February 2025 Archive | Court of Appeals Court Opinions

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Ahlers and Sandy, JJ.  Opinion by Sandy, J.  (14 pages)

            Octavio Lopez Sanchez appeals his sentences, arguing the district court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentences.  OPINION HOLDS: Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel Dalrymple, Judge.  REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS.  Heard by Schumacher, C.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.  Opinion by Badding, J.  (12 pages)

            The State appeals from the district court’s grant of postconviction relief to the petitioner.  OPINION HOLDS: Upon our de novo review of the record, there is overwhelming evidence of Mathews’ guilt, and he cannot satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test.  We remand for the district court to consider the remaining ineffective-assistance claims it did not previously address. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael Huppert, Judge.  AFFIRMED AND REMANDED TO DETERMINE ATTORNEY FEES.  Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.  Opinion by Buller, J.  (8 pages)

            A mother appeals from a custody decree placing physical care of the child with the father and requests the monthly child support payment amount be modified.  The father seeks $3000 in appellate attorney fees.  OPINION HOLDS: Because the father is better able to minister to the child’s wellbeing, provide more stability, and is more likely to support the child’s relationship with the mother, and because the mother waived her claim regarding the child support amount, we affirm placement of physical care with the father and the support amount.  We remand for the district court to order the mother to pay the father’s appellate attorney fees not to exceed $1500.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.  Opinion by Schumacher, P.J.  (2 pages)

            An inmate appeals a district court ruling on his petition for judicial review, which affirmed the Iowa Board of Parole’s denial of his conditional release on parole.  Opinion holds: Because we detect no error of law in the district court ruling, we affirm without further opinion under Iowa Court Rule 21.26(1)(d).

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Jennifer Miller, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.  Opinion by Langholz, J.  (3 pages)

            Khamfeuang Thongvanh appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief as time-barred, arguing that the statute of limitations is unconstitutional.  OPINION HOLDS: Because Thongvanh fails to flesh out any specific arguments as to why the statute of limitations violates most of the constitutional provisions he summarily mentions, his claims are mainly waived.  His due-process challenge fails as we are bound by the supreme court’s prior rejection of a federal due-process challenge to the statute of limitations.  And the exception to the statute of limitations for a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the limitations period does not apply.

            Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, Judge.  WRIT SUSTAINED.  Heard by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.  Opinion by Langholz, J.  Dissent by Greer, P.J.  (23 pages)

            On a writ of certiorari, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services challenges a juvenile court order prohibiting the department from changing the placement of a child in its custody without the court first holding an evidentiary hearing on whether the change is in the child’s best interest.  OPINION HOLDS: Because this is a question of public importance warranting a decision, we reach the merits even though the case’s progress in the juvenile court during our certiorari proceeding has mooted the question here.  And on the merits, we agree with the Department that the order exceeded the juvenile court’s limited statutory authority to review the Department’s specific placement decisions.  To be sure, the court could have reviewed and rejected the Department’s placement decision if it had found that the child proved the Department acted contrary to the child’s best interests by unreasonably or irresponsibly selecting a suitable placement—all while giving deference to the Department’s decision.  But this order was entered outside that statutory authorization.  And its prohibition on changing the specific placement—even temporarily—amounts to selecting the current placement.  Under the statute, only the Department has that authority.  To respect the different roles of the Department and the juvenile court, we must sustain the writ.  DISSENT ASSERTS: I would annul the writ; the juvenile court acted within its statutory authority when it prohibited the Department from moving the child to a new placement before the court had the chance to review the Department’s selection pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.102(1)(b) at the request of the child at issue. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Greer, P.J., and Buller and Langholz, JJ.  Opinion by Langholz, J.  (6 pages)

            Shevell Ash appeals his two-year prison sentence for domestic abuse assault, second offense.  Ash argues that the district court improperly considered unproven criminal conduct and abused its discretion in refusing to suspend his prison sentence.  OPINION HOLDS: The court indeed relied on the conduct Ash challenges on appeal in selecting his sentence.  But it was not unproven.  The State presented sworn testimony and a recording of the phone calls at the sentencing hearing—ample evidence to support the court’s finding that Ash had violated the court order.  And we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ultimate sentencing decision.  We thus affirm Ash’s sentence.

    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Kimberly Ayotte, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher and Sandy, JJ.  Opinion by Tabor, C.J.  (8 pages)

    A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three children.  She contends the State did not offer clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory grounds for termination, termination was not in their best interests, the parent-child bond should prevent termination, and the State failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite the family.  OPINION HOLDS:  On our review, we reach the same conclusions as the juvenile court.  The mother cannot provide the stability that the children need.  We thus affirm the termination order.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lucas County, John D. Lloyd, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.  Opinion by Langholz, J.  (4 pages)

            A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to three children.  OPINION HOLDS: The mother did not preserve error on her reasonable-efforts challenge or her permissive-exception arguments.  And we find the children are best served by termination, as the mother made no effort to see her children in a year and a half, she has not worked toward reunification, and the children are long overdue for permanency.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Richelle Mahaffey, Judge.  AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.  Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.  Opinion by Ahlers, P.J.  (5 pages)

            A mother to two children and the father of the older child separately appeal the termination of their respective parental rights.  The father argues termination of his parental rights is not in the child’s best interests and he should be given additional time to work toward reunification.  The mother broadly claims the State failed to prove its case for termination of her parental rights.  OPINION HOLDS: Termination of the father’s rights is in the child’s best interests, and we do not grant him additional time to work towards reunification.  The mother has failed to develop any specific claims for our review, resulting in the waiver of any claims she may have.  Nonetheless on our de novo review of the record it is clear that the State established statutory grounds for termination of the mother’s rights, termination of her rights is in the children’s best interests, and the mother could not establish a permissive exception to termination.

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Ahlers, P.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.  Opinion by Badding, J.  (4 pages)

            A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights.  OPINION HOLDS: There is clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory ground for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2024), so we affirm. 

            Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Lynn Poschner, Judge.  AFFIRMED.  Considered by Greer, P.J., and Langholz and Sandy, JJ.  Opinion by Langholz, J.  (8 pages)

            A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her son, arguing that termination is not in the son’s best interest and the parent–child bond exception applies.  OPINION HOLDS: We agree with the juvenile court that termination of the mother’s parental rights in the son’s best interest.  She has not made progress towards unsupervised visits, still struggles with substance use, and has not fully utilized mental-health services.  And the son is much improved in his foster-care placement and is finally receiving the stable home environment that he needs.  We also agree that the parent–child bond exception does not apply because the mother has not met her burden to prove that termination would be more detrimental to the son than the uncertain status quo.  We thus affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights.