim.
Automobile
races were held at the Adams County Speedway in Corning on August 22,
2000, as an activity of the defendant Adams County Fair and Racing
Association. That evening a special
race, known as the Hav-A-Tampa race, was being held. Defendant Gail Hampel was the promoter of the racing events at
the speedway, and defendant Roger Ruchti was a racing official in charge of the
fireworks that were to be set off during the event. Gail’s wife, Karen, was a person present in the restricted area
during the activities.
The plaintiffs who participated in the
races were on the infield of the racetrack known as the pit area. This is a restricted area. Each of them was required to sign a release
and pay a fee in order to enter the pit area.
They testified in their depositions that they had signed similar
releases every time they participated in races at other racetracks in
Iowa. The release stated in part that
the person signing it waived all claims “arising out of or related to the
activity.”
Shortly after the parade lap passed
the grandstand, Ruchti discharged a firework display in the pit area. Three or four of the fireworks rocketed
horizontally into the infield instead of flying into the air. The loose fireworks exploded in the pit area
injuring plaintiffs. The injured
parties brought the present action against defendants, seeking recovery for
personal injuries. Plaintiff Jayne
Petersen also joined in the action, seeking recovery for loss of
consortium. Defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment, which was resisted by plaintiffs. Following a hearing, the district court
granted the motion and dismissed the claims of all plaintiffs. Additional facts will be discussed in our
consideration of the legal issues presented.
I. Standard of
Review.
The
court reviews a grant of summary judgment for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Summary judgment is granted if there is no
genuine issue of material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Iowa R.
Civ. P. 1.981(3). The resisting party
must set forth specific facts showing that a genuine factual issue exists. Huber v.
Hovey, 501 N.W.2d 53, 55 (Iowa 1993); Suss v. Schammel, 375 N.W.2d
252, 254 (Iowa 1985); Froning & Deppe, Inc. v. S. Story Bank &
Trust Co., 327 N.W.2d 214, 215 (Iowa 1982). “Summary judgment is proper if the only
issue is the legal consequences flowing from undisputed facts.” Huber, 501 N.W.2d at 55.
II. Whether
Plaintiffs’ Injuries, Caused by the Discharge of Fireworks During a Racing
Event, Were Covered by the Release and Waiver of Liability Signed by Them Prior
to their Participation in the Event.
A. Arguments. Plaintiffs assert that
the releases they signed did not cover the discharge of fireworks because that
activity was not related to the racing events in which they were
participating. They also assert that
the discharge of fireworks is an ultrahazardous activity that should not be
included in a blanket release without specific reference to such activity.
Defendants argue this case is particularly suited for
resolution on summary judgment, as the matter is simply a question of contract
interpretation. They urge the type of
release involved here may be enforced even though the parties have not
contemplated the precise circumstance that occurred, especially when the risk
occurred within the restricted area covered by the release.
B. Analysis. The
release signed by the plaintiffs stated:
RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY,
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT
Adams Co. Speedway,
Corning, Ia 8/22/00
DESCRIPTION AND LOCATION OF SCHEDULED EVENT(S) DATE RELEASE SIGNED
IN CONSIDERATION of being permitted to compete,
officiate, observe, work for, or participate in any way in the EVENT(S) or
being permitted to enter for any purpose any RESTRICTED AREA (defined as any
area requiring special authorization, credentials, or permission to enter or
any to which admission by the general public is restricted or prohibited), EACH
OF THE UNDERSIGNED, for himself, his personal representatives, heirs, and next
of kin:
1. Acknowledges,
agrees, and represents that he have or will immediately upon entering any of
such RESTRICTED AREAS, and will continuously thereafter, inspect the RESTRICTED
AREAS which he enters, and he further agrees and warrants that, if at any time,
he is in or about RESTRICTED AREAS and he feels anything to be unsafe, he will
immediately advise the officials of such and if necessary will leave the
RESTRICTED AREAS and/or refuse to participate further in the EVENT(S).
2. HEREBY
RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE the promoters,
participants, racing associations, sanctioning organizations or any subdivision
thereof, track operators, track owners, officials, car owners, drivers, pit
crews, rescue personnel, any persons in any RESTRICTED AREA, promoters,
sponsors, advertisers, owners and lessees of premises used to conduct the
EVENT(S), premises and event inspectors, surveyors, underwriters, consultants
and others who give recommendations, directions, or instructions or engage in
risk evaluation or loss control activities regarding the premises or EVENT(S)
and each of them, their directors, officers, agents and employees, all for the
purposes herein referred to as “Releasees,” FROM ALL LIABILITY TO THE
UNDERSIGNED, his personal representatives, assigns, heirs, and next of kin FOR
ANY AND ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE, AND ANY
CLAIM OR DEMANDS THEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY
OR RESULTING IN DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE
EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE.
3. HEREBY
AGREES TO INDEMNIFY AND SAVE AND HOLD HARMLESS the Releasees and each of them
FROM ANY LOSS, LIABILITY, DAMAGE, OR COST they may incur arising out of or
related to the EVENT(S) WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR
OTHERWISE.
4. HEREBY
ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY RISK OF BODILY INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY
DAMAGE arising out of or related to the EVENT(S) whether caused by the
NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES or otherwise.
5. HEREBY
acknowledges that THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EVENT(S) ARE VERY DANGEROUS and involve
the risk of serious injury and/or death and/or property damage. Each of THE
UNDERSIGNED, also expressly acknowledges that INJURIES RECEIVED MAY BE
COMPOUNDED OR INCREASED BY NEGLIGENT RESCUE OPERATIONS OR PROCEDURES OF THE
RELEASEES.
6. HEREBY
agrees that this Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and
Indemnity Agreement extends to all acts of negligence by the Releasees,
INCLUDING NEGLIGENT RESCUE OPERATIONS and is intended to be as broad and
inclusive as is permitted by the laws of the Province or State in which the
Event(s) is/are conducted and that if any portion thereof is held invalid, it
is agreed that the balance shall, notwithstanding, continue in full legal force
and effect.
I HAVE READ THIS RELEASE AND WAIVER OF LIABILITY,
ASSUMPTION OF RISK AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENT, FULLY UNDERSTAND ITS TERMS, UNDERSTAND
THAT I HAVE GIVEN UP SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS BY SIGNING IT, AND HAVE SIGNED IT
FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY WITHOUT ANY INDUCEMENT, ASSURANCE OR GUARANTEE BEING
MADE TO ME AND INTEND MY SIGNATURE TO BE A COMPLETE AND UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE
OF ALL LIABILITY TO THE GREATEST EXTENT ALLOWED BY LAW.
Contracts releasing persons from
liability for their own negligent acts have been found to be enforceable and
are not contrary to public policy. Bashford v. Slater,250 Iowa 857,
865, 96 N.W.2d 904, 909 (1959); Weik v. Ace Rents, Inc., 249 Iowa 510,
515, 87 N.W.2d 314, 317 (1958); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Poling, 248
Iowa 582, 587, 81 N.W.2d 462, 465 (1957).
Releases assented to by participants in hazardous activities have been
upheld in Huber,501
N.W.2d at 55; Bashford,250
Iowa at 865, 96 N.W.2d at 909; and Korsmo v. Waverly Ski Club, 435 N.W.2d
746, 748 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988).
The release clearly identifies the
individuals who are to be considered released parties: “promoters, participants, racing
associations, sanctioning organizations or any subdivision thereof, track
operators, track owners, officials, car owners, drivers, pit crews, rescue
personnel, any persons in any RESTRICTED AREA, promoters, sponsors,
advertisers, owners and lessees of premises used to conduct the EVENT(S)
. . . and each of them, their directors, officers, agents and
employees.” The Adams County Fair and
Racing Association should be covered as a racing association. Gail Hampel was the promoter of the
racetrack and should be covered by the release as a promoter. Roger Ruchti was an official at the races,
first as a ticket-taker, then as a tech inspector and finally was in charge of
the pit gate. Additionally, Ruchti had
been in charge of discharging fireworks each year at the racetrack since 1988
or 1989. He would seem to be covered as
an official of the event or as any person in the restricted area. The record does not disclose Karen Hampel’s
role at the racetrack, but she would be covered by the release as “any person
in the restricted area.”
Plaintiffs’ contention that the
release waived only damages caused by racing contravenes the rather broad
language used in the release. The
release specified the description and location of the “event(s)” as “Adams Co.
Speedway, Corning, Ia.” It is also
clear that anyone participating in the “event(s)” or entering the “restricted
area” was required to sign the release.
For example, the release requires the signer to continuously inspect the
restricted areas and leave such areas if he feels unsafe. Also, it releases a large group of
individuals from “ALL LIABILITY,” even when caused by the negligence of the
released parties. We believe the
language “HEREBY acknowledges that THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EVENT(S) ARE VERY
DANGEROUS” implies that more than racing is included in the festivities.
Although it does not appear in the
record that the plaintiffs participating in the races had knowledge that there
would be a fireworks display that evening, each testified in their depositions
that they had participated at other racetracks where fireworks were
discharged. In upholding the release of
a race promoters liability in Huber, we recognized that a releasing
party does not need to have contemplated the precise occurrence that caused
injury as long as the occurrence was within the broad range of events that
might transpire with respect to the matter being undertaken. Huber, 501 N.W.2d at 56; see also
Korsmo, 435 N.W.2d at 749 (parties need not contemplate precise
occurrence as long as it is within a broad range of likely activities). Judged by this standard, we believe that the
district court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiffs also argue that including
the discharge of fireworks within the scope of the release would be improper
because fireworks present an ultrahazardous activity. Plaintiffs cite to 35 C.J.S. Explosives
§ 34 (1999) in support of their position that the discharge of
fireworks is an ultrahazardous activity.
Although it is illegal to discharge fireworks within Iowa without a
permit, it does not appear to us that the discharge of fireworks is an
ultrahazardous activity. It has been
recognized that
a fireworks display is not an ultrahazardous activity
even though it is an activity that threatens a grave risk of harm or death,
since the risk of serious harm from the discharge of fireworks is one that
could be eliminated through the non-negligent manufacture of the fireworks, and
since fireworks displays are a matter of common usage on appropriate occasions
such as the Fourth of July.
57A
Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 403,
at 395 (1989). More importantly, we are
satisfied the danger that the fireworks presented in the restricted area was a
matter against which the racing promoters were attempting to protect
themselves.
III. Whether the Comparative Fault Statute
Regarding Spousal Consortium Claims Negates Prior Case Law Holding Such a Claim
is Not Derivative of the Spouse’s Claim.
Plaintiff Jayne Petersen argues that her claim for
loss of consortium is not covered by the release because she did not sign it
and was not otherwise made a party to its provisions. In support of her claim, she notes that we held in Huber,
501 N.W.2d at 57, that the release we upheld in that case as precluding the
claims of a racing participant who signed the release did not bar his spouse’s
claim for loss of consortium because she had not signed the document. We reach a similar conclusion in the present
case. Although defendants urge that a
1997 amendment to Iowa Code section 668.3 provides that an injured person’s
claim is imputed to that person’s spouse in the trial of a loss-of-consortium
claim, that statute in no way negates the fact recognized in Huber
and other cases that the claim continues to be that of the spouse seeking
recovery for loss of consortium. While
section 668.3(1)(b) may aid defendants in the trial on the merits, it does not
serve to subject a loss-of-consortium claimant to the terms of a release that
the claimant has not signed or otherwise accepted.
We have considered all issues presented and conclude
that the grant of summary judgment dismissing the claims of the male plaintiffs
is affirmed. The judgment dismissing
the claim of plaintiff Jayne Petersen is reversed, and the cause is remanded
for further proceedings on her claim.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
IN PART.
All
justices concur except Larson, J., who takes no part.
