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State of Iowa
v.
Chad Leroy Wilson
Appellee
State of Iowa
Appellant
Chad Leroy Wilson
Attorney for the Appellee
Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for the Appellant
Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant Appellate Defender
Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Summary
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, James S. Heckerman, Judge. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS. Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and May, JJ. Opinion by Mullins, J. Special concurrence by Tabor, P.J. (11 pages)
Chad Wilson appeals his convictions, following a jury trial, of one count of sexual abuse in the third degree, two counts of lascivious acts with a child, and two counts of indecent contact with a child. He also challenges the sentences imposed. He argues (1) the court abused its discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial and new trial upon complaints about the presentation of prior-bad-acts evidence; (2) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to object to a jury instruction; (3) his stipulation to a prior conviction for sentencing-enhancement purposes was not entered knowingly and voluntarily; (4) the provision in the sentencing order requiring him to pay court costs, including attorney fees, fails to conform with the oral pronouncement of sentence or, alternatively, was improperly ordered without a determination of his reasonable ability to pay; and (5) the court’s entry of a lifetime sentencing no-contact order was illegal. OPINION HOLDS: We affirm Wilson’s guilty verdicts but reverse the district court’s findings in support of the enhancements under sections 901A.2(1) and 902.14 and remand for further proceedings under Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.19(9). Having reversed the prior-conviction findings, we likewise vacate the sentences imposed and the court’s written sentencing order. Having vacated the sentences imposed and the court’s written sentencing order, we find it unnecessary to address Wilson’s restitution challenge. Because we have vacated the sentences and the sentencing order, the no-contact order included in the sentencing order is likewise vacated. For protection of the victim, we direct the previously issued temporary no-contact order be reinstated. After further proceedings on remand and upon resentencing, the court may enter a no-contact order. SPECIAL CONCURRENCE ASSERTS: I would preserve the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the jury instruction equating out-of-court admissions by a party opponent with in-court testimony. As I discussed in two previous dissents, I believe this instruction is flawed and misleads the jurors.
