June 2022 Archive | Court of Appeals Court Opinions

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, John M. Wright, Judge.  APPEAL DISMISSED.  Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.  Opinion by Tabor, J.  (5 pages)

            Chico Newman appeals the denial of his petition for postconviction relief.  Because Newman died while this appeal was pending, the State moved to dismiss on mootness grounds.  Rebutting, Newman’s counsel contends collateral financial claims survived Newman’s death.  OPINION HOLDS: Newman’s appeal did not abate upon his death.  But without an estate or personal representative to substitute as party, there is no party to pursue these issues.  Lacking a remaining controversy, all claims are now moot.  And, because the public-interest exception does not apply on these facts, we dismiss.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Lucy J. Gamon, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Tabor, P.J., Badding, J., and Blane, S.J.  Opinion by Blane, S.J.  (9 pages)

            Herrarte appeals the denial of his postconviction-relief application.  He argues that his criminal trial counsel was ineffective for (1) incorrectly arguing the evidence supported a conviction of kidnapping in the third degree, of which he was convicted, when it was not a lesser included offense of kidnapping in the second degree, the crime charged, and (2) failing to object to the court finding him guilty of third-degree kidnapping.  OPINION HOLDS: We find, applying Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.22(3), since the kidnapping statute established three degrees of the crime, the trial court properly determined Herrarte guilty of kidnapping in the third degree.  Herrarte’s criminal trial counsel was not ineffective in arguing the court find Herrarte guilty of kidnapping in the third degree as trial strategy, and in not objecting to the court finding him guilty of third-degree kidnapping.  We find counsel did not fail in an essential duty and affirm the denial of postconviction relief.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Daniel P. Vakulskas, District Associate Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.  Opinion by Vaitheswaran, P.J.  (5 pages)

            Jarrod Jacobsen appeals his conviction for operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, second offense.  Jacobsen challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  OPINION HOLDS: We affirm the district court’s denial of Jacobsen’s suppression motion.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dickinson County, David C. Larson, District Associate Judge.  REVERSED AND REMANDED.  Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Potterfield, S.J.  Opinion by Potterfield, S.J.  (10 pages)

            Shane Bakke challenges the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the stop of his utility vehicle (UTV) by a conservation officer, which was not supported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause, violated his constitutional rights—notwithstanding Iowa Code section 321I.27 (2020), which gives statutory authority for the stop.  OPINION HOLDS: The conservation officer’s stop of Bakke’s UTV was not supported by probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and the statute giving authority to conduct stops in section 321I.27 cannot transform the stop into a reasonable, constitutional action.  Therefore, the district court should have granted Bakke’s motion to suppress.  We reverse and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.  REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.  Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.  Opinion by Tabor, J.  (16 pages)

            Lamar Outdoor Advertising appeals the district court’s denial of its writ of certiorari alleging the City of Des Moines Zoning Board of Adjustment and Building and Fire Code Board of Appeals erroneously denied its application to convert five existing static billboards around the city to digital boards.  On appeal, Lamar alleges the Building Board lacked jurisdiction to deny his appeal under the new zoning ordinance and the city and its boards acted illegally in interpreting the grandfather clause.  OPINION HOLDS: On the first point, the Zoning Board’s independent finding that Lamar’s application was incomplete resolves any jurisdictional question.  On the second point, we agree the Zoning Board acted illegally in denying Lamar’s sign permits based on the language of the grandfather clause.  Thus, we reverse and remand for the district court to enter an order sustaining Lamar’s petition for writ of certiorari.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Bower, C.J., Schumacher, J., and Doyle, S.J.  Opinion by Bower, C.J.  (3 pages)

            Tony Lee Lopez appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief.  OPINION HOLDS:  We affirm.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lawrence P. McLellan, Judge.  AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.  Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Ahlers, JJ.  Opinion by Ahlers, J. (8 pages)

            Isaiah Steide appeals his convictions for dominion and control of a firearm by a felon and trafficking in a stolen weapon.  OPINION HOLDS: We find sufficient evidence to support Steide’s conviction for dominion and control of a firearm by a felon.  We find the evidence insufficient to prove Steide knowingly acquired a stolen firearm.  Therefore, we affirm Steide’s conviction and sentence for dominion and control of a firearm by a felon, and we vacate his conviction and sentence for trafficking a stolen weapon.  We remand for entry of judgment of acquittal on the trafficking-a-stolen-weapon charge.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Amy M. Moore, Judge. AFFIRMED.  Considered by May, P.J., Chicchelly, J., and Gamble, S.J.  Opinion by Chicchelly, J.  (7 pages)

            Shiro Edward Remeliik appeals from the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief (PCR).  He alleges the untimeliness of his application is overcome by a new ground of law and that his PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance.  OPINION HOLDS: Because Remeliik fails to establish an exception to the statutory time bar or ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, the district court properly dismissed his PCR application. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda Fangman, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Heard by May, P.J., and Schumacher and Badding, JJ.  Opinion by May, P.J.  (10 pages)

            Tracy Even and All Purpose Storage, LLC (APS) appeal a summary judgment ruling in favor of Title Services Corporation (TSC) of their negligent misrepresentation claim relating to TSC’s failure to identify an easement to land purchased by Even.  OPINION HOLDS: TSC owed no duty of care to APS.  Because Even transferred ownership of the land to APS, Even could not claim lost future profits related to a storage business run by APS on the land.  And Even’s claim for lost opportunity could not go forward because he provided no evidence as to how he would have renegotiated the purchase price of the land had the easement been disclosed.

No. 21-0758   KARNS v. STATE

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Don E. Courtney, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by May, P.J., and Greer and Chicchelly, JJ.  Opinion by Greer, J.  (9 pages)

            Dylan Karns appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief (PCR).  He claims trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, arguing counsel breached an essential duty by failing to investigate Karns’s mental health and that he was prejudiced because, if counsel had done so, counsel would have learned Karns was not competent to enter the guilty pleas.  On appeal, Karns argues for the first time that his PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to obtain expert testimony to establish that Karns’s specific mental disorders—combined with the failure to take his medication—affected his competency at the time of the guilty pleas.  OPINION HOLDS: Without a medical expert making the connection for us between Karns’s mental conditions and his competency (or lack thereof), we cannot say trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.  And because the record on appeal is inadequate for us to address Karns’s claim PCR counsel provided ineffective assistance, we do not decide it.  We affirm the denial of Karns’s PCR application.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, Daniel Kitchen, District Associate Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.  Opinion by Vaitheswaran, P.J.  (3 pages)

            Robert Henry Jr. appeals the sentences imposed following his convictions for assault and assault on persons engaged in certain occupations.  OPINION HOLDS: Although the reasons for the sentence were brief, we conclude they did not amount to an abuse of discretion.  We affirm.

No. 21-0887   MUEGGENBERG v. MUEGGENBERG

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Crawford County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge.  AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.  Heard by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Badding, JJ.  Opinion by Badding, J.  (20 pages)

            Defendants appeal a district court ruling on a petition for partition in kind filed by the plaintiffs.  The defendants argue the court’s division of the property was inequitable, the court erred in taxing the plaintiffs’ attorney fees as costs, and the court erred in its overall assessment of costs.  OPINION HOLDS: We affirm the district court’s division of property and taxation of a reasonable fee in favor of plaintiffs’ attorney as costs.  But because the court taxed all costs against the defendants irrespective of whether all costs were attributable to contests in the proceeding, we vacate the assessment of costs and remand to the court to tax any costs arising from contests to the losing contestant unless otherwise ordered by the court, with any remaining costs taxed proportionately among the parties.