2019 Archive | Court of Appeals Court Opinions

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Russell Keast, District Associate Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.  Opinion by Doyle, P.J.  Special Concurrence by McDonald, J.  (7 pages)

            Roy Tompkins appeals the judgment and sentence entered following his plea to one count of operating while intoxicated, second offense.  OPINION HOLDS: Because the statutory provisions requiring substance abuse evaluation, treatment, and a course for drinking drivers is a collateral consequence of Tompkins’s plea, the court’s failure to inform Tompkins of the requirement did not affect the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, and his counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to correct the omission.  The record is insufficient to allow us to determine whether counsel’s failure to correct the court’s omission of the maximum possible fine prejudiced Tompkins.  Therefore, we preserve this claim of ineffective assistance for a postconviction proceeding.  SPECIAL CONCURRENCE ASSERTS: I concur in the judgment.  In State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1998), the supreme court held license revocation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to OWI and the district court had no duty to inform the defendant of the consequence prior to taking the plea.  Carney has since been undermined by State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 2016).  In Fisher, the supreme court held that “[b]ecause revocation of the driver’s license of a person convicted of a drug possession offense is mandatory, immediate, and part of the punishment for that offense, the court must inform the defendant of this consequence before accepting his or her plea.”  877 N.W.2d at 683.  The Fisher court distinguished Carney on the ground Fisher involved “revocation of a driver’s license as a mandatory consequence of a drug possession conviction.”  Id. (emphasis in original).  The proposed distinction is immaterial, and the cases are not reconcilable.  Nonetheless, Fisher and Carney remain good law.  I thus concur in the judgment. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Carl J. Petersen, Judge.  REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.  Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Danilson, S.J.  Opinion by Danilson, S.J.  (12 pages)

            Jim Henricksen appeals from the district court ruling ordering him to pay unpaid child support and daycare expenses.  Jim contends the district court erred in vacating its prior ruling.  Alternatively, Jim contends he did not receive notice of the amount of alleged arrearages, and thus the court should not have concluded he was barred from contesting the computation of arrearages and interest or from presenting defenses.  Jim contends the court should have applied the law of Oklahoma in computing the amount of arrearages and accrual of interest.  OPINION HOLDS: We conclude Jim’s appeal of the order vacating the previous ruling is timely but without merit.  However, because Jim did not receive notice of the amount of alleged arrearages now claimed by his ex-wife, we conclude it was improper to exclude Jim’s arguments and defenses regarding the actual amount owing.  We reverse and remand so the district court can consider the viability of Jim’s defenses and determine the actual amount owing according to Oklahoma law. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Terry R. Rickers, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.  Opinion by Vogel, C.J.  (11 pages)

            Jeff Lee Altmayer appeals his convictions for kidnapping in the first degree, sexual abuse in the second degree, and two counts of enticing a child.  He argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to a jury instruction regarding his out-of-court statements, and the court abused its discretion in admitting other-acts evidence and erred in submitting a jury instruction regarding the complaining witness.  OPINION HOLDS: We find both instructions correctly state the law and did not result in prejudice and the other-acts evidence was proper for proving identity.  Therefore, we affirm.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Franklin County, Christopher C. Foy, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle, J., and Danilson, S.J.  Opinion by Doyle, J.  (10 pages)

            Karen De Groote appeals the district court’s ruling removing her as trustee of her father’s trust and ordering her to pay part of the attorney’s fees of the beneficiaries that filed the petition.  OPINION HOLDS: Because good cause existed to remove Karen as the trustee, and because the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Karen to pay part of the petitioners-beneficiaries’ attorney fees, we affirm the ruling of the district court in all respects.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Farrell, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ.  Opinion by McDonald, J.  (3 pages)

            Jahmal Cavil appeals the district court’s imposition of sentence following his guilty plea for possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), third offense, and assault while displaying a dangerous weapon.  OPINION HOLDS: The district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sentence.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Sean W. McPartland, Judge.  AFFIRMED. Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.  Opinion by McDonald, J.  (5 pages)

            Andre White appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.  OPINION HOLDS: White’s trial counsel did not provide ineffective assistance by failing to object to alleged hearsay statements or by changing trial strategies after White’s first trial resulted in a hung jury.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Joel D. Yates, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Vogel, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.  Opinion by McDonald, J.  (2 pages)

            Scott Clayton appeals the district court’s decision to increase his child support obligation.  OPINION HOLDS: Credible evidence supported the district court’s decision to increase Scott’s child support obligation.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Andrew Chappell, Judge.  AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.  Heard by Tabor, P.J., Bower, J., and Mahan, S.J.  Opinion by Mahan, S.J.  (13 pages)

            Clinton Lunden appeals the physical care, visitation, and child support provisions of the decree dissolving his marriage to Bridgett Wood.  OPINION HOLDS: Upon our review, we affirm as modified to provide Clinton additional visitation during the summer.  We decline to award either party attorney fees on appeal.   

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie K. Vaudt, Judge.  REVERSED AND REMANDED.  Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.  Opinion by Potterfield, P.J.  (6 pages)

            Joseph Sliger appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition to modify his child-support obligation, arguing his reduction in income since the entry of the 2016 decree dissolving his marriage to Cassidee Sliger (now known as Cassidee Parks) was not voluntary.  Cassidee asks that we award her appellate attorney fees.  OPINION HOLDS: Joseph’s voluntary act that resulted in termination does not qualify as a self-inflicted or voluntary reduction of income that would justify using his former salary in setting child support payments.  Consequently, we reverse the district court’s denial of Joseph’s petition to modify his child-support obligation and remand for the obligation to be recalculated using the parties’ current incomes.  We decline Cassidee’s request for appellate attorney fees.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Warren County, Kevin A. Parker, District Associate Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Mahan, S.J., and Danilson, S.J.  Opinion by Danilson, S.J.  (19 pages)

            Carlos Sierra-Rojas appeals from his conviction and sentence, following a jury trial, for harboring a runaway.  Rojas contends the district court erred in denying his pretrial motion to dismiss for improper venue; erred in denying his motion for directed verdict based on insufficient evidence; abused its discretion in admitting an untimely disclosed, irrelevant, and unfairly prejudicial exhibit; and erred in not instructing the jury that he did not have an affirmative duty to report the runaway’s whereabouts to law enforcement.  OPINION HOLDS: Because venue is nonjurisdictional, Rojas’s failure to file a pretrial motion for change of venue was not preserved.  Because there was sufficient evidence Rojas committed the crime of harboring a runaway, the complained-of exhibit was disclosed as early as practicable and was not irrelevant and cumulative, and we determine Rojas was not prejudiced by the court’s refusal to give his proposed jury instruction, we affirm.  

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Jeffrey L. Poulson, Judge.  REVERSED AND REMANDED.  Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.  Opinion by Potterfield, P.J.  (6 pages)

            On interlocutory appeal, John Doe and James Doe, who are both HIV positive, challenge the district court’s ruling they cannot proceed in an action against Sally Gill for disseminating information about their diagnoses without using their own names in the public court filings.  OPINION HOLDS: We reverse the district court order requiring John and James to amend or restate their petition and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Mark R. Lawson, Judge, and Phillip J. Tabor, District Associate Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J.  Tabor, J., takes no part.  Opinion by Potterfield, P.J.  (3 pages)

            Christopher Goddard appeals the district court’s denial of his pre-plea motions to continue trial and waive his right to speedy trial, and the denial of his post-sentencing motion to set aside his guilty plea.  OPINION HOLDS: Because Goddard’s guilty plea waived his right to challenge the court’s adverse pre-plea rulings and because his claim that his plea was not knowing and voluntary is not preserved for our review, we affirm.