State of Iowa
v.
Roy Tompkins
Appellee
State of Iowa
Appellant
Roy Tompkins
Attorney for the Appellee
Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for the Appellant
Sharon D. Hallstoos
Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Summary
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Russell Keast, District Associate Judge. AFFIRMED. Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Doyle, P.J. Special Concurrence by McDonald, J. (7 pages)
Roy Tompkins appeals the judgment and sentence entered following his plea to one count of operating while intoxicated, second offense. OPINION HOLDS: Because the statutory provisions requiring substance abuse evaluation, treatment, and a course for drinking drivers is a collateral consequence of Tompkins’s plea, the court’s failure to inform Tompkins of the requirement did not affect the knowing and voluntary nature of his plea, and his counsel did not breach an essential duty in failing to correct the omission. The record is insufficient to allow us to determine whether counsel’s failure to correct the court’s omission of the maximum possible fine prejudiced Tompkins. Therefore, we preserve this claim of ineffective assistance for a postconviction proceeding. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE ASSERTS: I concur in the judgment. In State v. Carney, 584 N.W.2d 907, 909 (Iowa 1998), the supreme court held license revocation is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea to OWI and the district court had no duty to inform the defendant of the consequence prior to taking the plea. Carney has since been undermined by State v. Fisher, 877 N.W.2d 676 (Iowa 2016). In Fisher, the supreme court held that “[b]ecause revocation of the driver’s license of a person convicted of a drug possession offense is mandatory, immediate, and part of the punishment for that offense, the court must inform the defendant of this consequence before accepting his or her plea.” 877 N.W.2d at 683. The Fisher court distinguished Carney on the ground Fisher involved “revocation of a driver’s license as a mandatory consequence of a drug possession conviction.” Id. (emphasis in original). The proposed distinction is immaterial, and the cases are not reconcilable. Nonetheless, Fisher and Carney remain good law. I thus concur in the judgment.
