Linda Agan v. Tammy Krambeck
Linda Agan, Plaintiff-Appellee
Tammy Krambeck, Defendant-Appellant
Attorney for Appellant
Andrea Hiatt Buckley
Attorney for Appellee
Christopher R. Kemp
Amicus Curiae
Benjamin E. Bellus and Jessica Whitney, Assistant Attorneys General, for amicus curiae Iowa Attorney General
Rita Bettis of ACLU of Iowa Foundation, Clarissa Flege of Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, and Sandra Shin-Young Park and Lenora M. Lapidus of ACLU Women’s Rights Project, for amici curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Iowa, Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, American Civil Liberties Union, National Housing Law Project, National Law Center on Homelessness and Poverty, National Network to End Domestic Violence, and Sargent Shriver National Center on Poverty Law.
Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Summary
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Odell G. McGhee II, District Associate Judge. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR DISMISSAL. Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ. Opinion by Potterfield, J. (12 pages)
Tammy Krambeck appeals from the default judgement entered by the small claims court evicting her from the home she rented from Linda Agan for more than three years. Tammy maintains the small claims court had jurisdiction to set aside the default judgment and she had good cause for the judgment to be set aside. Alternatively, she argues the district court should have set aside the judgment entered by the small claims court because the small claims court never had jurisdiction to enter the default in the first place, as the forcible entry and detainer (FED) notice was facially defective—it did not provide the required language about her right-to-cure the alleged clear and present danger—and in violation of her right to summon emergency assistance, found in Iowa Code section 562A.27B (2017). OPINION HOLDS: Because the notice provided to Tammy failed to include the necessary right-to-cure language, the small claims court lacked jurisdiction to decide the FED action and the default judgment should not have been entered. We reverse the entry of the default judgment and the writ of removal and possession and remand for dismissal of the underlying action. As this issue is dispositive, we do not consider Tammy’s other arguments.
