John Dostart
v.
Columbia Insurance Group
Columbia Insurance Group (Columbia) seeks further review after the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s denial of its motion for summary judgment on judgment creditors’ claim for payment of an unsatisfied judgment against one of Columbia’s insureds for consumer fraud under Iowa Code chapter 714H. Columbia argues consumer fraud is not an “occurrence” that triggers commercial liability insurance coverage. Alternatively, Columbia argues consumer fraud is an intentional act excluded from coverage. Columbia further argues the jury’s damages award was not for covered “property damage.”
Resister
John Dostart
Applicant
Columbia Insurance Group
Attorneys for the Resister
Billy J. Mallory
Trevor A. Jordison
Attorneys for the Applicant
Michael A. Carmoney
Allison J. Frederick
Supreme Court
Oral Argument Schedule
15-15-5
Mar 27, 2025 9:00 AM
Briefs
Supreme Court Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Court of Appeals
Court of Appeals Opinion
Opinion Number:
Date Published:
Summary
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Coleman McAllister, Judge. AFFIRMED. Heard by Badding, P.J., Langholz, J., and Doyle, S.J. Opinion by Langholz, J. (14 pages)
Columbia Insurance Group appeals an interlocutory order of the district court denying its motion for summary judgment on John and Deena Dostart’s claim under Iowa Code section 516.1 (2022) for payment of an unsatisfied consumer-fraud judgment against the company’s insureds who constructed the Dostarts’ new home. Columbia argues the judgment is not covered by the commercial-general-liability insurance policy because: (1) the consumer fraud was not an occurrence under the policy; (2) the consumer fraud fell within the intentional-act exclusion of the policy; and (3) the judgment was not because of property damage. OPINION HOLDS: This summary-judgment record lacks sufficient evidence to hold that the insurance policy Columbia issued does not cover the consumer-fraud judgment entered in favor of the Dostarts. The jury verdict, jury instructions, and judgment entry are not enough to show as a matter of law that the judgment was based on intentional conduct that falls outside the definition of occurrence or within the intentional-act exclusion to the insurance policy nor evidence that the judgment was not from property damage.