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If you are 18 or older, you can ask for protection for: Yourself from an intimate partner or family member with a “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse.” Your child who is under age 18 whose intimate partner is harming the child with a “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Minor.” A child who is legally in your care, sometimes called a “ward” or “protected person,” who is harmed by the person’s intimate partner or family member with a “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Ward.”

Guide for information on how to file at https://www.iowacourts.gov/static/static/media/cms/E0002_569890E51EF7C.pdf. If you cannot file electronically, you may go to your county courthouse for help with filing your Petition. There are three Petitions, and you must use the correct Petition for you or the person you are helping: If you need protection for yourself, use the “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse.” If you want to protect your minor child, use the “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Minor.” If you want to protect your ward or a person legally in your care, use the “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Ward.” ... To ask the court for help, prepare a “Petition” and file it with the Iowa District Court. To prepare a Petition, there are free court forms on the Iowa Judicial Branch website at (https://www.iowacourts.gov/for-the-public/court-forms/). The free court forms are also available from the clerk of court office at the courthouse in the county where you live. You may file your Petition electronically from your personal computer. If you file electronically, see the Iowa Judicial Branch eFile User

dismissal of her pro se petition for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Jennifer Cerutti, Sioux ... 11, 2007, Amber Abbenhaus filed a pro se petition for relief from domestic abuse naming Lucas Flannegan as the ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Nancy L. Whittenburg, Judge. Plaintiff appeals the

final domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. Stephen B. Jackson, Cedar Rapids, for appellant. Kara L. McFadden, Cedar Rapids, for appellee. Considered by Eisenhauer, P.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ. 2 EISENHAUER, P.J. Thomas and Dana Wolfe married in October 2007 and are the parents of a two-year-old daughter. In early June 2010, the couple lived with Thomas’s parents. Dana testified on June 12, 2010, Thomas pushed her and grabbed their daughter from her as Dana was attempting to put the child in a car seat. Dana called the police. The police officer testified Dana did not “prove or show any marks of physical abuse,” and he did not file criminal charges. Dana testified that after the police left, Thomas was physically intimidating and made threatening statements. On June 17, 2010, Dana’s attorney notarized Dana’s petition for relief from ... abuse; it was subsequently filed, and a temporary protective order was entered on June 21. See Iowa Code § 236.3 (2009). Dana’s petition acknowledged Thomas had filed for divorce on June 14, alleged Thomas physically abused and threatened her, and stated she feared for her physical safety. On July 1, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on Dana’s petition. Thomas testified and directly contradicted Dana’s testimony: (1) he did not assault Dana and (2) he did not argue with and threaten Dana after the police officer left. Thomas’s parents and the police officer testified, but none of them saw the incident at the car. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, Thomas committed a domestic abuse assault against Dana, and Thomas “represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [Dana].” The court entered a final domestic abuse 3 protective order prohibiting Thomas from having any contact with Dana, effective until July 1, 2011. See id. § 236.5(2). Thomas appeals the court’s order arguing: “The trial court erred in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Thomas committed a domestic abuse assault against Dana.” We review civil domestic abuse cases de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). “Respectful consideration is given to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but not to the extent where those holdings are binding upon us.” Id. Because this is a civil proceeding, Dana’s burden is to prove the occurrence of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 596. “In order to prove domestic abuse, sufficient facts of assault must be alleged.” Id. See Iowa Code § 708.1. After our de novo review of the record and after giving weight to the trial court’s ability to see the witnesses and determine credibility, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence an assault occurred. The issue can only be resolved by evaluating the credibility of the testimony of Dana and Thomas. She says he shoved her; he says he did not. The trial court found he did. We defer to the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm. Thomas also argues this court should modify the protective order to permit the district court, in the dissolution of marriage action, to enter orders regarding the custody of the parties’ child. We note the supreme court on December 10, 2010, entered an order stating the issues relating to child custody are collateral to this appeal and the district court retained jurisdiction. 4 Dana requests $3000 in appellate attorney fees, which are discretionary. See Iowa Code § 236.5(3). We decline to award attorney fees. Costs are taxed to Thomas. AFFIRMED. Tabor, J., concurs; Potterfield, J., dissents. 5 POTTERFIELD, J. (dissenting) I respectfully dissent and would reverse the finding of domestic abuse. In so doing, I appreciate that an experienced district court judge heard the testimony and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses. I acknowledge this court is to give “respectful consideration” to the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the district court. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). However, the form orders used by the district court supply only a bare minimum finding of fact (“Respondent committed a domestic abuse assault”) and a quasi-determination of credibility (“Respondent represents a credible threat”), leaving this court with very little to which we can defer. The form orders do not allow for meaningful findings, and the order on appeal does not reveal which of the disputed facts were persuasive or which of the witnesses were credible. After a de novo review of the record, including the sequence of events emphasized by the respondent, I am convinced the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of domestic abuse. The police officer who spoke to Dana, Thomas, and Thomas’s mother immediately after the incident testified he saw no basis for filing a criminal charge that evening, primarily because he saw “no physical marks of reddening” resulting from the “violent push” described by Dana. He testified he believed Thomas when he said he did not push Dana. Thomas’s father testified he witnessed the event from the kitchen door. He saw Thomas and Dana on opposite sides of the open car door and saw Thomas turn around with Maya in his arms. He did not see an assault, but he did see the two parents at the car where Dana said the assault occurred. Thomas’s 6 father testified that he and Dana sat on the porch and talked “at length” after Thomas took the child into the house. Dana did not mention any shove or physical assault to her father-in-law immediately after Thomas removed Maya from the car. Dana returned to the house and spoke with her mother-in-law, who testified that although Dana “tells [her] everything,” Dana did not mention she had been pushed. Dana remained in the home the rest of the night and waited to file her petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas Horan, Judge. Husband appeals the court’s entry of a

their petitions for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Rhoda M. Tenuta of Legal Services Corp. of Iowa, Sioux City, for appellant. Tamera Peterson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, pro se appellee. Kirby Peterson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, pro se appellee. Christopher Price, Sioux City, Iowa, pro se appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, J. I. Background Facts and Proceedings A. Taylor v. Tamera Peterson and Taylor v. Kirby Peterson On September 22, 2009, Barbara Taylor filed two pro se petitions for relief from domestic abuse. She used the standard forms required for petitions for relief from domestic abuse. The named defendants were Tamera Peterson, Taylor‟s daughter, and Kirby Peterson, Tamera‟s husband. The petitions did not state clearly the relationships among the parties, although Taylor checked the box for “Lived together within one year of the assault, but not at the time of the assault,” a relationship qualifying for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2009).1 In her petition against ... rescind the orders dismissing her petitions for relief from domestic abuse and enter orders setting hearings on her petitions. On September 28, 2009, the district court denied Taylor‟s motion, stating that since it was required to use a form order approved by the supreme court to grant an ex parte temporary protective order, it was expected to “perform a valid gateway function in determining whether matters brought before it pursuant to Chapter 236 are advanced.” B. Snyder v. Price On October 13, 2009, Megan Snyder filed a pro se petition for ... the assault, a relationship qualifying for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236. In her narrative, Snyder asserted that on October 10, 2009, Price held the parties‟ eight-month-old child in his arms “bouncing her head around while freaking out.” She further stated that Price called the police and continued “[s]creaming and shaking [the child‟s] head around while the cop was there.” She alleged that this incident occurred in front of her other child who was six years old at the time. On October 13, 2009, the district court issued an order denying temporary relief and dismissing the petition. The

. http://www.iowacourts.gov/ PETITIONS FOR RELIEF FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE, ELDER ABUSE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE If you wish to file a petition for ... relief from domestic abuse, elder abuse, or sexual abuse, please call the Clerk of Court’s office ... for TODAY? If “YES,” for admittance to the courthouse, call the Clerk of Court’s office at: _______________ You

celebrated his first birthday in March of 2009. On November 18, 2009, Niki filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse alleging ... in her petition for relief. She further acknowledged that the birthday party was in March of 2009 and she did not seek any relief from that alleged event. Niki’s sister, Kristy Kappelman, testified she saw Jeffrey shake her sister at the birthday party but had not seen similar behavior since. Heidi Lohne, also Niki’s sister, testified she saw Jeffrey grab Niki by her arms and jerk her. Jeffrey testified. He denied he threatened to pull Niki by her hair. He said he had not thrown things in Niki’s direction, or made threats that indicated his intention to hurt Niki, nor did he shake her at their son’s birthday party. Jeffrey’s mother testified that she had not heard Niki express any fear of Jeffrey and while at the birthday party, did not see Jeffrey put his hands on Niki. Kenneth Robertson, Jeffrey’s father, who is part of the Ringgold County Sheriff’s Posse, testified he was at the birthday party and Jeffrey and Niki interacted as a loving couple, he had no concern about Jeffrey’s behavior, and did not see Jeffrey put his hands on his wife and shake her but they did hug. Following the close of the testimony the district court made oral findings. Noting that the testimony about the birthday party incident was conflicting, the court found there was more credible testimony the incident occurred and it would 4 constitute an assault under Iowa Code section 708.1. The court concluded the alleged hair pulling incident was more a verbal altercation and that the evidence did not support a finding domestic abuse assault ... 708.1(1) or (2). The court specifically found Jeffery had committed domestic abuse assault and he represents a credible threat to the physical safety of Niki and the court entered the protective order. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Civil domestic abuse cases are heard in equity and, thus, deserve a de novo review. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001); see Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We review the record in its entirety and formulate our own opinion. In re Marriage of Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Iowa 1998) (“We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented.”). Respectful consideration is given to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but those findings are not binding upon us. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. DID TWO ASSAULTS OCCUR? Jeffrey’s contention is that there is no evidence to support a finding that an assault or assaults occurred. He contends the district court erred in concluding that he committed domestic abuse at the birthday party. He contends that Niki’s testimony and that of her two sisters did not provide substantial information as to where in the home and at what point in the birthday party the incident occurred. He notes that his parents testified they 5 witnessed no such incident and his father testified Niki and Jeffrey were loving towards each other at the birthday party and that they provided a description of Niki’s home. He argues it is implausible such an incident could occur without more people seeing it happen, given the fact the home where the party was held was small and there were a number of people there. Jeffrey asks why, if it were as serious as Niki claimed, she did not call the police or report the incident before the day of the hearing and why she failed to mention the incident in her petition for relief from

abuse. He also contends the district court erred in admitting the testimony of a licensed social worker concerning information obtained in counseling sessions. We find the issues moot as the protective order has expired and dismiss the case. I. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Civil domestic abuse cases are heard in equity, consequently we review de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001); Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). II. BACKGROUND. In the parties’ dissolution decree primary physical care of their daughter, Sydney, was placed with Katherine, and Ricky was granted visitation. On August 29, 2006, Ricky, following a visitation period, dropped Sydney off at Katherine’s home, and as he was hugging her good-bye he told her he was looking forward to the upcoming Labor Day weekend as Sydney was scheduled for a visit with him then. Katherine, who believed Sydney was to be with her Labor Day weekend, in front of Sydney and with no apparent concern for Sydney’s feelings, immediately started arguing with Ricky. Katherine contended that she and Ricky had an agreement that she was to have Sydney then. The child understandably became upset. What happened next is a bit confusing as Ricky, Katherine, and Sydney are not in agreement as to the events. It does appear that Katherine 3 either attempted to put a hand out to Sydney or she pushed Ricky and Ricky then either, according to his testimony, pushed Katherine’s hand away, or, according to Katherine’s testimony, smacked her hand. Ricky left. Katherine called the police. Sydney, understandably upset by her parents’ behavior, called her father and told him her mother was calling the police. Ricky was ultimately arrested for domestic abuse assault. He pled guilty to disorderly conduct and the domestic abuse assault charge was dismissed. On August 31, 2006, Katherine filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, James Q. Blomgren, Judge. Ricky L ... , L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellant. Theodore F. Sporer and Meghan S. Hanson of Sporer & Flanagan, P.C., Des Moines, for

Iowa District Court for Woodbury County for relief from domestic abuse, pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2011), against her former husband, Ted Ball. She gave a mailing address in Sioux City, Iowa, and also stated Ted’s address was in Sioux City. Although the parties were divorced in 2005, they had been living together until they separated at some point prior to the present proceedings. The case proceeded to a hearing on January 19, 2011. Under oath, Toby testified her address was in Sioux City, Iowa. Toby testified to an incident on May 15, 2010, where she alleged Ted punched her in the nose and mouth, causing bleeding. She asserted this occurred in their vehicle as they were driving to their home in Homer, Nebraska. She also testified to an incident which occurred on January 1, 2011, where Ted shoved her into a shelf at their home in Nebraska. At the close of Toby’s testimony, Ted made an oral motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds. He pointed out that both of the incidents of alleged abuse occurred in Nebraska. He also asserted that Toby lived in Nebraska, rather than Iowa. He pointed out that in her petition Toby ... court should have granted his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because no acts of domestic abuse occurred in Iowa and both parties resided in Nebraska. Our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is for the correction of errors at law. Duder v. Shanks, 689 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Iowa 2004). The court’s factual findings are binding on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. The reviewing court is not bound, however, by the court’s conclusions of law. Id. In Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 2001), the wife alone had moved to Iowa, and the husband lived in another state when she filed a petition for a protective order. The case does not mention any incidents of domestic abuse that occurred in Iowa. The court concluded Iowa courts did not have 4 personal jurisdiction over the defendant but could enter a protective order against him. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 6. The supreme court stated: We believe the district court’s finding of insufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence . . . . Nevertheless, we affirm the legal conclusion by the district court that, under these circumstances, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is not required for a court to enter an order preserving the protected status afforded Iowa residents under chapter 236. Id. The court noted “[t]he interstate nature of many abusive relationships, and the concomitant need for protection extending beyond the borders of a particular state.” Id. at 9. Based upon the ruling in Bartsch, the district court did not lack authority to issue a protective order when the incidents of domestic abuse took place outside of Iowa even without personal jurisdiction over Ted. In addition, section 236.3(1) provides, “A person, including a parent or guardian on behalf of an unemancipated minor, may seek relief from ... abuse by filing a verified petition in the district court. Venue shall lie where either party resides.” We also observe Bartsch held that an Iowa court could enter “an order protecting a resident Iowa family from abuse.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). In her petition Toby gave her address and that of Ted as being in Sioux City, Iowa. Furthermore, at the hearing, when asked for her address Toby gave an address in Sioux City, Iowa. Also, when Ted was asked for his mailing address, he testified he currently had an address in Sioux City, Iowa. While there was evidence the parties had previously lived in Homer, Nebraska, the district court could properly find the parties were currently residing in Iowa. Given the fact both parties gave an Iowa address, the court could conclude Iowa was the proper venue for Toby’s petition for relief from

. 1 Mummau’s petition for postconviction relief from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse was denied by the district court and on appeal. See Mummau v. State, No. 16- 1909, 2017 WL 3535294, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017). 3 Kraus’s deposition in the civil action was taken on October 3, 2013. Her attorney stated evidence of Kraus’s sexual conduct with persons other than Mummau, the person who committed the sexual abuse, was not subject to discovery under section 668.15, and instructed Kraus not to answer questions on the issue. Mummau’s attorney stated, “[W]e’ll move on and deal with it later.” Kraus was asked if she had been the defendant in any civil suits. She was not questioned about whether she had been a plaintiff in a civil action or had filed any complaints against anyone other than Mummau for sexual improprieties. The district court determined Mummau’s conviction for third-degree sexual abuse was res judicata as to all elements of sexual battery and sexual abuse, except for the issue of damages. Mummau waived his right to a jury trial and a trial to the court was held in April 2014. On May 8, 2014, the district court found Kraus had been diagnosed with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder after the incident. The court awarded Kraus $153,750 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages, for a total of $163,750. Mummau did not appeal the district court’s decision. On April 27, 2015, Mummau filed a petition to vacate the judgment, pursuant to rule 1.1012(2) (irregularity or fraud), (5) (unavoidable casualty), and (6) (newly discovered evidence). He claimed Kraus’s deposition testimony in August 2011 was untruthful because on April 2, 1996, she filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse ... filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse from her boyfriend, Irons, which included allegations of sexual ... extrinsic fraud and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition to vacate the civil judgment

appeals from a domestic abuse protective order entered under Iowa Code section 236.5 (2001). AFFIRMED. Jessica A. Millage of Sporer & Flanagan, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant. Stacey N. Warren of Babich & Goldman, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Doyle, J., and Miller, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2011). 2 MILLER, S.J. Michael Abarr appeals from the district court’s final domestic abuse protective order, entered under Iowa Code section 236.5 (2011), finding he committed domestic abuse against his wife, Sheri Abarr. He contends: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AN ASSAULT OCCURRED AND THEREFORE IN ENTERING THE FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER. I. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Citing Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994), Michael asserts our review is de novo. Also citing Knight, Sheri points out that our review is determined by the how the matter was tried in the district court, asserts the court ruled on objections, and concludes our review is thus for correction of errors at law. Our review of those portions of the hearing transcript included in the appendix shows that on two occasions early in the domestic abuse hearing the trial court reserved ruling on objections by stating that the proposed answers would be received “subject to the objection.” These two rulings are consistent with a trial in equity. However, those same portions of the transcript show that on three prior occasions and twelve subsequent occasions the trial court sustained or overruled objections, consistent with trial as a law action. As the overwhelming majority of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are consistent with trial as a special action at law, we conclude our review is for correction of errors at law. See, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997) (“This 3 [domestic abuse] case was tried in the district court as a law action. The court ruled on objections as they were made. Our review is therefore at law.”). II. MERITS. Sheri filed a petition for relief from ... to having “poked [Sheri] with my right index finger.” “’Domestic abuse’ means committing assault as defined in ... domestic abuse. The trial court made no finding that these alleged incidents did or did not occur. We therefore focus only

4/14/22 New document type for guardianship and conservatorship cases This document type has been created to use with Adult and Juvenile Guardianship and Conservatorship case types. The COURT VISITOR REPORT is used by a Court Visitor to file a confidential report. 3/25/22 New and Updated Domestic Abuse Forms These forms are for self-represented litigants. Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse (1.78 MB) Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Minor (2.24 MB) Petition for Relief from ... Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Ward (2.24 MB) Protected Information Disclosure Form (542.36 KB) Information Sheet for Protective Order Registry & Service of Protective Orders (1.91 MB) Affidavit to Start Contempt Proceedings (3.40 MB) Request to Cancel or Change a Chapter 236 Protective Order (3.55 MB) Firearms Compliance Affidavit (1.29 MB) Firearms Transfer Affidavit (1.40 MB) 3/25/22 New and Updated Sexual Abuse Forms These forms are for self-represented litigants. Petition for Relief from ... Sexual Abuse (2.14 MB) Petition for Relief from Sexual Abuse on Behalf of a Minor Child (2.23 MB) Petition for Relief from Sexual Abuse on Behalf of a Ward (2.17 MB) Protected Information Disclosure Form (542.36 KB) Information Sheet for Protective Order Registry & Service of Protective Orders (1.91 MB) Affidavit to Start Contempt Proceedings (1.78 MB) Request to Cancel or Change a Chapter 236A Protective Order (1.90 MB) Firearms Compliance Affidavit (1.28 MB) Firearms Transfer Affidavit (1.40 MB) 2/14/22 New and Updated Elder Abuse Forms These forms are for self-represented litigants. Petition for Relief from Elder Abuse 235F (1.78 MB) Protected Information Disclosure (1,015.72 KB) Information Sheet for Protective Order Registry & Service (DAIN Form) (1.91 MB) Affidavit to Start Contempt Proceedings 235F (1.75 MB) Request to Modify, Cancel, or Change a Final Protective Order 235F (1.29 MB) Firearms Compliance Affidavit (1.29 MB) Firearms Transfer Affidavit (1.40 MB) 2/7/22 New Email Address for Courtesy Notifications Effective 2/9/22, email notifications that formerly came from helpdesk@iowacourts.gov will now come from noreply@iowacourts.gov. 1/26/22 Multiple Changes Effective Wednesday, 1/26/22 New and updated document types for abuse cases Three new document types have been established for use with civil and criminal abuse cases: APPLICATION TO MODIFY SEX OFFENDER REGISTRY – 692A.128 FIREARMS COMPLIANCE AFFIDAVIT FIREARMS TRANSFER AFFIDAVIT A new document type was created for use with civil abuse cases: APPLICATION/INITIATE CONTEMPT – ABUSE A document type was renamed because it could be used in any case type where a protective order was issued: New name: INFO SHEET PROTECTIVE/NO CONTACT ORDER REGISTRY/SERVICE Old name: DOMESTIC &

., filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse in October 2009, alleging her husband, R.M., had assaulted her ... the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Constance Cohen, Associate Juvenile Judge. A father appeals the ... termination of his parental rights to his child. AFFIRMED. Edward Bull of Bull Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, for

. Fautsch, Judge. Dale Manders appeals from the district court’s grant of Renee Manders’ petition for relief from domestic violence. AFFIRMED. Robert L. Sudmeier, Jenny L. Harris, and Amanda L. Elkins of Fuerste, Carew, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant. Kimberly C. Roddick of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Danilson, JJ. 2 DANILSON, J. Dale Manders appeals from the district court’s grant of Renee Manders’ petition for relief from domestic violence. Dale argues Renee did not meet her burden of proving that he committed domestic abuse because ... ruling in part on an allegation not listed in Renee’s petition for relief. Upon our de novo review, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion an assault was committed by Dale. We affirm the district court’s entry of a protective order for Renee. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Dale and Renee Manders have been married for eleven years and have no children. Dale is fifty-one years old; Renee is forty-eight years old. Renee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on January 8, 2010. The parties attended marriage counseling, reconciled, and Renee withdrew her petition on April 9, 2010. On July 12, 2010, Dale filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On July 15, 2010, Renee filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse pursuant ... court entered a written order, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Dale committed a domestic abuse assault: [Dale] on a number of occasions committed an act which was intended to place [Renee] in fear of immediate physical contact which could be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. On one occasion Dale restrained Renee on a bed. Recently Dale threw thistles at Renee. The court’s order prohibited Dale from having any contact with Renee. Dale now appeals. 6 II. Scope and Standard of Review. Because this civil domestic abuse case was heard in equity, our review is de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). The allegations of domestic abuse must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We give respectful consideration to the district court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but those holdings are not binding on appeal. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. III. Merits. “Domestic abuse” occurs when a person commits an assault as defined in section 708.1 under certain circumstances, such as assault between family or household members who reside together at the time of the assault. Iowa Code § 236.2(2)(a). Section 708.1 states, in relevant part: A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following: . . . . 2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Dale argues Renee did not meet her burden of proving that he committed domestic abuse because he did not intend to place her in fear, and she “failed to prove a threat, much less an overt act.” Our supreme court announced in State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010), that assault includes an element of specific intent. Specific intent has been defined as: “Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind. Because determining the defendant’s specific intent requires you to decide what the defendant was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you should 7 consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific intent. You may, but are not required to conclude a person intends the natural results of his or her acts. See Iowa Crim. Jury Inst. 200.2 (2004). The intent element required by the statute “may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant.” State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006) (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 128, at 214-15 (1998)); State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 132-33 (Iowa 2004). Renee is assisted in meeting her burden of proof on this element “by the principle that an actor will ordinarily be viewed as intending the natural and probable consequences that usually follow from his or her voluntary act.” Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 132. We acknowledge Dale’s version of some of the events, if believed, would support a dismissal of Renee’s petition. However, Renee also described several events that support granting the petition. We give weight to the district court’s credibility assessments, particularly as it had an opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. Dale concedes he punched the dashboard while irritated with Renee when she was driving a vehicle. Indeed, Renee testified that Dale’s actions in punching the dashboard made her “very afraid” of him. We find this is a natural and probable consequence of someone acting in such a manner. See id. We do not suggest the act of pounding on a vehicle’s dashboard constitutes an assault in every situation, even though such an act may be offensive to other occupants. However, in these circumstances, Dale was irritated with Renee, Dale and Renee were in the midst of an argument, Dale was seated directly beside Renee, 8 and Dale had the apparent ability to commit physical contact upon Renee. The record in this case supports the finding that Dale intended to make Renee fear immediate physical contact when he punched the dashboard while sitting beside her in the car. Dale also acknowledged throwing thistles towards Renee, but contended he did not know she was in his near vicinity. The court was not required to give weight to Dale’s explanation nor do we. Dale’s actions in throwing thistles at Renee causing Renee to be uncomfortable and afraid of Dale, supports the finding that Dale intended to place Renee in fear of physical contact that would be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive. Dale claims the court erred in relying in part on the alleged bedroom incident (in which Dale got on top of Renee and restrained her) because it was not listed in Renee’s petition for relief. On

now married to Annette Kaster. On December 18, 2009, Fettkether filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse against ... Human Services’ (DHS) child abuse findings against Kaster for denial of critical care. She further argues the appellate ... her safety. See Iowa Code § 236.4(1) (“[P]laintiff must prove the allegation of domestic abuse by a preponderance of

final domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. A. Eric Neu of Neu, Minnich, Comito & Neu, P.C., Carroll, for appellant. John P. Loughlin of Loughlin Law Firm, Cherokee, for appellee. Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, J. K.K. appeals from the juvenile court‟s issuance of a final domestic abuse protective order. She contends the district court erred in not dismissing the action, and the juvenile court incorrectly found she had committed a domestic abuse assault against Crouch. The district court was required to “waive its jurisdiction over the action to the juvenile court” pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (Supp. 2009) and had authority to continue the hearing, which was scheduled and commenced within the statutory deadline. Because Crouch proved by a preponderance of the evidence that K.K. committed a domestic abuse assault, we affirm the issuance of the protective order. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On November 1, 2010, Zachary Crouch filed a petition for relief from ... abuse against K.K. alleging that on October 31, I was attack [sic] from behind when taking family picture by [K.K.] when I was knock down to the ground with [B.C.] in my arms, Tanya Webb then took [B.C.] and gave him to [K.K.] and then ran back to the truck and left, she assaulted my sister Ashley Crouch scratch [sic] her arm up and she was hit in the stomach, she is 4 months pregnant. We took pictures of the marks she left the police where [sic] called to the house and took pictures of the marks that were left on [Crouch] and Ashley Crouch. In the petition, Crouch indicated that K.K. was “17 years or younger” and that the plaintiff and defendant were the parents of the same minor. A temporary protective order was entered by Judge David Lester in which he granted temporary custody of B.C. to Crouch. A hearing on Crouch‟s petition was scheduled in the district court on November 15, 2010, before the statutory deadline. 3 K.K. served a motion to dismiss on November 9, 2010, noting she was a seventeen-year-old minor and, [p]ursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (final paragraph), “[i]f the person against whom relief from domestic abuse is sought is seventeen years of age of younger, the district court shall waive its jurisdiction over the action to the juvenile court.” At the November 15, 2010 hearing, K.K.‟s attorney argued there was a statutory time frame in which such hearings must be held; it was “now too late” to have the hearing within the statutory time frame; and “I filed a motion to dismiss because I didn‟t see how jurisdictionally it was going to be able to be transferred to the juvenile court.” The district court stated it would “do what the statute says” and “waive our jurisdiction and to bring this promptly to the attention of the juvenile court.” The district court found the cited terms of section 236.3 were mandatory. It continued the hearing to comply with the requirement that the case be heard in juvenile court. Upon receipt of the district court‟s order, the juvenile court scheduled the continued hearing for November ... Following the hearing on November 30, 2010, the juvenile court entered a final domestic abuse protective order1 on the prescribed form, which contains the pre-printed findings that K.K. was (1) “personally served with the copy of the petition and temporary protective order containing notice of this hearing”; (2) “committed a domestic abuse assault against the protected party named above”; (3) “represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the protected party”; and (4) the parties “meet the definition of intimate partners.” Crouch was granted temporary custody of B.C. and K.K. was granted visitation. K.K. now appeals, contending the district court erred in not dismissing the action and the juvenile court incorrectly found she had committed a domestic abuse assault against Crouch. II. Scope of Review. We review civil domestic abuse cases de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). We give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). III. Merits. A. Relevant legal principles. The domestic abuse chapter, chapter 236 of the Iowa Code, is meant to be protective rather than punitive in nature; it is to be given a reasonable or liberal construction, which would best effect its purpose. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 596. 1 Form 4.2: Protective Order Following Adjudication of Domestic Abuse (Section 236.3 Petition)─Final Domestic Abuse Protection Order. 6 Iowa Code section 236.3 sets forth the procedure for initiating an action for a domestic abuse protection order. The statute lists the identifying information to be contained in the petition and provides further: 1. A person . . . may seek relief from

therapist. 3 In August 2008, Jennifer filed a petition in Polk County for relief from domestic abuse pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2007), alleging Todd had physically and sexually abused her and threatened her safety. A temporary protective order was issued and Jennifer was granted temporary care of the children. On September 15, 2008, Todd filed a petition to ... history of domestic abuse and a no-contact order violation, and (3) erred in determining Todd could provide the children stability. 5 The best interest of the children is our standard for deciding child custody. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(o); In re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999). Our objective is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity. Murphy, 592 N.W.2d at 683. In considering what custody arrangement is in the best interest of the children, we consider statutory factors. Iowa Code § 598.41(3). All these factors bear upon the “first and governing consideration” as to what will be in the best long-term interest of the child. In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Iowa 1984). These statutory factors and the factors identified in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Iowa 1974)1 are appropriately considered in determining the award of physical care. In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). 1 These factors are: 1. The characteristics of each child, including age, maturity, mental and physical health. 2. The emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. 3. The characteristics of each parent, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health. 4. The capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. 5. The interpersonal relationship between the child and each parent. 6. The interpersonal relationship between the child and its siblings. 7. The effect on the child of continuing or disrupting an existing custodial status. 8. The nature of each proposed environment, including its stability and wholesomeness. 9. The preference of the child, if the child is of sufficient age and maturity. 10. The report and recommendation of the attorney for the child or other independent investigator. 11. Available alternatives. 12. Any other relevant matter the evidence in a particular case may disclose. Winter, 223 N.W.2d at 166-67. 6 A. Marital residence. We first consider Jennifer‟s claim the court gave too much weight to the fact Todd resides in the marital home. The district court noted the following facts in determining which parent could better minister to the children‟s healthy physical, mental, and social maturity: Todd lives in the marital home which is a large five-bedroom, two-bath farm house and has been the marital residence since Jayna was approximately four years old. The farm house had previously been his grandfather‟s and Todd and Jennifer took advantage of purchasing the property because of the family connection. The farm home allows the children access to their pets, is close to the school district, and close to friends. . . . . . . . . . . The court believes that the marital residence of the parties, the farm home which the children have known most of their lives [and] provides access to friends and school as well as access to pets appears to be the more stable and wholesome environment. In contrast to Todd‟s residence, Jennifer moved into a store front that has a residence above it. She runs her Tae Kwon Do school out of the first floor. It was not improper of the court to consider the residences of the parties as a factor in determining custody. The children stated their preference to live with Todd based on the factors enumerated by the court. Considering the children‟s preference was permissible under section 598.41(3)(f) as the children were nine, fourteen, and fifteen years of age respectively at the time of the trial. Jennifer‟s main argument is the weight the court gave this evidence is inappropriate in light of the fact there was a no-contact order pursuant to chapter 236 that gave Todd temporary possession of the home. Accordingly, we next consider Jennifer‟s argument the court failed to consider Todd‟s history of domestic abuse and a no-contact order violation. 7 B. No-contact order. This court has recognized domestic abuse is a factor in determining which parent should be granted child custody. In re Marriage of Daniels, 568 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). This is because domestic abuse can have ravaging and long-term consequences on children. Id. at 54-55. Spousal abuse discloses a serious character flaw in the batterer and an equally serious parenting flaw. Id. at 55. Consequently, we believe evidence of untreated domestic battering should be given considerable weight in determining the primary caretaker, and under some circumstances even foreclose an award of primary care to a spouse who batters. Domestic abuse is, in every respect, dramatically opposed to a child‟s best interests. Id. The district court did give consideration to whether a history of domestic abuse existed. In the decree, the court states: A 236 action was commenced in Polk County, Iowa, and a temporary protective order was issued against Todd. This matter was dismissed with the parties‟ temporary stipulation entered on March 9, 2009. The DHS reports are attached as part of the pleading in the court file and introduced as exhibits at trial. The reports allege an incidence in which Todd is alleged to have used a choke-hold to discipline Kathryn; that may have caused her to lose consciousness temporarily. The report is not confirmed and the incidence was denied by Jayna and Kathryn. We conclude Jennifer‟s allegations of domestic abuse are not substantiated by the record. The first allegations were made in August 2009 in the petition for relief from ... AND JENNIFER BRECHWALD Upon the Petition of TODD BRECHWALD, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning

filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The named defendant was Quiles’s husband, Lucio Perez Munoz (Perez ... appellee. Amber L. Markham of Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Des Moines, for amicus curiae ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge. Yecika Quiles

entry of a domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant. Phillip F. Van Liew of Babich Goldman P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. 2 MULLINS, Judge. Randycurtis Bruske (Randy) appeals the entry of a domestic abuse protective order pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.5(1)(b) (2017). He contends the district court’s conclusion that he committed domestic abuse assault against his wife, Theresa Bruske, is not supported by substantial evidence. He specifically contends “[t]here is insufficient evidence to prove that [he] specifically intended to assault Theresa or that she was placed in fear by any of his actions as she alleged.” Theresa requests an award of appellate attorney fees. I. Background Facts and Proceedings We make the following findings of fact based upon the evidence which we find credible. The parties have been married for seven years. Their marriage has produced two children. On, January 31, 2017, Theresa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On February 1, Theresa called Randy while he was at work and informed him of the pending dissolution action. That evening, Randy was visibly upset when he returned home from work. Randy went out while Theresa stayed home with the children. Randy returned home at approximately 10:45 p.m. after being gone for roughly four hours. He went straight to bed. At approximately 11:45 p.m., as Theresa was washing dishes, Randy, who was heavily intoxicated,1 came out of his room, approached Theresa, pulled down her pants, and tried to initiate sexual intercourse. Theresa initially resisted but reluctantly consented to the contact and requested that the encounter take place in the bedroom so the children would not be awoken. 1 Randy conceded at trial that, after finding out about the divorce, he did “indulge a little extra” in his alcohol consumption on the evening in question. 3 The ensuing intercourse was aggressive on the part of Randy and he continued such aggressiveness, directing Theresa to “Take it!” several times, despite being advised by Theresa that he was hurting her and she wanted him to stop, as well as her unsuccessful effort to force Randy off of her. Specifically, during the encounter, Randy forced penetration more than once, pulled her hair, slammed her head into the mattress several times, and dug his fingers into Theresa’s neck. Theresa was finally able to end the encounter. Theresa then went to her daughter’s room to sleep. The next morning at approximately 4:30 a.m., Theresa awoke to Randy ripping her pants off and forcing penetration, all while the parties’ daughter was asleep in the same room, approximately eight feet away. Theresa declined consent to the encounter, but ultimately relented so the child would not be awoken. Randy “got up and stormed out of the room” a few minutes later. Theresa testified she feared for her safety during both of these encounters. Randy testified at trial that he believed both encounters were completely consensual. He conceded, however, that Theresa advised him on February 2 that his aggressive actions hurt her—he apologized for his conduct. Later that morning, Randy removed all the money from and closed the parties’ joint checking accounts and cancelled their credit cards. On February 5, the parties argued in relation to Theresa having previously hidden the magazines and ammunition for Randy’s firearm. Randy left the home with his firearm and Theresa, frightened by what Randy might do with it, called her father who, in turn, called the police. Randy testified at the trial that he left the home at this time, a Sunday evening, to go to work. When the police arrived, 4 Theresa advised them of the argument and the events that occurred on February 1. Theresa took the kids to her parents’ home, switched vehicles, and then stayed in a motel “under someone else’s name.” On Tuesday, February 7, Theresa filed a petition for relief from ... Review “District courts hear civil domestic abuse cases in equity, and we review them de novo.” In re Petition of ... actions that were taken by [Randy] on those two days definitely rises to domestic abuse as the Court has read into the

about November 1, 2008. Matthew filed a petition for dissolution of marriage November 4, 2008. After about a week, Daphne moved back in with Matthew, and they lived together in a very tense atmosphere for the next few months. In February 2009 Daphne filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse and ... BERNARD AND DAPHNE BERNARD Upon the Petition of MATTHEW BERNARD, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning DAPHNE ... District Court for Marshall County, Carl D. Baker, Judge. Matthew Bernard appeals from the custodial and

prior domestic abuse, his repeated violations of the protective order, and the confirmed report of child abuse naming Robert as the perpetrator, we conclude the child‟s interests are best served by awarding Christina primary physical care. We therefore modify the decision of the district court ordering joint physical care and order physical care of the child with Christina, and remand to the district court to award liberal visitation to Robert. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Robert and Christina were married in December 2007. They had one child together in May 2008. Christina‟s two older children, ages two and nine, from different fathers, also lived with the family during the parties‟ marriage. The parties agreed that Christina would be a stay-at-home mother for the children. Robert was employed by Determann Industries as an equipment operator, where he worked from about 5:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. In October 2008, Robert stopped working for Determann Industries, the parties purchased a semi truck, and Robert became a truck driver for CNRD Trucking, L.L.C.1 The marriage was mostly stable until an incident in March 2009 at a fireman‟s fundraiser in Buffalo. Apparently Christina was not ready to leave 1 Robert testified at trial that he made $45,000 per year as a truck driver. However, the district court found that Robert “was less than forthcoming about his income,” and noted that the record showed Robert‟s gross income in 2009 to be $63,200. 3 when Robert wanted to, and Robert grabbed Christina‟s arm in an attempt to force her to leave, leaving bruises on her arm. Another incident occurred in April 2009, when Robert became upset with Christina‟s oldest child, chased the child upstairs to his bedroom, and threw him onto his bed, causing him to strike the wall. Robert denied that he threw the child onto the bed, but admitted that he grabbed the child by the leg and turned him over. Robert then forced Christina to get out of the shower and yelled at her to discipline the child. The incident resulted in a confirmed but not registered child abuse report by the Iowa Department of Human Services. Based on this altercation, Christina gathered the children and their clothing, left the family‟s home in Camanche, and moved in with Christina‟s parents in Davenport. Christina soon rented an apartment in Davenport where she lived with the children. As a result of these incidents, Christina filed a petition for relief from ... permanent protective order finding that Robert committed a domestic abuse assault against Christina. The order also ... . Meanwhile, Christina also filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In July 2009, the court entered an order setting

prior domestic abuse, his repeated violations of the protective order, and the confirmed report of child abuse naming Robert as the perpetrator, we conclude the child‟s interests are best served by awarding Christina primary physical care. We therefore modify the decision of the district court ordering joint physical care and order physical care of the child with Christina, and remand to the district court to award liberal visitation to Robert. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Robert and Christina were married in December 2007. They had one child together in May 2008. Christina‟s two older children, ages two and nine, from different fathers, also lived with the family during the parties‟ marriage. The parties agreed that Christina would be a stay-at-home mother for the children. Robert was employed by Determann Industries as an equipment operator, where he worked from about 5:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. In October 2008, Robert stopped working for Determann Industries, the parties purchased a semi truck, and Robert became a truck driver for CNRD Trucking, L.L.C.1 The marriage was mostly stable until an incident in March 2009 at a fireman‟s fundraiser in Buffalo. Apparently Christina was not ready to leave 1 Robert testified at trial that he made $45,000 per year as a truck driver. However, the district court found that Robert “was less than forthcoming about his income,” and noted that the record showed Robert‟s gross income in 2009 to be $63,200. 3 when Robert wanted to, and Robert grabbed Christina‟s arm in an attempt to force her to leave, leaving bruises on her arm. Another incident occurred in April 2009, when Robert became upset with Christina‟s oldest child, chased the child upstairs to his bedroom, and threw him onto his bed, causing him to strike the wall. Robert denied that he threw the child onto the bed, but admitted that he grabbed the child by the leg and turned him over. Robert then forced Christina to get out of the shower and yelled at her to discipline the child. The incident resulted in a confirmed but not registered child abuse report by the Iowa Department of Human Services. Based on this altercation, Christina gathered the children and their clothing, left the family‟s home in Camanche, and moved in with Christina‟s parents in Davenport. Christina soon rented an apartment in Davenport where she lived with the children. As a result of these incidents, Christina filed a petition for relief from ... permanent protective order finding that Robert committed a domestic abuse assault against Christina. The order also ... . Meanwhile, Christina also filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In July 2009, the court entered an order setting

. Concluding there was a history of domestic abuse, the trial court rejected Brad’s request for joint physical care and instead awarded primary physical care to Holly. Brad was allowed visitation of one evening a week, alternating three-day weekends and holidays, and three weeks in the summer. The district court’s judgment also ordered Brad to have no contact with Holly for one year. 3 Brad appealed, claiming it was in Garisin’s best interest that the parties be awarded joint physical care. The case was transferred to the court of appeals. A divided panel of that court modified the district court decree to provide that Brad and Holly would have joint physical care of Garisin. We granted Holly’s application for further review. We review the district court’s decision de novo. See In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). “ ‘Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court's factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 2003)). II. Underlying Facts. When the parties married in 2001, Holly had completed a year of college and Brad, who has a GED, was employed. Holly completed her degree in May 2004 and took an advertising and marketing job with a local radio station. Brad was the primary income producer while Holly was in school. Holly was Garisin’s primary caretaker. At trial, both parties highlighted past conditions and conduct of the other. The evidence showed Holly had counseling in high school for a possible eating disorder. She had also suffered from episodes of depression since marrying and was being treated for a major depressive disorder at the time of trial. Holly’s psychiatrist testified she was in full remission, however, and had no mental health issues that would affect her ability to parent. The evidence showed that prior to marrying Holly, Brad had had several run-ins with the law, including possession of alcohol by a minor, violation of the open container law, possession of methamphetamine, and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He had no criminal record after 2000, however, until charges of domestic abuse were filed by Holly after the parties separated. Notwithstanding Holly’s and Brad’s problems and 4 shortcomings, the trial court found, and we agree, that both were good parents to Garisin. We turn now to the allegations of domestic abuse. Holly decided to leave Brad in February 2005; Brad did not want the marriage to end. The parties agreed to share physical care of their son by each parent living in the marital home with Garisin on an alternating schedule. When Holly was not in the parties’ residence, she initially lived with Deb Patterson, a person unknown to Brad. Patterson was the mother of Jason Hewitt, a friend of Holly. Brad suspected that Holly was having an affair with Hewitt, an allegation that Holly denied then and continued to deny at trial. On February 26, 2005, Holly came to the parties’ house to see Garisin. Brad began questioning Holly about where she had been and with whom she had been. Rather than answering Brad’s questions, Holly decided to leave. The parties’ explanations of what happened as Holly tried to walk out vary, but it is clear Holly wanted to leave and Brad wanted her to stay and talk. As Holly attempted to go out the door, Brad put his foot in the doorway to stop her, and Holly ended up with a bruise on her knee where her leg was hit by the door. As a result of this incident, Holly obtained a temporary no-contact order under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005). Rather than pursue a permanent no-contact order, Holly filed for divorce on March 7, 2001. The parties agreed to a temporary order allowing shared physical care of Garisin. Brad did not handle the pending dissolution of his marriage well, and he was quite bothered by his suspicions that Holly was involved with another man. On March 26, he learned that Holly was with Hewitt at a third person’s home. Brad went there and pounded on the door, shouting for Holly. Holly was scared and called the police. The officers who 5 responded spent several minutes talking with Brad before convincing him to leave. On June 5, Brad called Holly to talk to her about the divorce. After speaking with him at length, Holly eventually hung up. Brad then came to her apartment and started pounding on the door. Holly told him to leave and threatened to call the police, but he kept knocking on the door. Holly finally called law enforcement, but Brad left before the officers arrived. While the officers were at Holly’s apartment, Brad called her. She gave the phone to an officer who told Brad to leave Holly alone. Nonetheless, later that day, Brad called Holly again, trying to talk her out of the divorce. Holly considered Brad’s phone calls not only harassing, but also threatening, as he asserted in his calls that he was not going to let her go through with the divorce. In this same time frame, another incident occurred that eventually led Holly to seek a second no-contact order. Holly was at the home of Brad’s parents to pick up Garisin when Brad arrived. While inside the house, Brad pulled down Holly’s slacks and demanded to know when she stopped wearing underwear. He then went outside to Holly’s vehicle and began looking through it. As she was trying to leave, Brad said something to the effect that, if he gave Holly a gun, would she just shoot him, that that would make the whole situation easier. On June 7, 2005, Holly filed a petition for relief from ... physical care for two reasons: (1) Brad’s alleged abuse of her, and (2) the parties’ inability to communicate ... domestic

pursue criminal charges. The day after Lisa filed her initial report with DHS, she filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse alleging ... domestic abuse on the part of Ryan and 6 requested the entry of protective order ... same day. Lisa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage approximately one week later. Therein, she requested, among

the district court erred in ruling that he was required to file a petition for postconviction relief before being able to modify the injunction. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Timothy Braunschweig of Braunschweig Law Firm, Algona, for appellant. Richard Meyer of Fillenwarth & Fillenwarth, Estherville, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield, J. and Robinson, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007). 2 VAITHESWARAN, P.J. Dennis Schneider appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment in an action to modify an injunction. I. Background Facts and Proceedings This case has a lengthy and convoluted procedural history, only some of which is relevant to the ruling that is challenged here. Dennis Schneider and Debra Rodgers divorced in 1998. Several months after the dissolution decree was entered, Rodgers applied for a permanent injunction against Schneider to prevent a claimed pattern of harassment. The application was filed under the same caption as the dissolution matter even though the dissolution decree contained no injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the district court issued an injunction directing Schneider to have no contact with Rodgers. The order was dated April 1, 1999. Schneider did not appeal the order. A state district court subsequently found Schneider in contempt for violating the injunction and sentenced him to thirty days in jail. Schneider petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal district court focused on whether Schneider exhausted state court remedies before proceeding to federal court. The court concluded that a state court needed to determine whether a state postconviction relief action was a cognizable means of challenging a finding of criminal contempt. The court stated, If the state courts determine that a postconviction relief application will not lie from a conviction for criminal contempt, then it will be clear that Schneider has both attempted to exhaust state remedies and that the State’s postconviction relief process is “ineffective” to protect his rights. 3 Schneider’s federal court petition was ultimately dismissed without prejudice. Meanwhile, Schneider filed a state court petition to modify and clarify the April 1, 1999 injunctive order. This petition, like the injunction that it challenged, was filed under the caption of the dissolution action and alleged several grounds for dissolving the injunction, including changed circumstances. Years after filing the petition, Schneider moved for summary judgment. He asserted that the 1999 order was actually a chapter 236 (1999) domestic abuse injunction ... petition for habeas corpus ordinarily must first present those claims to the state court and must exhaust state remedies.”). The habeas corpus action was not a direct challenge to the 1999 injunctive order. This action, in contrast, is an action to modify the 1999 injunction. Setting aside the question of whether Schneider could attack the 1999 order by filing a petition to modify the injunction years after it was issued and the appeal deadline had expired,1 we find no authority requiring challenges to injunctive orders such as this to be made in a postconviction relief action. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1) (2001) (stating statute applies to “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense”). Therefore, we reverse the district court’s ruling denying Schneider’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was required to challenge the injunction via a postconviction relief action. Schneider also argues that the 1999 order was in fact a domestic abuse order ... . RODGERS AND DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER Upon the Petition of DEBRA R. RODGERS f/k/a DEBRA R. SCHNEIDER, Petitioner

had an intimate relationship.” The court continued: The second issue is whether there’s been any domestic abuse and whether there’s a current legitimate concern for safety. Normally, the fact that the incidents of assault were so long ago would lead the court to decline the request. However, this is a very unusual case with unusual facts. And given the history between the parties and the timing, in terms of not filing for this protective order, a civil protective order, because there was the criminal protective order already in place and after the criminal case was dismissed, the petitioner feeling the need for a civil protective order, I am going to grant the protective order. The district court’s final order, issued December 13, 2016, directed Flick to “stay away” from Marcinowicz and not be in her presence except during court proceedings. The protective order also restricted him from communicating with her through any means, including third parties. The restriction on communication did not apply to legal counsel. Flick now appeals. 5 II. Legal Standards and Scope of Review To obtain a protective order, the petitioner, here Marcinowicz, must prove her allegation of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. See Iowa Code § 236.4(1). A preponderance of the evidence is “the lowest degree of proof upon which issues of fact are determined.” State v. Beasley, 50 N.W. 570, 571 (Iowa 1891). The quantity of evidence required of a party having the burden of proof in a civil action is “no more than will outweigh the evidence of the other side.” Hall v. Wright, 156 N.W.2d 661, 667 (Iowa 1968). Because chapter 236 proceedings are tried in equity, our review is de novo. See Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We adjudicate anew issues properly preserved and presented for appellate review. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). But we give weight to the district court’s credibility findings. Id. Because “chapter 236 is protective rather than punitive in nature,” we employ “a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose.” Christenson v. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Iowa 1991). III. Analysis Flick contends the civil protective order is invalid because Marcinowicz did not offer substantial evidence to support a finding of domestic abuse.1 Flick sets out the definitions of assault.2 But he does not, indeed cannot, argue his actions 1 Domestic abuse means committing an assault, as defined in section 708.1, while in a specified relationship with the other person. See Iowa Code § 236.2. Flick does not challenge the existence of a qualifying relationship. 2 Under Iowa Code § 708.1(2): A person commits assault when, without justification the person does the following: a. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or 6 in February and March of 2015 fall outside those definitions. Instead he argues those events were too remote to merit issuance of a protective order. The remoteness argument is not persuasive in this case. “Iowa Code chapter 236 has no provision that requires a petition to be filed within a specific time after an alleged assault.” Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1994). The district court may consider a lapse in time when deciding what relief is ... Marcinowicz. The two officially divorced in April 2016. The divorce took roughly three years from petition to decree. In ... the decree, the district court noted Flick had “demonstrated many of the classic signs of a domestic abuser.” The court

put in peril other judgments entered in name changes, domestic abuse protective orders, and other civil matters where a parent has appeared pro se when filing an action as next friend for their minor children. Those concerns are assuaged by statutes that specifically allow parents to proceed on behalf of their children‘s interests without the aid of counsel. For example, Iowa Code section 236.3(1) allows parents to proceed pro se on behalf 24 of their children when seeking relief from domestic violence.10 Likewise, Iowa Code section 674.1 provides ―a parent may file a verified petition requesting ... , including a parent or guardian on behalf of an unemancipated minor, may seek relief from domestic abuse by filing a ... for an abuse of discretion. Id. In contrast, if the motion for new trial was based on a legal question, we review for

you extended it a year. THE COURT: Did he ever finish the domestic abuse classes? MR. SANDON: No. THE COURT: You need to do that. Be on probation until January 5th–excuse me–January 25th, 1998. . . . In keeping with this colloquy, the court file reveals a document dated May 31, 1996, finding Polson in contempt for violating his probation and ordering that he serve a six-month sentence concurrent with his sentence for violating the no-contact order. The written order, signed by Judge Moisan, also stated: “Probation is extended to 1-25-98.” Polson’s reprieve was disappointedly short lived. At a hearing held August 1, 1996, the court found Polson violated the no-contact order thirteen more times. He was sentenced to serve six months in jail, with credit for time served. By separate written entry, the court found no proof of further probation violation but directed that Polson “shall remain on probation until 1-25-98 as previously ordered.” Upon his release on December 17, 1996, Polson was ordered to immediately make arrangements for probation supervision. He did so, but the meeting with his probation officer did not go well. Advised that he would be on intensive supervision with curfews and electronic monitoring, Polson refused to sign the probation agreement. A warrant issued for his arrest. On December 18, 1996, free on bond, Polson filed the petition for writ of habeas corpus which forms the basis for the controversy now before us. His petition sought “relief from ... judge’s order extending the probation of James Polson. We granted the State’s petition and, for the reasons that follow ... domestic assault in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(b) (1995), for which he was sentenced to one year in jail, all

same date, the State filed a CINA petition with respect to A.J.M. and an application for order of temporary removal ... with the order for adjudicatory hearing, the CINA petition, the removal order, and other documents in Whitehall ... court noted the couple’s history of domestic abuse was the instigating factor of the siblings’ CINA files; the criminal

not a petition for the modification of a custody and visitation order and Petitioner is not requesting this Court to make any judgment concerning the custody of her minor daughter, Sophie Molano. Rather, this Court is asked to declare whether Respondent HECTOR MOLANO was an abusive husband and father and whether Sophie Molano has, of her own accord and volition, the legal right to refuse contact with her alleged abuser if she should so desire or if Hector’s rights as a father supercede Sophie’s rights as an individual and as a victim of Hector’s past abuse. This latter statement appears to be the gist of the complaint as Wendee’s reply brief also states: [T]he fighting issue in the declaratory judgment action is Sophie’s right to reject contact with Hector, making relevant Sophie’s and Wendee’s assertions of Hector’s prior conduct—especially as to the points where the court issued ambiguous, inconclusive findings of fact. 3 Wendee’s petition also asked the court to temporarily and permanently enjoin compulsory contact between father and daughter until such time as the father completes a course of counseling in anger management. On March 23, Hector answered and moved to dismiss the petition asserting a res judicata defense. He asserted the parties were also parties in case number CE54576,1 wherein the matters had already been considered and decided. On April 8, the district court entered an order setting for hearing Hector’s motion to dismiss, and Wendee’s requests for declaratory judgment and injunction. Wendee filed a resistance to the motion to dismiss, and Hector then filed a supplemental motion to dismiss. Wendee thereafter filed a resistance to the supplemental motion to dismiss, a supplemental memorandum of law, and jury demand. On May 6, a hearing was held. Hector argued that even if the motion to dismiss was improper, the grounds asserted were sufficient to deny the request for declaratory judgment. He asserted the matters alleged in the petition were raised in CE54576, a proceeding for custody of the parties’ child, and could not be re-litigated. Wendee argued that the motions to dismiss were procedurally defective. She also contended the decree entered in CE54576 did not address the rights of Sophie Molano. The district court, without objection of either party, 1 Wendee Molano v. Hector Molano, Polk County No. CE54576, is described more fully in the following footnote. 4 took judicial notice of the proceedings in CE54576.2 Hector’s counsel noted that in CE54576 Hector’s application to show cause was rejected as the district court found nothing in the resulting custody decree which required Wendee to encourage Sophie to speak with her father. On June 11, 2009, the district court entered its “Ruling on Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss.” The court concluded that because the respondent did not file the motion to dismiss before his answer, his motion was untimely pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.441(1). The court thus denied the motion. However, the court dismissed the declaratory judgment action sua sponte, finding the petition “amounts to a collateral attack on a previous judgment in 2 That action commenced with Wendee’s petition for child custody, visitation, and support pursuant to Iowa Code section 598B.204 (2005), which in subsection one provides: A court of this state has temporary emergency jurisdiction if the child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned or it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because the child, or a sibling or parent of the child, is subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. A “Decree of Custody, Visitation and Support” was filed in July 2008 wherein the court found, among other things, that “Hector has difficulty with his frustration, tolerance, and impulsivity at times and is prone to be emotionally expressive”; “Hector can be frequently moody and unpredictable in his reactions to Wendee and Sophie, and they have both developed a fear of Hector”; “While Sophie’s counselors have recommended no contact at this time between Hector and Sophie, the court finds that the fear Sophie has of contact with Hector, while real for Sophie, is quite likely as much a product of Wendee’s actions as it is Hector’s behaviors”; “Wendee has not carried her burden with respect to establishing domestic abuse by Hector”; the “parties now live a considerable distance from each other” (Wendee and Sophie reside in Iowa, Hector resides in Florida); both parents love their child and have provided her care for extended periods; “Wendee is better able to provide for Sophie’s physical needs presently and in the foreseeable future.” The court awarded joint custody to the parties and primary physical care to Wendee. Noting Sophie’s counselors’ recommendation that Sophie have no contact with her father, the court ordered “Hector shall initially have only supervised phone contact and supervised in-person contact with Sophie. . . . At such time [as] Sophie’s counselor authorizes, Hector shall have unsupervised phone contact with Sophie . . . [and] the following unsupervised visitation.” Hector was to pay child support of $369.12 per month. Wendee did not appeal from the decree. 5 CE54576.” The court rejected Wendee’s claim that the issues presented were not precluded because they were brought on behalf of Sophie, who was not a party to the prior action. “Judge Phipps has already considered Sophie’s interests in CE54576.” The court further stated: The district court has an interest in seeing that its decrees and judgments are followed. Associated with this is upholding of the integrity of those decrees and judgments. The Court will not permit a litigant in one case, dissatisfied with the Court’s ruling, to raise the same issues in a newly filed action and have another bite of the proverbial apple. For this Court to grant the Petitioner’s requested relief in ... that her daughter Sophie continues to refuse contact with her abusive father.” The petition also recites: This is ... Petition

on Theresa Seeberger’s petition for judicial review following an agency determination of Schreurs’s housing-discrimination complaint. The Commission contends the district court erred in concluding Schreurs’s complaint was not filed under the federal Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Davenport Municipal Code (2014) does not authorize an award of attorney fees in the context of discriminatory housing practices. Schreurs argues the district court erred in concluding the municipal code and FHA do not entitle her to an award of attorney fees incurred during administrative proceedings and abused its discretion in refusing to award her attorney fees in the judicial-review proceeding. Theresa Seeberger cross-appeals the same ruling. She asserts that holding her liable for her discriminatory statements violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Iowa Constitution because the statements she made amount to protected speech. OPINION HOLDS: We conclude the challenged ordinance is not an unconstitutional infringement upon Seeberger’s freedom-of-speech rights and affirm the agency and district court’s findings of liability. We reverse the district court’s determination that Schreurs was not entitled to the attorney fees incurred in the administrative proceeding and remand the matter to the district court to consider whether the attorney-fee award was excessive. We affirm the district court’s denial of Schreurs’s request for attorney fees in the judicial-review proceeding. No. 16-1828 AFFIRMED. STATE v. JONES Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, David P. Odekirk, Judge. Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by McDonald, J. (18 pages) Charles Jones challenges his convictions for robbery in the first degree, going armed with intent, carrying weapons, and making a false report to law enforcement. Jones challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, alleges trial counsel provided constitutionally deficient representation in several respects, and contends the district court applied the wrong legal standard in denying his motion for new trial. OPINION HOLDS: We conclude there is sufficient evidence to support the convictions and find trial counsel did not breach any essential duties, but we preserve one claim for potential postconviction-relief proceedings. We also conclude the district court did not err in ruling on the motion for new trial. We affirm the judgment of the district court in all respects. No. 16-2023 AFFIRMED. BUTTS v. STATE Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Mark J. Eveloff, Judge. Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. Opinion by Vogel, P.J. (22 pages) Robert Butts, convicted of one count each of first-degree burglary, second-degree kidnapping, going armed with intent, assault while participating in a felony, assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse, carrying weapons, and possession of burglar’s tools, filed a postconviction-relief action, asserting his trial counsel was ineffective. Additionally, Butts claims his appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to seek further review and failing to challenge trial counsel’s disclosure of a letter. Finally, Butts asserts his kidnapping conviction should be reconsidered in light of our supreme court’s ruling in State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464 (Iowa 2015). OPINION HOLDS: As we conclude the district court properly denied Butts’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims against both his trial and appellate counsel and because we do not find any structural error in the trial record, cumulative error, or entitlement to kidnapping reconsideration, we affirm the district court’s denial of Butts’s application for postconviction relief. No. 16-2221 AFFIRMED. STATE v. DOUGLASS Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge. Considered by Vogel, P.J., Mullins, J., and Mahan, S.J. Opinion by Mahan, S.J. (8 pages) David Douglass appeals his conviction for assault with the intent to commit sexual abuse, contending his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move to suppress the eyewitness identification from the victim’s neighbor. OPINION HOLDS: Upon consideration of the issue raised on appeal, we affirm. No. 17-0014 AFFIRMED. WILSON v. STATE Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Mary Ann Brown, Judge. Considered by Tabor, P.J., McDonald, J., and Blane, S.J. Opinion by Blane, S.J. (14 pages) Applicant Daniel Wilson contends his criminal convictions cannot stand because the State admitted in its answer to the postconviction-relief (PCR) application, despite the evidence at the criminal trial, that the substance Wilson threw at jailers was vomit and not urine, which does not meet the elements of the crimes of which he was convicted. He also asserts that his trial counsel and potentially PCR counsel were ineffective and that his sentences were unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment. OPINION HOLDS: Having addressed all of Wilson’s contentions and finding that he cannot prevail on any in this appeal, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. No. 17-0056 AFFIRMED. CITY OF DUBUQUE v. JADE ENGINEERING LLC Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J. Shubatt, Judge. Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by McDonald, J. (2 pages) The City of Dubuque appeals from an order denying its petition to obtain title to four pieces of real property claimed to be abandoned within the meaning of Iowa Code section 657A.10A (2016). The city challenges the district court’s findings of fact, application of fact to law, and ultimate conclusion the city failed to prove the parcels were abandoned. OPINION HOLDS: On de novo review, we conclude the city failed to prove the property was abandoned within the meaning of the Iowa Code. No. 17-0057 JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, SENTENCE AFFIRMED IN PART AND VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED FOR ENTRY OF A CORRECTED SENTENCE. STATE v. BASQUIN Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M. Lekar, Judge. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Bower, J., and Blane, S.J. Opinion by Vaitheswaran, P.J. (11 pages) Timothy Basquin appeals his conviction for domestic abuse ... ) Brian Ingram appeals his convictions for domestic abuse assault with a dangerous weapon and child endangerment. He ... district court decision denying his request for postconviction relief. OPINION HOLDS: We find Escobedo is barred

Services (DHS) determined D.W. was at risk for neglect and abuse due to A.W.’s history with DHS in two previous child- in ... intoxicated father, D.T., following a domestic dispute between the couple. D.T. had a history of substance abuse ... and domestic violence that formed the basis for the prior termination of parental rights involving the two older

McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, J. (7 pages) Ramon Flick appeals a domestic-abuse protective order prohibiting contact between Ramon and his ex-wife. On appeal, Ramon argues past domestic-abuse incidents are too remote in time to warrant a protective order. Previously, there was a criminal no-contact order between the parties preventing contact. OPINION HOLDS: The district court’s granting of a protective order was proper because (1) there is no specific requirement for when in time a protective order petition must be filed, (2) there is a long history of domestic abuse between the parties, and (3) Ramon’s ex-wife promptly filed her petition after the criminal no-contact order was dismissed. No. 17-0040 AFFIRMED. STRUEBING v. ADDISON INSURANCE CO. Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, John J. Haney, Judge. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. Opinion by Mullins, J. (6 pages) Joann Struebing, J & E Enterprises, and El-Wayne, Inc. appeal a district court ruling declaring property damage by fire and subsequent property damage by rain constitute a single covered cause of loss under an insurance policy and defining the policy term “Actual Cash Value” to mean market value. OPINION HOLDS: Finding no legal error, we affirm the district court’s declaratory ruling in its entirety. No. 17-0171 AFFIRMED. STATE v. MALLOY Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John D. Ackerman, Judge. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, J. (7 pages) Kelly Malloy appeals his convictions for eluding in the first degree and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. On appeal he argues there was insufficient evidence showing he was under the influence of methamphetamine and he received ineffective assistance of counsel. He takes issue with counsel’s failure to object to testimony about a sobriety field test from a witness not certified as a drug-recognition expert. OPINION HOLDS: There is sufficient evidence showing Malloy was under the influence of methamphetamine. Malloy’s erratic driving, possession of a methamphetamine-covered spoon, refusal to submit to chemical testing, and flight from officers all support Malloy’s convictions. He cannot prevail under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because the supposed breach in duty would not change the outcome given the strong evidence supporting conviction. No. 17-0172 AFFIRMED. STATE v. JOHNSON Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Robert E. Sosalla, Christopher L. Bruns, and Kevin McKeever, Judges. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. Opinion by Danilson, C.J. (4 pages) Jeremy Johnson, in two cases, entered a written plea of guilt of aggravated misdemeanor assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. On appeal, he contends he was not adequately advised regarding the maximum punishment prior to entering his pleas, rendering them unknowing and involuntary. OPINION HOLDS: The record shows Johnson was aware of the special parole and the duration. Because there was substantial compliance with Iowa Rule Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b)(2), we affirm. No. 17-0301 AFFIRMED. STATE v. SALLIS Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M. Fangman, Judge. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by McDonald, J. (12 pages) A defendant appeals his convictions for domestic abuse assault with intent to cause serious injury and domestic abuse assault causing bodily injury, contending the district court committed evidentiary error and there is insufficient evidence to support the convictions. He also raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. OPINION HOLDS: We find no evidentiary error and conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. We preserve the claim of ineffective assistance for possible postconviction relief. No ... modification petition. Jennifer argues the visitation schedule should be further modified for purposes of consistency and the ... Savings Bank and its president, Mark White, appeal a jury verdict in favor of borrower Marty DeShaw in his action for

following guilty pleas to possession of a firearm or offensive weapon by a felon and domestic abuse assault. He contends his defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) pressuring him to withdraw a motion in arrest of judgment, (2) failing to inform the trial court the plea colloquy was insufficient, specifically concerning the requirement to complete batterer’s education, and (3) not challenging the State’s alleged failure to abide by its obligations under the plea agreement. OPINION HOLDS: We affirm Freitag’s sentence and preserve one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for possible postconviction-relief proceedings. No. 17-0903 CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED, AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING. STATE v. UTECH Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, John C. Nelson, District Associate Judge. Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, J. (9 pages) The defendant appeals his conviction and sentence arguing plea counsel was ineffective for not informing him of the pretrial conference and not calculating surcharges on fines. The defendant also argues the court impermissibly forced him to enter a guilty plea, in exchange recalling a warrant for his arrest. Finally, the defendant argues his sentence was illegal because, although he was not placed on probation, he was sentenced to electronic monitoring and to take an anger management class. OPINION HOLDS: We preserve the defendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for postconviction-relief proceedings because the record is inadequate to address the issues. We find the sentence provision requiring electronic monitoring was valid but the order to attend anger management class was not because the defendant was never sentenced to probation. We vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. No. 17-0924 AFFIRMED. STATE v. CLARK Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joseph M. Moothart, District Associate Judge. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ. Opinion by Bower, J. (5 pages) A defendant appeals his conviction for assault causing bodily injury or mental illness. OPINION HOLDS: We find Clark did not preserve error on his claim of insufficient evidence. We also find trial counsel was effective. No. 17-0980 REVERSED AND REMANDED. STATE v. LOMEN Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Cynthia M. Moisan, District Associate Judge. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Bower, JJ. Opinion by Danilson, C.J. (4 pages) David Lomen appeals the amount of restitution ordered upon his conviction for theft in the fourth degree. OPINION HOLDS: The victim’s cost for computer components incurred more than a decade before the defendant’s possession of the stolen computer is not a reasonable measure of the damages caused by Lomen exercising control of a stolen computer. Restitution should be fixed in the amount of the reasonable cost to replace or repair the computer including the amount of other damages that are otherwise causally related to the criminal activity, if any. Because the court’s order of restitution was grounded upon an improper measure of damages, we reverse the restitution order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. No. 17-1040 MODIFICATION AFFIRMED. CONTEMPT CITATIONS AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. IN RE MARRIAGE OF JACOBSON Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Marlita A. Greve, Judge. Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by McDonald, J. (18 pages) Sommer Wasser appeals from a ruling granting a petition to ... Tabor, J. (3 pages) Christopher Anderson appeals the dismissal of his application for postconviction relief alleging ... justifying the finding of domestic abuse. OPINION HOLDS: Because the protective order was previously dismissed, the issue

.” The hospital discharged A.M. to outpatient mental-health and substance- abuse treatment. He continued treatment for ... Court for Bremer County, Christopher C. Foy, Judge. A person previously involuntarily hospitalized for mental ... , Benson, Engels, Galles & Demro, P.L.C., Cedar Falls, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A

2003, which added some stress in Rocky’s life. Rocky filed a petition for dissolution in July 2008. Separation ... ; geographic proximity; child’s safety; history of domestic abuse). Though these considerations technically apply to joint ... CHIPOKAS AND MARK LEWIS CHIPOKAS Upon the Petition of RAQUEL LYNN CHIPOKAS, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning

behavior, including convictions for domestic abuse of his mother and child endangerment for assaulting Carol’s then ... reasonable efforts to reunify the children with him.1 For three reasons we find no entitlement to relief on this ground ... court to entertain an action for a dissolution of Carol and Tim’s marriage. Carol and Tim were then separated

district court dismissed the petition following a hearing. Nicolle filed a “motion for new trial and reconsideration ... . Nicolle cites the following grounds for relief: (2) Irregularity or fraud practiced in obtaining it. (3 ... credit card bill of $8500, and (4) Steven would receive the tax exemptions for both children until “Nicolle’s wages

more reluctant to find an abuse of discretion where the judgment has been vacated than when relief has been denied ... the entry of an amended qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). He contends the amended QDRO was entered without ... contends the court erred in denying his request for attorney fees in regard to this matter. Both parties seek an award

. Opinion by Bower, J. (5 pages) Nathan Smith appeals his conviction for domestic assault. OPINION HOLDS: We find the district court properly admitted the evidence and preserve one of Smith’s claims of ineffective assistance for postconviction review. No. 16-2224 AFFIRMED. STRATFORD HOLDING v. CITY OF DES MOINES Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson, Judge. Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Tabor, J. (12 pages) A convenience store appeals the district court’s affirmation of a board of adjustment’s denial of a zoning variance permitting the sale of spirits and the court’s refusal to consider the board’s prior variance decisions to determine if the denial was arbitrary and capricious. The convenience store also raises an equal protection claim. OPINION HOLDS: Because the store failed to present an equal protection claim to the district court, that claim is not preserved for appeal. Because the store presented no authority indicating the district court should have considered prior board of adjustment decisions, we decline to remand. No. 16-2229 REVERSED ON APPEAL; AFFIRMED ON CROSS-APPEAL. IN RE MARRIAGE OF KRAGEL Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Ida County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge. Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Potterfield, JJ. Opinion by Danilson, C.J. (10 pages) Randall Kragel appeals the district court’s ruling denying his petition for the modification of a dissolution decree. He contends (1) the district court applied an incorrect modification standard and erred in failing to find a material change in circumstances to support modification and (2) the district court’s ruling effectually modified the property-distribution provisions of the original decree. Leisha Kragel cross-appeals the same ruling which denied her request for attorney fees in the modification proceeding. Both parties request an award of appellate attorney fees. OPINION HOLDS: On appeal, we reverse the district court and modify Randall’s spousal-support obligation. On cross-appeal, we affirm the denial of Leisha’s request for trial attorney fees. We decline to award appellate attorney fees to either party. No. 17-0100 AFFIRMED. MUMMAU v. ESTATE OF KRAUS Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clayton County, David P. Odekirk, Judge. Considered by Vogel, P.J., Bower, J., and Scott, S.J. Opinion by Bower, J. (8 pages) Vincent Mummau appeals the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to defendants on his petition to set aside a sheriff’s sale of farmland. OPINION HOLDS: We find no error in the district court’s conclusion Mummau had an equitable interest in the farmland, which was subject to a judgment lien. Also, we find no error in the district court’s conclusion Mummau’s claims concerning the adequacy of the sale price were moot, as the one-year statutory redemption period had expired. We affirm the district court decision granting summary judgment. No. 17-0119 AFFIRMED. IN RE D.M. Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Christine Dalton Ploof, District Associate Judge. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. Opinion by Potterfield, J. (5 pages) The juvenile, D.M., appeals her adjudication as a delinquent, which was based on the court’s findings she committed the delinquent acts of robbery in the first degree and willful injury resulting in bodily injury. She maintains there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s findings, arguing there was no evidence she “intended to steal the property of [the victim] or . . . had the intent to assault or harm [the victim] in any way.” OPINION HOLDS: We affirm the juvenile court’s adjudication of D.M. as a delinquent based on the findings she committed both delinquent acts of willful injury causing bodily injury and robbery in the first degree. No. 17-0124 AFFIRMED. CARMICHAEL v. PHILPOTT Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Taylor County, John D. Lloyd, Judge. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Potterfield, J. (9 pages) Stacy Anderson (formerly known as Stacy Philpott) appeals from the district court’s ruling on the petition to modify, which placed physical care of the parties’ minor child with the father, Clinton Carmichael. On appeal, Stacy maintains the district court improperly considered testimony from the guardian ad litem (GAL) over her objection. She also maintains the court erred in its determination that a substantial change in circumstances warranting modification had taken place. OPINION HOLDS: Because Stacy failed to object to the testimony of the GAL, we have not considered this argument; the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the GAL’s report as a sanction for Stacy’s willful disregard of discovery orders. Because there has been a substantial change in circumstances since the entry of the 2014 modification, we affirm. No. 17-0153 AFFIRMED. JACKSON v. STATE Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert J. Blink and William P. Kelly, Judges. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. Opinion by Mullins, J. (4 pages) Andrew Jackson appeals the dismissal of his third application for postconviction relief (PCR ... for third-degree sexual abuse and to establish the value of damaged property to support his third-degree-criminal ... Court for Polk County, Jeffrey D. Farrell, Judge. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. Opinion by

petition for judicial review, and the district court affirmed the ruling. Babe asserts there is not substantial, credible evidence to support the Board’s findings. She also asserts the sanction imposed was “unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion,” or “so grossly disproportionate to the benefits accruing to the public interest from that action that it must necessarily be deemed to lack any foundation in rational agency policy.” Finally, Babe argues the decision was inconsistent with the Board’s precedent and prior decisions. OPINION HOLDS: Because there is not substantial evidence to support a finding Babe committed an act of physical abuse, and thus, no basis for the disciplinary sanction imposed, we reverse and remand to the district court with directions that the matter be remanded to the Board for dismissal. No. 17-0223 APPEAL DISMISSED. LUMAN v. LUMAN Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison, Judge. Considered by Danilson, C.J., Doyle, J., and Mahan, S.J. Opinion by Danilson, C.J. (3 pages) James Carrell Luman II appeals from the district court’s entry of a protective order pursuant to Iowa Code 236.5 (2017) prohibiting James from having contact with his wife, Heather Luman. OPINION HOLDS: Because the protective order is no longer in effect, the appeal is dismissed as moot. No. 17-0235 AFFIRMED. STATE v. SHEPPARD Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Gregory D. Brandt, District Associate Judge. Considered by Doyle, P.J., McDonald, J., and Carr, S.J. Opinion by Doyle, P.J. (6 pages) James Sheppard appeals the sentence of incarceration imposed following his guilty plea to operating while intoxicated, third offense. He asserts the sentencing court abused its discretion in declining to grant him a suspended sentence. OPINION HOLDS: The core of the Sheppard’s argument is that he simply disagrees with the district court’s exercise of discretion. This is not a ground for relief. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the Sheppard’s sentence. No. 17-0288 AFFIRMED. STATE v. JACKSON Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea J. Dryer, Judge. Considered by Doyle, P.J., Tabor, J., and Goodhue, S.J. Opinion by Goodhue, S.J. (5 pages) Antavieon Chyrome Jackson was convicted by a jury trial of sexual abuse in the third degree on December 16, 2016. Jackson moved for a new trial but his motion was denied. Jackson appeals. OPINION HOLDS: The greater weight of the evidence supports the verdict, and the motion for a new trial was correctly denied. We affirm. No. 17-0313 AFFIRMED. ALLEN v. TYSON FRESH MEATS, INC. Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott D. Rosenberg, Judge. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and McDonald, JJ. Opinion by Potterfield, J. (7 pages) Clifford Allen appeals from the district court ruling affirming the worker’s compensation commissioner’s award of ten percent industrial disability and the denial of penalty benefits. Allen maintains the district court applied the incorrect standards when reviewing the commissioner’s interpretation of Iowa Administrative Code rule 876-4.2(86) and the commissioner’s award of ten percent industrial disability. OPINION HOLDS: Because the commissioner’s interpretation of rule 876-4.2(86) is neither an error at law nor irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable and because we cannot say the commissioner’s decision to award a ten percent industrial disability—lower than Allen’s functional impairment—was irrational or illogical under these facts, we agree with the district court that the award should be affirmed. No. 17-0413 AFFIRMED. STATE v. LEE Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Monica L. Ackley, Judge. Considered by Vogel, P.J., Mullins, J., and Scott, S.J. Opinion by Scott, S.J. (12 pages) Kohlvidas Lee appeals his convictions for domestic abuse ... is better able to provide for the children. OPINION HOLDS: Because the mother has been the primary caregiver and the ... provide compelling reasoning for separating the children. No. 17-0200 AFFIRMED. STATE v. WILLIAMS Appeal from

in your case, but the mediator will NOT give you legal advice or make any decisions for you. The parties are encouraged ... days after service of the original notice and petition. One mediation session is required, but you may find that ... attending additional sessions will help you resolve your case. Mediation may not be appropriate when there has been domestic

County), Judges. Appellants appeal from the district courts' dismissals of their petitions for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Rhoda M. Tenuta of Legal Services Corp. of Iowa, Sioux City, for appellant. Tamera Peterson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, pro se appellee. Kirby Peterson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, pro se appellee. Christopher Price, Sioux City, Iowa, pro se appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ. 2 POTT No. 0-323 / 09-1633 HILLTOP CARE CENTER and IOWA LONG TERM CARE RISK MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, Petitioners-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, vs. JULIE K. BURTON, Respondent-Appellant/Cross-Appellee. No. 0-345 / 09-0813 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CORY D. ANTLE AND TIFFANY C. ANTLE Upon the Petition of ... KENT D. STRICKER, Beneficiaries-Appellants. No. 0-404 / 09-1698 STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CHRISTOPHER TAD BRUINEKOOL, Defendant-Appellant. No. 0-406 / 09-1780 BANK OF THE WEST, Successor-In- Interest to Commercial Federal Bank, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. RANDALL L. SHIMA and REBECCA A. SHIMA, Defendants-Appellants. No. 0-409 / 09-1875 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF RONALD N. ARMSTRONG, JR. AND ANGELA F. THUNE, Upon the Petition of RONALD N. ARMSTRONG, JR., Petitioner ... -Appellee, And Concerning ANGELA F. THUNE, Respondent-Appellant. No. 0-410 / 09-1907 IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF MICHAEL A. FREDRICKSON AND HEATHER L. FREDRICKSON Upon the Petition of MICHAEL A. FREDRICKSON, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee, And Concerning HEATHER L. FREDRICKSON, Respondent-Appellee/Cross-Appellant. No. 0-415 / 08-1523 STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOSE ABEL GARCIA, Defendant-Appellant. No. 0-421 / 09-1042 STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. DARWIN

the record indicates L.R. has diligently sought assistance from a domestic abuse victim advocate during the past two years. The advocate testified L.R. has matured to the point where she has obtained her own apartment and is holding down a job. The advocate has worked with L.R. on safety planning and understanding that S.H. is not a healthy person to be around. L.R., who has a history of depression, also keeps regular appointments with a mental health counselor to work on issues of self-esteem and setting boundaries with S.H. The counselor testified that L.R. has made significant progress toward self-sufficiency and is able to manage the care of her son, who was born a month after K.H.’s removal. The counselor described L.R.’s advancement as follows: When I first started to work with her [L.R.] was sullen, she was very withdrawn, she avoided eye contact, she didn’t speak much when [S.H.] was around. She was living back and forth between [family homes] so she didn’t have a place of her own. She had no transportation of her own. She had no job. She allowed [S.H.] to make decisions for her. Her family appeared to be overly involved based on [L.R.’s] self report. It seemed like she was completely dependent on other people for all of her decision- 5 making. And also she admitted she was uncomfortable making decisions. At this point she is self-sufficient. She has her own vehicle. She has her own place to live. She cares for [her son]. And she admits that she does care for him . . . about 70 percent of the time . . . . And she still depends on her family for assistance with him, but it works for them, according to [L.R.]. The mother also completed a twelve-week parenting course called Incredible Years and consistently participated in the Family Safety, Risk and Permanency services offered to her. Given L.R.’s genuine efforts toward independence, we are unable to find that the State offered clear and convincing evidence that K.H. could not be returned to her custody. We also note the State’s evidence regarding L.R.’s current relationship with S.H. featured more speculation than fact. Witnesses testified that L:R. and S.H. reported being “just friends,” but social workers occasionally found S.H. present during unannounced visits to L.R.’s residence leading them to believe their relationship was more involved. The most compelling evidence concerning the couple’s relationship came from a family consultant who explained that the DHS implemented a safety plan for L.R.’s younger son which prohibited L.R. and S.H. from being together in his presence. The consultant testified she had no reason to believe they violated that safety plan. The State argues on appeal that in addition to the risk of domestic violence posed by L.R.’s ongoing relationship with S.H., the mother relies too heavily on others to help parent her children. As an example, the State asserts that during supervised visits, the mother required prompting to meet the needs of K.H. and the new baby. While this may have been a legitimate concern shortly 6 after the baby’s birth, the family consultant testified the mother has improved in her interactions with K.H. and is providing for her daughter’s needs. The consultant observed that L.R. has appropriate supplies on hand for K.H. and was never lacking for food to fix for her children. The State also points to a pattern of the mother passing off her children’s care onto relatives. The mother acknowledged to her therapist that she relied on her grandparents to care for her son about thirty percent of the time. L.R.’s grandfather testified that he and his wife care for the baby “mostly on days when she works.” We don’t believe the mother’s reliance on family members to help nurture her children as she gets back on her feet following a violent relationship necessarily supports the termination decision. The availability of a strong safety net of family caregivers should bode well for L.R.’s long-term prospects for success in parenting K.H. In considering whether to terminate parental rights, our primary considerations are the child’s safety; her physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs; and the placement which best provides for her long-term nurturing and growth. Iowa Code § 232.116(2); see In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (holding there is no all-encompassing best-interest standard to override the express terms of the statute). It is not clear from this record that terminating the mother’s parental rights serves the best interests of K.H. The State presented no evidence in the termination proceedings that the mother exposed K.H. to any family violence after the child’s removal and CINA adjudication. The DHS case manager agreed at the termination hearing that the 7 most recent reports from the Mid-Iowa Family Therapy Clinic revealed “no current safety concerns” in terms of L.R.’s home environment. According to the report, the supervised visits generally went well and the mother was following the basic expectations of the case plan. The report also noted K.H. was bonded with L.R. and enjoyed her visits with her mother and younger brother. We respectfully disagree with the juvenile court’s conclusion that the State presented clear and convincing evidence that K.H. could not be returned to her mother at the time of the termination hearing. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h). The termination of parental rights is generally final and irrevocable. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599, 606 (1982) (stating that parents are not given second chances after parental rights have been terminated absent some type of judicial relief). Although this is a close case, we find the bond between mother and daughter, the child’s placement with relatives, and the mother’s progress in gaining self- sufficiency after being in an abusive relationship all weigh against termination of parental rights at this time. This finding, of course, does not preclude a subsequent termination petition should

. 4 In November 2006, Jeremy was charged with domestic abuse assault and a no contact order was entered for Theresa ... Jeremy was struggling with substance abuse he took medication for depression and attempted suicide at age sixteen and ... MORRIS AND THERESA ANN MORRIS Upon the Petition of JEREMY LYNN MORRIS, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning

. Attorneys sometimes call this the Statistical Abstract Report. Request for Relief: Form 227 asks the court to grant your divorce if your spouse is not participating in the process. You tell the court what you want the terms of the divorce to be. The court considers this in a default Decree. Respondent: The person who receives the Petition for Dissolution of Marriage from that person’s spouse, who is Petitioner. Return of Service: On this form, the county sheriff or civil process server tells the court that Respondent has received a copy of the Petition and the Original Notice, or some other paper. Self-represented party: This refers to a person who handles his or her own court case with little or no help from an attorney. A self-represented party is sometimes called a pro se (pronounced “pro say”) party. “Pro se” is a Latin term, which means “for or on behalf of oneself.”  As a self-represented party, when you register to electronically file, you will pick “Registered Filer” as your category and be a “Pro se” filer. Serve (Service): To give your spouse a copy of a form or document, like the Petition and Original Notice. Some papers must be given in-person and some papers can be sent by mail.  After the Petition and Original Notice are personally served by the Petitioner, EDMS serves most papers by means of the Notice of Electronic Filing (NEF). Exceptions to electronic service are made for people who apply for and are granted an exemption by the court. See Rule 16.317 for rules on service of documents subsequent to the original notice.  Electronic Service: This is where an eFiled paper (legal document) is served by the EDMS on all Guide to Representing Yourself in an Iowa Divorce Case with Children p. 27 http://www.iowacourts.gov/eFiling/Training_Documents/ registered case parties who have filed an Answer (if a self-represented party) or an Appearance (if an attorney).  Mailed Service: This is where a paper (legal document) is delivered through the mail to a party in a court case to that party’s last known address.  Personal Service: This is where a paper (legal document) is delivered to a party in a court case by a party, another person, a sheriff, or some other civil process server. See forms 205 (Acceptance of Service), 206 (Directions for Service), and 210 (Affidavit of Service). Settlement Agreement: A paper with the final agreement between you and your spouse on how to settle your divorce. It is filed with the clerk of court and then given to the judge. The Settlement Agreement (form 228) will include the details of your dissolution of marriage (divorce), if the judge agrees those terms are fair to both sides and in the best interests of the children. Spousal support: Payment from one ex-spouse to another (or to a spouse during the divorce process) to avoid any unfair economic or financial consequences of a divorce. Courts do not always award spousal support. Spousal support may also be called alimony. Statistical Abstract Report: See “Report of Dissolution of Marriage or Annulment,” above. Subpoena: (Pronounced “suh-peena.”) A paper ordering a person to appear in court and give testimony. The court may impose a penalty on a person who fails to obey a subpoena without a good reason. Continued on the next page Guide to Representing Yourself in an Iowa Divorce Case with Children p. 28 X. Iowa Court Expectations of Parents in a Dissolution of Marriage Involving Children The judge in your case will expect each parent to act in the best interests of their children. This means that: 1. Each parent will promote respect and affection for the other parent. 2. Each parent will permit and encourage communication between the other parent and the children. 3. Neither parent will interfere between the children and the other parent. 4. Each parent will allow the other parent reasonable telephone and email contact with the children. 5. Each parent will have access to information about the children including medical, educational, and law enforcement records. 6. Each parent will tell the other parent if the children suffer an illness or accident requiring medical care. The parents will share with each other the results of any routine medical or dental examinations. 7. Each parent will provide advance notice to the other parent about needed medical and dental care, and each will inform the other of any medical emergencies. Each parent will oversee the completion of homework assignments, studying for tests, and music practice while the parent has care of the children. Each parent will encourage the children to visit friends and to attend school, church, and social activities. Each parent will tell the other of any events involving the children. 8. The extra-curricular activities of the children will be mutually discussed and planned for each child in advance. 9. The religious activities of the children will be mutually discussed and mutually planned for each child in advance. 10. Neither parent will post or allow to be posted any information about the children or pictures of the children on the internet without the other parent’s prior, specific consent. 11. Each parent will allow the other parent to have the children with him or her for special family events such as weddings, funerals, reunions, or major anniversaries and birthdays (e.g. grandparent's 50th wedding anniversary or 50th birthday). The other parent will provide as much advance notice of special events as possible. 12. Each parent will keep the other advised of his or her current address and telephone numbers for residence and business, unless this is not required to protect a victim of domestic abuse. 13 ... Dissolution of Marriage or Annulment: The Iowa Department of Public Health requires for each completed divorce that this

Se (Self Represented) for eFiling” at: http://www.iowacourts.gov/eFiling/Training_Documents/. Request for Relief (form 427): Use form 427 to ask the court to determine child custody and visitation matters if the other parent is not participating in the process. You tell the court what you want the terms of the Decree to be. The court considers this in a default Decree. Respondent: The parent who receives the Petition for Child Custody and Visitation from the other parent, http://www.iowacourts.gov/eFiling/Training_Documents/ Guide to Representing Yourself in an Iowa Custody and Visitation Case (Parents not Married) p. 26 who is Petitioner. Return of service: On this form, the county sheriff or civil process server tells the court that Respondent has received a copy of the Petition and the Original Notice, or some other document. Self-represented party: This refers to a person who handles his or her own court case with little or no help from an attorney. A self-represented party is sometimes called a pro se (pronounced “pro say”) party. “Pro se” is a Latin term that means “for or on behalf of oneself.”  As a self-represented party, when you register to electronically file, you will pick “Registered Filer” as your category and be a “Pro se” filer. Serve (Service): To give the other parent a copy of a form or document, like the Petition and Original Notice. Some papers must be given in-person and some papers can be sent by mail.  After the Petition and Original Notice are personally served by the Petitioner, EDMS serves most papers by means of the Notice of Electronic Filing. Exceptions to electronic service are made for people who apply for and are granted an exemption from electronic filing by the court. See Rule 16.315 for rules on service of documents subsequent to the original notice.  Electronic service: This is when EDMS serves a filed document on all registered case parties who have filed an Answer (if a self-represented party) or an Appearance (if an attorney).  Mailed service: This is where a paper (legal document) is delivered through the mail to a party in a court case to that party’s last known address.  Personal service: This is where a paper (legal document) is delivered to a party in a court case by a party, another person, a sheriff, or some other civil process server. See forms 405 (Acceptance of Service), 406 (Directions for Service), and 410 (Affidavit of Service). Settlement Agreement (form 428): A paper with the final agreement between you and the other parent on how to settle your case. It is filed with the clerk of court and then given to the judge. The Settlement Agreement will include the details of custody and visitation arrangements. Subpoena: (Pronounced “suh-peena.”) A document ordering a person to appear in court and give testimony. The court may impose a penalty on a person who fails to obey a subpoena without a good reason. Continued on the next page Guide to Representing Yourself in an Iowa Custody and Visitation Case (Parents not Married) p. 27 IX. Iowa Court Expectations of Parents in a Child Custody and Visitation Case The judge in your case will expect each parent to act in the best interests of their children. This means that: 1. Each parent will promote respect and affection for the other parent. 2. Each parent will permit and encourage communication between the other parent and the children. 3. Neither parent will interfere between the children and the other parent. 4. Each parent will allow the other parent reasonable telephone, email, and social media contact with the children. 5. Each parent will have access to information about the children including medical, educational, and law enforcement records. 6. Each parent will tell the other parent if the children suffer an illness or accident requiring medical care. The parents will share with each other the results of any routine medical or dental examinations. 7. Each parent will provide advance notice to the other parent about needed medical and dental care, and each will inform the other of any medical emergencies. Each parent will oversee the completion of homework assignments, studying for tests, music practice, and other extra-curricular activities while the parent has care of the children. Each parent will encourage the children to visit friends and to attend school, church, and social activities. Each parent will tell the other of any events involving the children. 8. The extra-curricular activities of the children will be mutually discussed and planned for each child in advance. 9. The religious activities of the children will be mutually discussed and planned for each child in advance. 10. Neither parent will post or allow to be posted any information about the children or pictures of the children on the internet without the other parent’s prior, specific consent. 11. Each parent will allow the other parent to have the children with him or her for special family events such as weddings, funerals, reunions, or major anniversaries and birthdays (e.g. grandparent's 50th wedding anniversary or 50th birthday). The other parent will provide as much advance notice of special events as possible. 12. Each parent will keep the other advised of his or her current address and telephone numbers for residence and business, unless this is not required to protect a victim of domestic abuse. 13 ... concerning crime victims  Sensitive security information  Home addresses Registration: You must register for an ... account to file electronically through EDMS. For help, visit the Iowa Judicial Branch website and see “How to Register Pro