State v. Cullum
State of Iowa, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
Jacob Monroe Cullum, Defendant-Appellant.
Attorney for Appellant
Ella M. Newell, Assistant Appellate Defender
Attorney for Appellee
Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Amicus Curiae
Alan R. Ostergren
Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Summary
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Adam D. Sauer and Karen Kaufman Salic, Judges. CONVICTIONS CONDITIONALLY AFFIRMED; SENTENCES VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS. Considered without oral argument en banc. Opinion by Greer, J. Special concurrence by Buller, J. Special concurrence by Langholz, J., Partial Dissent by Ahlers, J. (31 pages)
Jacob Cullum appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, the denial of his motion for new trial, and his sentence. He argues the district court wrongly: (1) denied his motion to suppress because the officer who stopped him lacked reasonable suspicion, (2) denied his motion for new trial after applying the wrong standard, and (3) engaged in a fixed sentencing scheme or failed to realize it had the discretion to suspend the fines. OPINION HOLDS: Because the officer had reasonable suspicion to initiate the traffic stop, we affirm the denial of his motion to suppress. On his second claim, we agree the district court used the wrong standard when ruling on his motion for a new trial; we conditionally affirm his convictions but remand to the district court for application of the correct standard. Finally, the district court failed to recognize and exercise its discretion to suspend the fines, so we vacate Cullum’s sentences. If Cullum’s motion for new trial is denied and his convictions affirmed, he is to be resentenced. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE ASSERTS: I concur in the judgment to vacate the fine, finding myself in part boxed in by existing supreme court precedent. But I would encourage the elected branches to clarify by statute whether suspended fines may be imposed absent probation. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE ASSERTS: As a matter of first principles of statutory interpretation, I agree 100% with the partial dissent’s thoughtful textual analysis of our sentencing statutes. But even so, I reluctantly concur in the judgment to reverse and remand for resentencing on the fine because we do not get to follow those first principles when our supreme court has already rejected that precise interpretation in a materially identical statute. PARTIAL DISSENT ASSERTS: Because I believe the district court correctly determined that it could not suspend the fines without also placing the defendant on probation, and the court determined that probation was not appropriate in this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing the defendant. The defendant is not entitled to resentencing.
