Iowa Code section 804.20
for errors at law. State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 2011). We affirm
the suppression ruling “when the court correctly applied the law and substantial
evidence supports the court’s fact-finding.” Id. Iowa Code section 804.20
provides:
3
Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person
arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for any reason
whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after
arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member
of the person’s family or an attorney of the person’s choice, or both.
Such person shall be permitted to make a reasonable number of
telephone calls as may be required to secure an attorney. If a call
is made, it shall be made in the presence of the person having
custody of the one arrested or restrained. If such person is
intoxicated, or a person under eighteen years of age, the call may
be made by the person having custody. An attorney shall be
permitted to see and consult confidentially with such person alone
and in private at the jail or other place of custody without
unreasonable delay. A violation of this section shall constitute a
simple misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added.) The State contends there was no violation of section 804.20
when neither Lamoreux nor Hovda made any affirmative request to meet in a
room without video surveillance. In other words, the State argues the defendant
must make a specific request for a private room or there is no violation of the
statute. The State cites a line of cases wherein the custodial defendant was
required to make a specific request to obtain a right set out in section 804.20.
See State v. Hellstern, 856 ... inform him that the attorney must come to the jail for
a confidential conference); State v. Lukins, 846 N.W.2d 902, 909 (Iowa 2014)
(stating “if an imprecise statement, reasonably construed, implicates the statute,
then the officer should inform the detainee of his or her right to an independent
chemical test under Iowa Code section 321J.11”); State v. Garrity, 765 N.W.2d
592, 596-97 (Iowa 2009) (holding when a defendant requests a phone call to a
4
person outside the scope of section 804.20, the officer must inform the defendant
that the statutory right entitles the defendant to call an attorney or a family
member only).
Our supreme court recently clarified the statutory language and addressed
videotaped surveillance of client-attorney consultations in the jailhouse in State v.
Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 287. The court found the law enforcement officer violated
Walker’s rights under section 804.20 when Walker was only permitted to consult
with his attorney through a glass partition in a booth that was under video
surveillance. Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 287. In construing the statute, the court
determined people under police video surveillance would not believe they are
meeting “alone and in private” as the statute requires. Id. at 294. The State
argued that the partition and surveillance were necessary to prevent passing of
contraband or weapons to detainees and because “the attorney might pose a
safety issue.” Id. at 287-88. The State could point to no specific safety issue
under the circumstances. The court rejected the argument and held, “[I]n the
absence of any individualized showing of a safety or security risk[,] video
surveillance violates an arrestee’s right to ‘see and consult confidentially’ with his
attorney ‘alone and in private.’” Id. at 295 (quoting Iowa Code § 804.20).
In State v Hellstern, a ... IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0831
Filed April 22, 2015
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs
804.20 “applies to the period after arrest but prior to the formal
commencement of criminal charges.” State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 487
(Iowa 2015). We review a district court’s interpretation of Iowa Code section
804.20 for errors at law. Id. at 467. We affirm the court’s ruling on a suppression
4
motion if it “correctly applied the law and substantial evidence supports the
court’s fact-finding.” State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 2011).
III. Analysis
On appeal, Markley phrases the issue: “[W]hether this Deputy undertook
to perform his mandatory duty to inform [Markley] of both the persons he could
call under the statute, and the purposes for which he could make calls under the
statute, when he asked to call someone outside the statute.” Markley also
asserts section 804.20 “requires [officers to] inform the defendant, prior to the
exercise of phone calls, and regardless of the denial of phone calls, of the
arrestee’s right to call a family member or an attorney under the statute.”
We turn to the case law discussing the scope of an officer’s duty under
section 804.20. In State v. Garrity, the court held: “If, as here, the officer turns
down the arrestee’s phone call request because the request is to call someone
not contemplated by the statute, the officer must explain the scope of the
statutory right.” 765 N.W.2d 592, 597-98 (Iowa 2009) (emphasis added) (stating
violations of section 804.20 result in application of the exclusionary rule). One
year later, the court stated the statute’s “guaranteed right is a limited one” and
ruled: “[Section 840.20] does not require a police officer to affirmatively inform
the detainee of his statutory right; however, the peace officer cannot deny the
right exists.” See State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2010) (emphasis
added); see also State v. Lukins, 846 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Iowa 2014) (stating
“section 804.20 does not require a peace officer to inform the detainee of his or
her right to make a telephone call” but “if the detainee suggests calling someone
outside the scope of individuals authorized by the statute, the peace officer, who
5
knows the statutory scope, must clarify to the detainee the scope of individuals to
whom a telephone call may be made.”).1
Despite this case law generally declining to recognize an affirmative duty
and thereby foreclosing his appellate arguments, Markley cites State v. Hellstern,
where ...
circumstances similar to Markley’s circumstances. See State v. Stephens, No. 13-1858,
2015 WL 15969, at *1-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 22, 2015) (declining to suppress evidence
where the detainee was advised he could make telephone calls to “anybody” and made
calls); State v. Nemeth, No. 13-0529, 2014 WL 2884778, at *1-2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 24,
2014) (holding “the officer did not have an affirmative duty to inform a detained person of
the people who may be called or the purposes for which a call may be made” where the
officer allowed the detainee to “make any telephone calls she wanted to, which she did”);
State v. Rieks, No. 10-1703, 2011 WL 5868224, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011)
(noting the officer “never restricted who [the detainee] could call but simply said he could
call ‘somebody’” and rejecting claim the failure to advise the OWI detainee “who could
be called and for what purpose” violated the statute: “Only when an officer turns down a
request for a phone call because the request is to call someone outside the scope of
section 804.20 must the officer explain the scope of the right”); State v. Parra, No. 10-
0601, 2011 WL 3480965, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2011) (holding an OWI detainee
“was not denied her rights under section 804.20” when she “was given the opportunity to
call ‘anyone’”); State v. Fessler, No. 10-0667, 2011 WL 1584886, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App.
Apr. 27, 2011) (stating Garrity held “the officer must explain the scope of the statutory
right” when “the officer turned down the arrestee’s phone call request” and also stating
“neither the statue nor case law support a blanket requirement that an officer advise an
arrestee of all persons that may be called or all purposes for which calls may be made”).
6
See also id. at 365 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (stating section 804.20 is
not intended to be used as “a trap for the state”). In contrast to the facts in
Hellstern, the ... ruling also is supported by State v. Lyon, where Lyon
had asked the court “to go well beyond our case law” and “require
. Hellstern saw Officer Dyer typing on his
computer keyboard during the phone conversation, perhaps taking
notes. Hellstern asked for privacy during the call, saying to Officer Dyer,
“Can I have a moment with my attorney?” Officer Dyer first told
Hellstern no, but then said, “You can, but . . . Not on the phone.” Later
during the same phone call with Keller, Hellstern asked Officer Dyer for
“attorney–client privilege.” Officer Dyer responded, “Not on the phone.”
5
Officer Dyer knew Hellstern had a right to consult confidentially with his
lawyer at the jail, but stopped short of telling Hellstern because “he
didn’t ask.” Officer Dyer did not believe section 804.20 required him to
“tell the detainee that an attorney can come down to the jail” for a
confidential conference. If Officer Dyer had informed him of that option,
Hellstern contends he “would have asked [Keller] to come down and talk
to [him]” at the jail.
At one point during the phone call, Officer Dyer left the room for
about forty-five seconds. Otherwise, he remained within earshot and
could hear Hellstern’s side of the conversation. Officer Dyer followed the
“normal procedure” at the jail to remain in the staff room with Hellstern
during the phone call. He cited “safety reasons,” noting there were
objects in the room, and “to cover ourselves, we always stay close to the
person. So if they were to try to harm themselves or do other things, we
could stop them immediately.” Officer Dyer acknowledged Hellstern
“never got aggressive or belligerent with him” and did nothing to suggest
“he was a safety concern to himself or others.”
After the call, Hellstern again attempted without success to contact
an attorney from the Gourley firm. In total, Hellstern made fourteen
phone calls, left five voice mails, sent one text message, and received a
single phone call from attorney Keller. At approximately 3:18 a.m.,
Hellstern indicated he did not want to make any additional phone calls.
When asked, he agreed that Officer Dyer had not hindered him from
making any calls he wished to make.
Officer Dyer then asked Hellstern yet again if he would take the
Breathalyzer test. Hellstern asked to use the restroom. Officer Dyer
indicated Hellstern could use the restroom after the test, but Hellstern
argued and said he could not wait to use the restroom. Officer Dyer
6
reiterated that he could use the restroom once he had made a decision
on the test and completed the test if he chose to take it. After
approximately fifteen minutes of discussing Hellstern’s need to use the
restroom, Hellstern told Officer Dyer he would consent to the test
because Officer Dyer was making him. Officer Dyer repeated that it was
Hellstern’s decision to either consent or refuse and that he could use the
restroom once the decision was made and the test was completed.
Hellstern consented to the test, checked the consent box, and signed the
form at approximately 3:36 a.m. Hellstern took the Breathalyzer test at
that time.
After the test, Officer Dyer offered to take Hellstern to the
restroom, but Hellstern said he wanted to wait to see the results of the
test. The test showed his blood alcohol concentration was 0.194%, more
than double the legal limit for intoxication (.08%). When asked if the
results surprised him, Hellstern replied, “no.”
Officer Dyer read Hellstern the notice of revocation and provided
him with a copy of his test results. Hellstern was charged with OWI, first
offense, and was issued a warning for the improper use of lanes. His
vehicle was impounded, and Officer Dyer took his driver’s license.
Hellstern filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence and argued,
in part, that Officer Dyer violated Iowa Code section 804.20 by failing to
notify Hellstern that he had the right to consult privately with his
attorney if the attorney met with him in person, as opposed to on the
telephone and that Officer Dyer had violated Hellstern’s rights under the
Sixth Amendment and Iowa Constitution by failing to provide him
privacy for his phone conversation with attorney Keller. That motion was
denied by the district court, which concluded there is no “affirmative
obligation on the officer to notify any defendant that they have the right
7
to request that their attorney come to the jail.” The district court also
denied Hellstern’s motion to reconsider, ruling no right to counsel had
attached under the Sixth Amendment or Iowa Constitution at the time of
the chemical testing.
The case against Hellstern proceeded to a stipulated trial on the
minutes of evidence. Hellstern was found guilty of OWI, first offense;
sentenced to one year in jail, with all but three days suspended; and
fined $1250. Hellstern appealed, and we retained his appeal to decide
whether his statutory or constitutional right to counsel had been
violated.
II. Standard of Review.
“The district court’s interpretation of Iowa Code section 804.20 is
reviewed for errors at law.” State v. Walker ... constitutional claims. See Simmons v.
State Pub. Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 73–74 (Iowa 2010).
We begin our analysis with the text of Iowa Code section 804.20,
which provides:
8
Any peace officer or other person having custody of
any person arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for
any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without
unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to
call, consult, and see a member of the person’s family or an
attorney of the person’s choice, or both. Such person shall
be permitted to make a reasonable number of telephone calls
as may be required to secure an attorney. If a call is made, it
shall be made in the presence of the person having custody of
the one arrested or restrained. If such person is intoxicated,
or a person under eighteen years of age, the call may be
made by the person having custody. An attorney shall be
permitted to see and consult confidentially with such person
alone and in private at the jail or other place of custody
without unreasonable delay. A violation of this section shall
constitute a simple misdemeanor.
(Emphasis added.)
In State v. Vietor, we observed Iowa Code section 755.17, now
section 804.20, provides for “a limited statutory right to counsel before
making the important decision to take or refuse the chemical test under
implied consent procedures.” 261 N.W.2d. 828, 831 (Iowa 1978).1 As we
noted in Walker,
[t]he arrestee’s intoxication impairs his judgment as well as
his driving ability. Such individuals must make a stressful
and time-sensitive decision whether to take or decline the
evidentiary breath test—a choice with significant
consequences for their criminal liability and driving
privileges.
804 N.W.2d at 291. “ ‘The legislative purpose of section 804.20 is to
afford detained suspects the opportunity to communicate with a family
member and [an] attorney.’ ” Id. at 290 (quoting State v. Hicks, 791
N.W.2d 89, 95 (Iowa 2010)). In Hicks, we concluded “the best way to
1The time for consultation is limited by the need to conduct chemical testing
within two hours after defendant stopped driving. See Iowa Code § 321J.2(12)(a)
(providing alcohol concentration established from specimen withdrawn within two
hours of driving will be presumed to be the concentration at the time of driving);
Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 290 (“The time for consultation is, however, effectively limited by
law enforcement’s interest in obtaining the test within two hours of the defendant’s
driving in order to preserve the [statutory] presumption . . . .”).
9
further this statutory purpose is to liberally construe a suspect’s
invocation of this right.” 791 N.W.2d at 95.
Section 804.20 requires police to allow the arrestee “to make a
reasonable number of telephone calls as may be required to secure an
attorney.” Iowa Code § 804.20. The statute, by its terms, affords no
privacy to a person in custody during a phone call to their attorney. See
id. (“If a call is made, it shall be made in the presence of the person
having custody of the one arrested or restrained.”).2 “Indeed, ‘the
telephone calls which section 804.20 assures to persons in custody are
not intended to be confidential as is shown by the provision that they are
to be made in the presence of the custodian.’ ” Walker, 804 N.W.2d at
291 (quoting State v. Craney, 347 N.W.2d 668, 678–79 (Iowa 1984)
(concluding defendant’s statement, “I killed my baby,” is admissible when
made in phone call to attorney that an officer overheard during booking
process because no attorney–client privilege protects statements made in
the presence of a third person)).
By contrast, the statute expressly provides a right to a confidential
consultation between an attorney and client at the jail to be conducted
“alone and in private.” Iowa Code § 804.20; Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 291.3
“[T]he ‘right of privacy between attorney and client is well recognized and
jealously guarded’ during jailhouse consultations.” Id. (quoting State v.
Coburn, 315 N.W.2d 742, 748 (Iowa 1982)).
2The district court ruled that section “804.20 is clear that the officer is not
required to provide privacy to someone who’s on the telephone.” Hellstern concedes ... of section
804.20.
Id.4 (citation omitted).
We applied the Didonato disclosure rule in State v. Garrity, 765
N.W.2d 592, 597 (Iowa 2009). Garrity, arrested for OWI (third offense),
asked the officer at the jail to call a narcotics officer. Id. at 594. Garrity
4We affirmed Didonato’s license revocation because he was allowed to phone his
sister, an attorney, before he provided his urine specimen for chemical testing.
Didonato, 456 N.W.2d at 371.
11
hoped he could broker a deal to reveal information about a drug
operation in exchange for a promise of no jail time for his OWI. Id. The
arresting officer informed Garrity he could call the narcotics officer after
he was released. Id. Garrity argued that once he had requested a phone
call the officer had a duty to advise him of the scope of his rights to a
phone call under section 804.20. Id. We concluded, “If, as here, the
officer turns down the arrestee’s phone call request because the request
is to call someone not contemplated in the statute, the officer must
explain the scope of the statutory right.” Id. at 597.
We revisited the arresting officer’s statutory obligations under
section 804.20 in Hicks. Hicks was arrested for OWI and made repeated
requests at the police station to phone his mother, stating he wanted a
ride home. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 92. The officer denied his requests,
and Hicks ultimately refused the Breathalyzer test. Id. He moved to
suppress evidence of his test refusal. Id. The district court denied his
motion, and Hicks was convicted of OWI (second offense) after a jury
trial. Id. We reversed his conviction and remanded the case for a new
trial on grounds he was denied his statutory right to place a phone call to
a family member. Id. at 98. We said this about the proper balance to be
struck between the detainee’s statutory rights and law enforcement:
By providing detainees this statutory right, the legislature
has deemed that a detainee’s right to communicate with
family or counsel to be a tolerable burden upon law
enforcement and suitably balances the state’s law
enforcement needs with the right of the accused.
Id. at 95. We noted that “[b]ecause of the disparity in power between
detaining officers and detained suspects during the detention process,”
section 804.20 “requires law enforcement to take affirmative action to
ensure the request for a phone call is honored.” Id. at 97.
12
The legislature did not amend section 804.20 in response to the
Didonato, Garrity, or Hicks decisions. We can infer by its silence that the
legislature acquiesced in our consistent interpretations of the disclosure
obligations in this statute dating back to our Didonato decision in 1990.
See Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Iowa
2013) (concluding legislature acquiesced in repeated judicial
interpretations spanning many years that punitive damages are not
recoverable under Iowa Civil Rights Act). Moreover, “[w]e are slow to
depart from stare decisis and only do so under the most cogent
circumstances.” Id.
In Walker, we reiterated that “section 804.20 ‘is to be applied in a
pragmatic manner, balancing the rights of the arrestee and the goals of
the chemical-testing statutes.’ ” 804 N.W.2d at 291 (quoting State v.
Tubbs, 690 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Iowa 2005)). We read section 804.20
“together with the implied-consent provisions of Iowa Code chapter
321J.” Id. at 290. “ ‘[W]e have continuously affirmed that the primary
objective of the implied consent statute is the removal of dangerous and
intoxicated drivers from Iowa’s roadways in order to safeguard the
traveling public.’ ” Id. (quoting Welch v Iowa Dep’t of Transp., 801
N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2011)). We must strike the proper balance in this
case, examining our precedent under both section 804.20 and the
implied-consent provisions of chapter 321J.
We most recently summarized an officer’s disclosure duties under
section 804.20 as follows:
Iowa Code section 804.20 does not require a peace officer to
inform the detainee of his or her right to make a telephone
call. In Garrity, we observed nevertheless that a detainee
may be aware he or she has a right to make a telephone call;
however, the detainee may be unaware that a statute limits
to whom such a call may be made. For that reason, if the
13
detainee suggests calling someone outside the scope of
individuals authorized by the statute, the peace officer, who
knows the statutory scope, must clarify to the detainee the
scope of individuals to whom a telephone call may be made
under Iowa Code section 804.20. In short, the absence or
shortage of knowledge on the detainee’s part warranted
enabling the detainee to invoke his or her rights by legally
inaccurate requests.
State v. Lukins, 846 N.W.2d 902, 908 (Iowa 2014) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted). In Lukins, the arrestee asked for a “re-check” of his
Breathalyzer test. Id. at 904–05. Iowa Code section 321J.11 allows a
person who submits to a breath test to have an independent blood or
urine test at his own expense, but provides no right to repeat a
Breathalyzer test. Id. at 909–10. We nevertheless held the arrestee’s
imprecise request for a “re-check” adequately invoked his statutory right
to another chemical test. We concluded, based on our cases construing
section 804.20, that “if an imprecise statement, reasonably construed,
implicates the statute, then the officer should inform the detainee of his
or her right to an independent chemical test under Iowa Code section
321J.11.” Id. at 909.5
Thus, under Didonato, Garrity, and Lukins, the arrestee’s specific
request was beyond the scope of the statutory right. We nevertheless
held the request could be reasonably construed as invoking a right
conferred by the statute and, thereby, triggering the officer’s duty to
explain to the arrestee what he was allowed to do. Similarly, in this case,
Hellstern unequivocally
alleged violations of constitutional rights de novo. State
v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1997). We make an independent
evaluation of the totality of circumstances shown by the entire record.
Id.
“[W]e review the defendant’s challenge of the district court’s
interpretation of Iowa Code section 804.20 for correction of errors at
law.” State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Iowa 2015). We will
affirm a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress when the court
correctly applied the law and there is substantial evidence to support the
court’s fact-finding. State v. Hellstern, 856 ... . Ultimately, the State charged Lyon with operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated (OWI), second offense, in ... argument under the
state constitutional provision.
The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. The
invoke the rights available under the statute.
Thus, in State v. Meissner, we held,
An arrested person has the right under section 804.20, The
Code, to consult an attorney. There was no requirement
here that the defendant be told of this right by the officer. It
was only required that any such request be honored.
315 N.W.2d 738, 740 (Iowa 1982). Otherwise stated, the statutory
language requiring law enforcement to “permit” an arrestee to call,
consult, and see an attorney does not require law enforcement to inform
the arrestee of that right, let alone mandate that such a consultation
take place.
Then, in a series of cases beginning with Didonato v. Iowa
Department of Transportation, 456 N.W.2d 367, 371 (Iowa 1990), we
made clear that attempts by defendants to invoke rights under Iowa Code
2Walker relied in part on two out-of-state decisions, one of which involved a
denial of an attorney’s request and the other of which involved secret taping. In People
v. Dehmer, the Colorado Court of Appeals found that the video surveillance violated that
state’s statutory privacy requirements for prison consultations. 931 P.2d 460, 463
(Colo. App. 1996). The statute at issue said that those in custody must be permitted to
see and consult with an attorney “alone and in private.” Id. Although defense counsel
had requested the camera be shut off or another room be provided for the meeting,
prison officials refused the request. Id. at 462. In the other case, the Vermont Supreme
Court found that law enforcement “violated defendant’s right to a private consultation
with his lawyer by taping the conversation. The tape itself [was] evidence that
defendant’s conversation with counsel was not, in fact, private.” State v. Sherwood, 800
A.2d 463, 466 (Vt. 2002). In Sherwood, neither the defendant nor presumably his
counsel at the other end of the phone line knew the conversation was being recorded.
Id. at 464–65. Neither of those circumstances—failure to honor an attorney request or
a surreptitious recording—is present here.
12
section 804.20 should be broadly construed, but without abandoning the
concept that some effort to invoke the statute must be made. Hence, in
Didonato, we said in dicta that when an arrested person asks to
telephone a friend, the statutory purpose of section 804.20 is not met “if
the officer stands mute” and does not advise “for what purpose a phone
call is permitted under the statute.” Id. at 371.
One exception to this trend was Tubbs. See 690 N.W.2d at 913.
There the defendant had asked to speak with his wife before deciding
whether to consent to chemical testing. Id. One of the officers, however,
recalled that Tubbs had a judicial no-contact order in place regarding his
wife, and therefore did not allow Tubbs to call her. Id. Tubbs argued on
appeal that evidence of his refusal to consent to the chemical test should
have been excluded. Id. at 914. We disagreed, noting “Tubbs failed to
ask to talk to an attorney or to anyone besides his wife,” and “[u]nder
these circumstances, the officers fulfilled their responsibility under
section 804.20.” Id.
In State v. Garrity, 765 N.W.2d 592, 596–97 (Iowa 2009), though,
we squarely held that once an arrestee asks to make a phone call, the
officer has an obligation to advise the arrestee the persons to whom calls
can be made. We said,
People may be aware they have the right to a phone call, but
are likely unaware of the specified people they are allowed to
call. If, as here, the officer turns down the arrestee’s phone
call request because the request is to call someone not
contemplated in the statute, the officer must explain the
scope of the statutory right.
Id. at 597. We distinguished Tubbs on the ground “there was no
confusion [in Tubbs] that triggered the duty to clarify the scope of the
persons who may be called.” Id. at 596.
13
We adhered to the same approach in Hellstern. See ... testing.
See id.
Most recently, in State v. Lyon, 862 N.W.2d 391, 401 (Iowa 2015),
we held that Iowa Code section 804.20 does not impose a duty on police
to explain to an arrestee why he should obtain legal advice. In that case,
Lyon was told of his section 804.20 right to call a family member or
attorney. Id. at 399. He then inquired about the purpose for making a
call: “I’m gonna call someone first to get out of here, correct?” Id. The
officer replied that if Lyon wanted to bond out, “that’s your prerogative of
14
these phone calls.” Id. Lyon asserted that the officer’s response was
“misleading” in that officers should be required to tell persons in custody
that the purpose of the calls is to get advice about whether to take a
chemical test. Id. We declined to adopt such a suppression rule because
“[w]e do not believe law enforcement officers must help shape the nature
of the communication with attorneys and family members once they have
honored the accused’s right to communicate with such individuals.” Id.
at 401. We noted that the officer had not made a misstatement of law or
undermined the defendant’s rights, and he had “plainly honored” the
defendant’s section 804.20 to make phone calls. Id. at 401.
While Lyon held that law enforcement need not inform an arrestee
of the preferred reasons for making a call to a family member or an
attorney, we have found that law enforcement may not interfere with an
arrestee’s efforts to place such a call just because they believe his or her
stated reasons for the call lack “good faith” or are “futile.” See Hicks, 791
N.W.2d at 96. In Hicks, we held that the state violated Iowa Code section
804.20 by denying the defendant a reasonable opportunity to call his
mother after he had asked to do so, even though the defendant’s mother
presumably would not have been able to “come get [him]” as the
defendant desired. Id.
Unlike circumstances where we have granted relief in the past, the
present case does not involve law enforcement’s refusal to honor an
arrestee’s or an attorney’s direct assertion of Iowa Code section 804.20
rights. Cf. Walker, 804 N.W.2d at 296; Hicks, 791 N.W.2d at 96. Nor
does it involve law enforcement’s failure to clarify the scope of section
804.20 rights to an arrestee whose requests indicated he may well have
wanted to exercise those rights but did not know what rights the statute
afforded. Cf. Hellstern, 856 ... “legally inaccurate requests.” See State v. Lukins, 846 N.W.2d
902, 908 (Iowa 2014) (summarizing caselaw under Iowa
State of Iowa vs. Zachariah J. Rogerson No. 13–0496 Alta Vista Properties, LLC vs. Mauer Vision Center, PC No. 13–0253 Shelby County Cookers, L.L.C., an Iowa Limited Liability Company vs. Utility Consultants International, Inc., a Michigan Corporation No. 12–1065 Amended January 29, 2015 State of Iowa vs. Jabari Lamar Walker No. 13–0888 In the Interest of D.S., Minor Child. D.S., Minor Child No. 13–1228 State of Iowa vs. David Joseph Hellstern No. 14–0806 In the Interest of A.M., Minor Child. Heather Thomas ... , & A, Inc. vs. Joseph A. Polaschek and Michael J. Meloy No. 13–1502 Amended June 30, 2015 City of Sioux City vs. Michael Jon Jacobsma No. 14–1596 Amended February 26, 2015 in the Matter of Douglas A. Krull, Judicial Magistrate. On Application of the Iowa No. 13–1403 Amended May 7, 2015 State of Iowa vs. Max V. Thorndike No. 13–1872 Amended June 5, 2015 Steven A. Mueller, Bradley J. Brown, Mark A. Kruse, Kevin D. Miller, and Larry E. Phipps, on Behalf of Themselves and Those Like Situated vs. Wellmark, Inc ... , Subpoenaed Witness No. 12–0729 Amended February 10, 2015 State of Iowa vs. Patrick Michael Dudley No. 12–1633 Amended February 23, 2015 State of Iowa vs. Matthew Eugene Brown No. 12–2264 Amended February 23, 2015 State of Iowa vs. Jose Fernando Jaquez Sr. No. 13–0060 Amended February 23, 2015 Luana Savings Bank vs. Pro-Build Holdings, Inc. and United Building Centers No. 13–1285 Amended February 23, 2015 Rosauer Corporation vs. Sapp Development, L.L.C.; Todd Sapp; Whispering Creek, L.L.C.; and W.C