State of Iowa
v.
Will Earnest Young, Jr.
Appellee
State of Iowa
Appellant
Will Earnest Young, Jr.
Attorney for the Appellee
Zachary Miller (argued), Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for the Appellant
Alan R. Ostergren (argued)
Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Summary
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P. Odekirk, Judge. AFFIRMED. Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Schumacher, Badding, Buller, and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Badding, J. Special concurrence by Tabor, C.J. (22 pages)
Will Young Jr. appeals his convictions and sentences for willful injury causing serious injury and intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent. He asserts that he was denied effective assistance of counsel, urging this court to reach that claim by finding Iowa Code section 814.7 (2023) unconstitutional. Young also contends that the State failed to prove the “reasonable apprehension” element of his intimidation charge, and that the district court was unaware it had discretion to reduce his minimum sentences. OPINION HOLDS: We reject Young’s argument that Iowa Code section 814.7 violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. We therefore lack authority to decide his ineffective-assistance claim on direct appeal. We further conclude that Young’s conviction for intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent, as marshaled at trial, is supported by sufficient evidence. We find no evidence of a lapse in the district court’s sentence discretion. Accordingly, we affirm. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE ASSERTS: The majority properly finds Young’s interest in vindicating his Sixth Amendment right can be diverted to postconviction proceedings without violating the Supremacy Clause. But in my view, he makes a powerful case that “the Iowa legislature’s determination that most ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are better resolved in collateral proceedings cannot countermand the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that states provide indigent defendants with effective representation.” I write separately to underscore that serious doubt remains whether vindication in postconviction relief proceedings—on a practical level—will come quickly enough to deliver justice.
