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Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse March 2020 Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse Page 1 of 7 Read Protect ... abuse, call the confidential Iowa Domestic Violence Hotline: 1-800- 942-0333. In the Iowa District Court for County County where the Petition is filed Plaintiff Full name of person seeking relief from ... domestic abuse vs. Defendant Full name of alleged domestic abuser Civil no. Leave blank – Clerk of court will fill in Petition for Relief from

Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Minor Child March 2020 Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on ... Information Disclosure form. For other general information about domestic abuse, call the confidential Iowa Domestic Violence Hotline: 1-800- 942-0333. In the Iowa District Court for County County where Petition is filed Plaintiff Full name of parent or guardian seeking relief from ... abuse on behalf of Minor Child Initials of minor child in need of relief from domestic abuse vs. Defendant Full name of alleged domestic abuser Civil no. Leave blank – Clerk of court will fill in Petition for Relief

Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Ward March 2020 Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on ... Disclosure form. For other general information about domestic abuse, call the confidential Iowa Domestic Violence Hotline: 1-800- 942-0333. In the Iowa District Court for County County where Petition is filed Plaintiff Full name of parent or guardian seeking relief from ... abuse on behalf of Ward Initials of Ward, if a minor child, in need of relief from domestic abuse vs. Defendant Full name of alleged domestic abuser Civil no. Leave blank – Clerk of court will fill in Petition for Relief

If you are 18 or older, you can ask for protection for: Yourself from an intimate partner or family member with a “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse.” Your child who is under age 18 whose intimate partner is harming the child with a “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Minor.” A child who is legally in your care, sometimes called a “ward” or “protected person,” who is harmed by the person’s intimate partner or family member with a “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Ward.”

Guide for information on how to file at https://www.iowacourts.gov/static/static/media/cms/E0002_569890E51EF7C.pdf. If you cannot file electronically, you may go to your county courthouse for help with filing your Petition. There are three Petitions, and you must use the correct Petition for you or the person you are helping: If you need protection for yourself, use the “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse.” If you want to protect your minor child, use the “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Minor.” If you want to protect your ward or a person legally in your care, use the “Petition for Relief from Domestic Abuse on Behalf of a Ward.” ... To ask the court for help, prepare a “Petition” and file it with the Iowa District Court. To prepare a Petition, there are free court forms on the Iowa Judicial Branch website at (https://www.iowacourts.gov/for-the-public/court-forms/). The free court forms are also available from the clerk of court office at the courthouse in the county where you live. You may file your Petition electronically from your personal computer. If you file electronically, see the Iowa Judicial Branch eFile User

Protect Yourself from Domestic Abuse ©Iowa Judicial Branch 2019 1 Iowa Code Chapter 236—Domestic Abuse Protect Yourself from Domestic Abuse 1 What is domestic abuse? Domestic abuse, also called domestic violence, is when an intimate partner or family member assaults or injures, attempts to assault or injure, or threatens to harm you or the person you’re trying to protect, and that person’s actions:  Are meant to cause pain or injury or result in physical contact that offends you;  Place you in fear of immediate physical contact;  Involve pointing any firearm towards you, or displaying a dangerous weapon in threatening manner at you; or  Make it hard for you to breathe normally or limit your blood flow circulation. 2 How can I protect myself or someone else from domestic abuse? You can ask the court to help protect you, your minor child, or a minor child in your care from domestic abuse. The court does this with a “Protective Order.” “You” means you, your minor child, or a minor child legally in your care (also called a “ward” or “protected person”). If you need help with this process, you should contact an attorney. Additional places to get help are on page 6. You or the person you are seeking protection from (the defendant) must live in Iowa. 3 Who can ask for protection? If you are 18 or older, you can ask for protection for:  Yourself from an intimate partner or family member with a “Petition for Relief from ... Abuse on Behalf of a Ward.” 4 Do I have to know the defendant? You or your minor child or a minor child legally in your care, must have suffered domestic abuse from a person (the defendant), and you must be one of the following:  Married to or divorced from the defendant,  Separated from the defendant,  Adult relatives living together,  Living together,  Have lived together within one year of the assault, but not at the time of the assault,  Parents of the same minor child or children under age 18,  In an intimate or romantic relationship (the relationship does not have to be a sexual relationship), or  Have been in an intimate relationship and have had contact within one year of the assault. Protect Yourself from Domestic Abuse ©Iowa Judicial Branch 2019 2 5 What help can I get? You can ask the court to help protect you and order the person who hurt you to:  Stop the abuse.  Not contact you in any way, including in-person, by phone, in writing, through social media, or by another person.  Stay away from your home or the family home.  Provide housing, transportation, and financial support. 6 How do I ask the court for help? To ask the court for help, prepare a “Petition” and file it with the Iowa District Court.  To prepare a Petition, there are free court forms on the Iowa Judicial Branch website at (https://www.iowacourts.gov/for-the-public/court-forms/). The free court forms are also available from the clerk of court office at the courthouse in the county where you live.  You may file your Petition electronically from your personal computer. If you file electronically, see the Iowa Judicial Branch eFile User Guide for information on how to file at https://www.iowacourts.gov/static/static/media/cms/E0002_569890E51EF7C.pdf.  If you cannot file electronically, you may go to your county courthouse for help with filing your Petition. There are three Petitions, and you must use the correct Petition for you or the person you are helping:  If you need protection for yourself, use the “Petition for Relief from ... Abuse on Behalf of a Ward.” 7 What if I do not understand how to do this? If you need help with these instructions, you may contact:  A private attorney.  Iowa Legal Aid at 800.532.1275 (M – F, 8:30 am – 4:30 pm) or at www.iowalegalaid.org.  The Iowa State Bar Association “Find-A-Lawyer” at https://www.iowafindalawyer.com/.  Your local domestic violence victim advocacy program. If you are not sure who provides services in your area, call the Iowa Victim Service Call Center Hotline at 800.770.1650, or text IOWAHELP to 20121 (available 24/7).  The county attorney where you are filing your petition may provide help. Note: Clerks of court cannot give legal advice or tell you what to write on court forms. 8 Will I have to pay to file the Petition? In Iowa, you cannot be charged any money for asking the court for protection from domestic abuse. The court may order the defendant to pay costs in some cases. https://www.iowacourts.gov/for-the-public/court-forms/ https://www.iowacourts.gov/static/media/cms/E0002_569890E51EF7C.pdf http://www.iowalegalaid.org/ https://www.iowafindalawyer.com/ Protect Yourself from Domestic Abuse ©Iowa Judicial Branch 2019 3 What do I have to say in the Petition for Relief from

from the district court’s issuance of a domestic abuse protection order. REVERSED AND REMANDED. David A. Morse of Rosenberg, Stowers & Morse, Des Moines, for appellant. Joni Pierson, Waukee, pro se. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ. 2 EISENHAUER, J. Matthew Mullenix appeals from the district court’s issuance of a domestic abuse protection order. He contends there was insufficient evidence to show he committed domestic abuse. He also contends the court improperly acted as an advocate for a pro se litigant. Our review is de novo. Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). A petition for relief from ... abuse was filed by Joni Pierson under Iowa Code section 236(2)(d) (2005). Domestic abuse occurs when an assault takes place between persons who have been in an intimate relationship and have had contact within the past year of the assault. Iowa Code § 236.2(2)(d). There is no question the relationship existed within the year preceding the allegations. A person commits assault when, without justification, they do any of the following: 1. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. 2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. 3. Intentionally points any firearm toward another, or displays in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another. Iowa Code § 708.1. We conclude there is insufficient evidence to show Mullenix assaulted Pierson. The only acts alleged by Pierson in support of her petition for relief from ... abuse are a series of phone calls in which Mullenix stated, “You’re going to pay for this” or “You’re going to get it.” A mere threat, without more, is not necessarily an assault by placing another in fear. State v. Law, 306 N.W.2d 3 756, 759 (Iowa 1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wales, 325 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1982). “It is well settled that mere words, even at short range, do not constitute an assault. The fact that the words were spoken over the telephone line would of itself quite negative the theory of assault.” Kramer v. Ricksmeier, 159 Iowa 48, 51, 139 N.W. 1091, 1091 (Iowa 1913) (citations omitted). We reverse the protection order and remand for dismissal of the petition for relief from

appeals the district court’s orders dismissing her petition for relief from domestic abuse and granting Bassam Kadura’s ... cross-petition for relief from domestic abuse. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. Melody J. Butz of Butz ... appeals the district court’s order denying her petition for relief from domestic abuse and granting the petition filed

Robert Tornblom appeals from the district court’s grant of Catherine Tornblom’s petition for relief from domestic abuse. AFFIRMED ... . 2 HUITINK, P.J. James Robert Tornblom appeals from the district court’s grant of Catherine Tornblom’s petition for relief from domestic abuse. We ... form petition for relief from domestic abuse pursuant to chapter 236 of the Iowa Code (2007). In this petition she

dismissing her petition for relief from domestic abuse. AFFIRMED. Michelle Mackel-Wiederanders, Iowa Legal Aid ... BEEGHLY, S.J. I. Background Facts On August 29, 2008, Susan Osho filed a pro se petition for relief from domestic abuse under ... from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Martha L. Mertz, Judge. Plaintiff appeals the district court order

. Dawn Wegman, on behalf of her child, appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her petition for relief from domestic abuse filed ... district court’s dismissal of her petition for relief from domestic abuse. She argues dismissal was improper. We ... affirm finding Iowa Code chapter 236 does not apply to petitions for relief from domestic abuse by a parent on behalf of a child against the child’s other parent. I. Facts and Proceedings. Dawn filed a petition on

the district court’s grant of Angela Saladino’s petition for relief from domestic abuse. AFFIRMED. Dennis D ... EISENHAUER, J. Donald Harms appeals from the district court’s grant of Angela Saladino’s petition for relief from domestic abuse. He ... contends: (1) the district court erred in entering a final domestic abuse protective order restraining him from having contact with Saladino because he did not have sufficient notice of the “charge” against him, and (2) there was insufficient evidence showing he committed domestic abuse. We review these claims de novo. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Harms and Saladino were involved in an extramarital affair. Saladino filed a pro se petition for relief from

dismissal of her pro se petition for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Jennifer Cerutti, Sioux ... 11, 2007, Amber Abbenhaus filed a pro se petition for relief from domestic abuse naming Lucas Flannegan as the ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clay County, Nancy L. Whittenburg, Judge. Plaintiff appeals the

Ingalls-Coy appeals the district court’s order following her petition and hearing for relief from domestic abuse. AFFIRMED. David McManus of Sole & McManus, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant. John J. Wood of Beecher, Field, Walker, Morris, Hoffman, & Johnson P.C., Waterloo, for appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Danilson and Tabor, JJ. 2 DANILSON, J. Kathleen Ingalls-Coy appeals the district court’s order following her petition and ... filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse, claiming her former husband, Scott Medhaug, had endangered her. The ... relief from domestic abuse. She contends the district court failed to fulfill its procedural obligation to provide specific findings of fact and conclusions of law when dismissing her petition and

district court’s order dismissing her petition for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTION ... . 2 VOGEL, P.J. Christy Matthews appeals the district court’s order dismissing her petition for relief from domestic abuse. She ... abuse assault, and (2) refusing to hear evidence of Desplanques’s past acts of domestic abuse against her. We reverse and remand for a new trial. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Matthews and Desplanques, although never married, have a daughter together, born in 2004. A consent decree entered in December 2007 provides Desplanques supervised visitation. Matthews claims that Desplanques has threatened and assaulted her during their interactions surrounding the visitations. She filed a petition for relief from

of a domestic abuse protective order by the district court. AFFIRMED. Nicholas A. Bailey of Bailey Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Mitchellville, for appellant. Julie Gragen, Altoona, pro se. Considered by Potterfield, P.J., Doyle, J., and Huitink, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2011). 2 HUITINK, S.J. I. Background Facts & Proceedings. Mahlon and Julie Gragen are married. On July 18, 2011, Julie filed a petition for relief from ... abuse pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2011). She claimed Mahlon had wished she were dead, grabbed her arm leaving bruising, threatened to put a gun to her head and beat the “crap” out of her, and choked her. The court entered a temporary protective order and set a hearing for July 21, 2011. At the hearing, Julie testified the most recent incident had occurred in April 2011. She stated Mahlon told her, “I will not hesitate to put a gun to your—and beat the living sh** out of you, and I do not care who knows.” Julie stated he had her against a wall and had his hands around her neck, choking her. She testified that when he finally did let go of her he took her telephone so she could not call the police. She also testified about an earlier incident where Mahlon shoved her so hard she fell on her back. Julie stated she waited until July 2011 to report the abuse because recently he had started scaring her by asking why she was still alive. Mahlon denied laying his hands on Julie or acting in a threatening manner toward her. He testified Julie was a drug addict. Their family was involved with the Iowa Department of Human Services. Mahlon claimed Julie made up the claim of domestic abuse because she was angry with him because he reported her to the police for possession of drug paraphernalia. He also claimed Julie wanted him out of the house so she could sell their possessions in order to pay for illegal drugs. 3 The district court issued a final domestic abuse protective order, prohibiting Mahlon from having contact with Julie for one year. The court found by a preponderance of the evidence that domestic abuse had occurred. The court found that after observing the parties, Mahlon was not credible on issues regarding abuse. Mahlon appeals the court’s decision. II. Standard of Review. Civil domestic abuse cases are heard in equity, and our review is de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). “Respectful consideration is given to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but not to the extent where those holdings are binding upon us.” Id. III. Merits. Mahlon contends the district court failed to give proper weight to the length of time from the occurrence of the alleged domestic abuse to when it was reported. He asserts that the fact Julie did not file a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Terry Rickers, Judge. A husband appeals the entry

your current husband rot in hell, I hope you die.” On November 7, 2005, Hosch filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. She ... assault. Domestic abuse occurs when an assault occurs between persons divorced from each other. Iowa Code § 236.2(2)(b) (2005). A person commits assault when, without justification, they do any of the following: 1. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. 2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. 3. Intentionally points any firearm toward another, or displays in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another. Iowa Code § 708.1. Upon de novo review, Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994), we conclude the evidence is not sufficient to support a finding Rolle assaulted Hosch. Rolle’s phone message to Hosch did not indicate that he intended to bring about harm to Hosch or her husband. However, even if we consider the message a threat, it does not meet the definition of assault. By threatening another with immediate serious injury, an assault is not necessarily committed. State v. Law, 306 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Iowa 1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wales, 325 N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1982). A mere threat, without more, is not necessarily an assault by placing another in fear. Id. In its ruling on Rolle’s post-judgment motion, the district court focuses on Hosch’s belief that Rolle had the apparent ability to execute the act which he threatened. However, the ability to execute such act must be apparent to the offender, not the victim. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1997). At 4 the time he made the phone call, Rolle was in LaMotte, many miles from Hosch’s home. He never approached Hosch or her home that day or in the six days following. Upon review of the evidence, it is apparent that Rolle was frustrated with Hosch’s failure to adhere to their agreement regarding the children. He made a call in which he wished Hosch and her husband ill. He did not voice any intent to harm Hosch or her husband. He did not approach Hosch or her home and was nowhere in the vicinity of Hosch when the call was made. He did not even speak directly with Hosch, but left a voice message. Rolle had no apparent ability to immediately cause Hosch harm. Although Hosch testified Rolle had made “intimidating” phone calls to her in the two years since surrendering his parental rights, she admitted his threats were that of taking her to court. Rolle has never come to Hosch’s property or touched her since the divorce. One phone message in which Rolle expressed his anger with her, however inappropriately, is not sufficient to warrant a domestic abuse protective order. We reverse the protection order and remand for dismissal of the petition for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jones County, Douglas S. Russell, Judge. Thomas Rollee appeals from

from the district court’s decision finding he committed a domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005). AFFIRMED. Jeanne Johnson, Des Moines, and Deborah McKittrick, Ankeny, for appellant. Laura Lockard of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Miller and Baker, JJ. 2 ZIMMER, P.J. Richard Thielman appeals from the district court’s entry of a domestic abuse protective order following a hearing held on a petition for relief from ... abuse filed by his former spouse, Lisa Thielman. He contends the evidence was not sufficient to prove he committed civil domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005). Richard and Lisa were divorced in June 2005. They share custody of their son, Erich. The parties have had some disagreements while transferring physical care of their son. As a result, they exchange custody of Erich at the Ankeny police station instead of their homes. On April 25, 2006, Lisa filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas Staskal, Judge. Richard Thielman appeals

final domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. Stephen B. Jackson, Cedar Rapids, for appellant. Kara L. McFadden, Cedar Rapids, for appellee. Considered by Eisenhauer, P.J., and Potterfield and Tabor, JJ. 2 EISENHAUER, P.J. Thomas and Dana Wolfe married in October 2007 and are the parents of a two-year-old daughter. In early June 2010, the couple lived with Thomas’s parents. Dana testified on June 12, 2010, Thomas pushed her and grabbed their daughter from her as Dana was attempting to put the child in a car seat. Dana called the police. The police officer testified Dana did not “prove or show any marks of physical abuse,” and he did not file criminal charges. Dana testified that after the police left, Thomas was physically intimidating and made threatening statements. On June 17, 2010, Dana’s attorney notarized Dana’s petition for relief from ... abuse; it was subsequently filed, and a temporary protective order was entered on June 21. See Iowa Code § 236.3 (2009). Dana’s petition acknowledged Thomas had filed for divorce on June 14, alleged Thomas physically abused and threatened her, and stated she feared for her physical safety. On July 1, 2010, the court conducted a hearing on Dana’s petition. Thomas testified and directly contradicted Dana’s testimony: (1) he did not assault Dana and (2) he did not argue with and threaten Dana after the police officer left. Thomas’s parents and the police officer testified, but none of them saw the incident at the car. The court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, Thomas committed a domestic abuse assault against Dana, and Thomas “represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [Dana].” The court entered a final domestic abuse 3 protective order prohibiting Thomas from having any contact with Dana, effective until July 1, 2011. See id. § 236.5(2). Thomas appeals the court’s order arguing: “The trial court erred in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Thomas committed a domestic abuse assault against Dana.” We review civil domestic abuse cases de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). “Respectful consideration is given to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but not to the extent where those holdings are binding upon us.” Id. Because this is a civil proceeding, Dana’s burden is to prove the occurrence of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. at 596. “In order to prove domestic abuse, sufficient facts of assault must be alleged.” Id. See Iowa Code § 708.1. After our de novo review of the record and after giving weight to the trial court’s ability to see the witnesses and determine credibility, we conclude there is sufficient evidence to establish by a preponderance of the evidence an assault occurred. The issue can only be resolved by evaluating the credibility of the testimony of Dana and Thomas. She says he shoved her; he says he did not. The trial court found he did. We defer to the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm. Thomas also argues this court should modify the protective order to permit the district court, in the dissolution of marriage action, to enter orders regarding the custody of the parties’ child. We note the supreme court on December 10, 2010, entered an order stating the issues relating to child custody are collateral to this appeal and the district court retained jurisdiction. 4 Dana requests $3000 in appellate attorney fees, which are discretionary. See Iowa Code § 236.5(3). We decline to award attorney fees. Costs are taxed to Thomas. AFFIRMED. Tabor, J., concurs; Potterfield, J., dissents. 5 POTTERFIELD, J. (dissenting) I respectfully dissent and would reverse the finding of domestic abuse. In so doing, I appreciate that an experienced district court judge heard the testimony and evaluated the credibility of the witnesses. I acknowledge this court is to give “respectful consideration” to the findings of fact and credibility determinations of the district court. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). However, the form orders used by the district court supply only a bare minimum finding of fact (“Respondent committed a domestic abuse assault”) and a quasi-determination of credibility (“Respondent represents a credible threat”), leaving this court with very little to which we can defer. The form orders do not allow for meaningful findings, and the order on appeal does not reveal which of the disputed facts were persuasive or which of the witnesses were credible. After a de novo review of the record, including the sequence of events emphasized by the respondent, I am convinced the evidence is insufficient to support a finding of domestic abuse. The police officer who spoke to Dana, Thomas, and Thomas’s mother immediately after the incident testified he saw no basis for filing a criminal charge that evening, primarily because he saw “no physical marks of reddening” resulting from the “violent push” described by Dana. He testified he believed Thomas when he said he did not push Dana. Thomas’s father testified he witnessed the event from the kitchen door. He saw Thomas and Dana on opposite sides of the open car door and saw Thomas turn around with Maya in his arms. He did not see an assault, but he did see the two parents at the car where Dana said the assault occurred. Thomas’s 6 father testified that he and Dana sat on the porch and talked “at length” after Thomas took the child into the house. Dana did not mention any shove or physical assault to her father-in-law immediately after Thomas removed Maya from the car. Dana returned to the house and spoke with her mother-in-law, who testified that although Dana “tells [her] everything,” Dana did not mention she had been pushed. Dana remained in the home the rest of the night and waited to file her petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Thomas Horan, Judge. Husband appeals the court’s entry of a

boyfriend appeals the district court’s grant of a domestic abuse protective order to the mother of his two children. AFFIRMED. Gary D. McKenrick of Cartee & McKenrick, P.C., Davenport, for appellant. David A. Millage of Gallagher, Millage & Gallagher, P.L.C., Bettendorf, for appellee. Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ. 2 TABOR, Presiding Judge. Jerry Waldron Jr. appeals a final domestic abuse protective order prohibiting him from having contact with Ann Tessier, with whom he has two children in common. He contends Tessier presented insufficient credible evidence that he assaulted her. After reviewing the record,1 we find Tessier carried her burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to a protective order under Iowa Code section 236.5(1)(b) (2015). Waldron and Tessier started dating in 2004 and lived together from 2006 until 2014. At the time of the domestic abuse proceedings in 2015, their children were ages three and five. On July 21, 2015, Tessier filed a petition for relief from ... abuse, alleging she feared for her safety and the safety of her children. She described the most recent assault as follows: “Last week, Jerry threw a racket at me in front of my children.” She also alleged Waldron had threatened to kill her twice in front of the children and had given her bloody noses several times during their relationship. She further claimed he pushed her off the front stoop, had stolen things from her house, had broken into her computer, “calls and texts at all hours of the day,” harasses her mother and babysitters, and has “called [her] every name that is degrading.” The district court issued a temporary protective order the same day. See Iowa Code § 236.4(2). 1 Because the case was tried in equity, our review is de novo. See Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). That standard means, after examining both the facts and the law, we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and presented for appellate review. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). We give weight to the district court’s findings, particularly its credibility determinations, but our obligation to adjudicate the issue anew means we must satisfy ourselves the petitioning party has offered the quantum and quality of evidence sufficient to prove the statutory ground for issuing a protective order. Id. 3 After a contested hearing, the court granted Tessier’s petition for relief from ... has engaged in domestic abuse.” Id. § 236.5(1). “Domestic abuse” means an “assault as defined in section 708.1

December 2003. Soon after her petition was filed, Penny filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. A judge ... issued. Following an evidentiary hearing held January 13, 2004, the court dismissed Penny’s petition for relief from domestic abuse after ... for relief from domestic abuse was dismissed, Penny took Kylie to Blank Children’s Hospital because the child had cuts

. http://www.iowacourts.gov/ PETITIONS FOR RELIEF FROM DOMESTIC ABUSE, ELDER ABUSE, OR SEXUAL ABUSE If you wish to file a petition for ... relief from domestic abuse, elder abuse, or sexual abuse, please call the Clerk of Court’s office ... for TODAY? If “YES,” for admittance to the courthouse, call the Clerk of Court’s office at: _______________ You

appeals the district court’s entry of a domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. Don M. Peterson, Council Bluffs, for appellant. Matthew V. Stierman of Stierman Law Office, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellee. Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vogel, J., and Robinson, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007). 2 ROBINSON, S.J. I. Background Facts & Proceedings On December 27, 2006, Charlotte Owens filed a petition for relief from ... abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005). She alleged Jerry Owens had been physically abusive to her prior to the parties’ separation in May 2006. Her petition stated Jerry had, in the past, assaulted her by hitting her with his fists, and had dragged her into a room and confined her there against her will. She further alleged Jerry had “thrown her around,” blackened her eyes, and knocked out teeth. She alleged that on the morning of December 27, Jerry had followed her car on the interstate, and this was frightening to her. As a result, she filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge. Defendant

their petitions for relief from domestic abuse. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Rhoda M. Tenuta of Legal Services Corp. of Iowa, Sioux City, for appellant. Tamera Peterson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, pro se appellee. Kirby Peterson, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, pro se appellee. Christopher Price, Sioux City, Iowa, pro se appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, J. I. Background Facts and Proceedings A. Taylor v. Tamera Peterson and Taylor v. Kirby Peterson On September 22, 2009, Barbara Taylor filed two pro se petitions for relief from domestic abuse. She used the standard forms required for petitions for relief from domestic abuse. The named defendants were Tamera Peterson, Taylor‟s daughter, and Kirby Peterson, Tamera‟s husband. The petitions did not state clearly the relationships among the parties, although Taylor checked the box for “Lived together within one year of the assault, but not at the time of the assault,” a relationship qualifying for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2009).1 In her petition against ... rescind the orders dismissing her petitions for relief from domestic abuse and enter orders setting hearings on her petitions. On September 28, 2009, the district court denied Taylor‟s motion, stating that since it was required to use a form order approved by the supreme court to grant an ex parte temporary protective order, it was expected to “perform a valid gateway function in determining whether matters brought before it pursuant to Chapter 236 are advanced.” B. Snyder v. Price On October 13, 2009, Megan Snyder filed a pro se petition for ... the assault, a relationship qualifying for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236. In her narrative, Snyder asserted that on October 10, 2009, Price held the parties‟ eight-month-old child in his arms “bouncing her head around while freaking out.” She further stated that Price called the police and continued “[s]creaming and shaking [the child‟s] head around while the cop was there.” She alleged that this incident occurred in front of her other child who was six years old at the time. On October 13, 2009, the district court issued an order denying temporary relief and dismissing the petition. The

. Certiorari proceeding reviewing district court’s ruling on a chapter 236 domestic abuse petition. WRIT SUSTAINED; REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS. Nancy Lynn Robertson of the Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Des Moines, for appellant. Louis M. Fusco, Indianola, for Skylar Hobbs. Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Huitink and Mahan, JJ. 2 HUITINK, J. Lisa Hobbs filed this petition for writ of certiorari from the district court’s ruling on her chapter 236 domestic abuse petition. She claims the court erred when it found her petition moot and, without her consent, adopted a no-contact order identical to a no-contact order in a related criminal complaint. We sustain the writ, vacate the order, and remand for further proceedings. I. Facts and Prior Proceedings On October 29, 2005, Lisa reported to the police that her husband, Skylar, lunged at her and spit in her face. Based on her statement, Hobbs was arrested and charged with simple domestic abuse assault. Pursuant to this charge, the court entered a criminal no-contact order on November 4, 2005. This order was modified twice, without prior notice to Lisa, to allow Skylar phone contact with their children and to allow him to attend their school activities. On December 20, 2005, Lisa filed a chapter 236 civil petition for relief from ... abuse. Lisa based her request for the civil protection order on the aforementioned incident, an incident in July 2005 where Skylar slammed her into a wall, a previous threat that Skylar was going to shoot her, and an unspecified allegation of sexual abuse. Lisa also alleged that guns were missing and she was now “in a higher state of fear.” Lisa requested the court order Skylar to (1) stop the domestic abuse, (2) stay away from the family home, (3) stay away from her work or school, (4) give her temporary custody of the children, (5) give her financial support, (6) give her temporary possession of the family home, (7) take part in counseling, and (8) not contact her personally or through another person by telephone or writing. Several of these items, including the request for 3 financial support and the request that Skylar be ordered to participate in counseling, were not included in the criminal no-contact order. The court issued a temporary civil protective order on December 20, 2005. On December 23, 2005, Skylar filed a motion to quash the temporary order, stating that Lisa “already has a remedy to modify the current no-contact order or to allege violations of the current order if that is her desire.” On the same day, the court issued an order modifying the protective order so that Skylar could contact his children by telephone. The petition for relief from ... -Appellant, vs. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WARREN COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee

, Judge. Greg Wilson appeals from the district court order granting Shelli Wilson’s petition for relief from domestic abuse. AFFIRMED ... BOWER, J. Greg Wilson appeals from the district court order granting Shelli Wilson’s petition for relief from domestic abuse. He ... committed an act of domestic abuse. Shelli requests an award of her appellate attorney fees. Because Shelli met her burden of proving Greg committed an act of domestic abuse, we affirm the district court’s order. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Greg and Shelli are married with four children. They share a home together in Ames. Greg works as an advanced software developer, and Shelli is a stay-at-home mom. On April 17, 2012, Shelli filed a petition for relief from

Hunter Kiersch appeals a civil domestic abuse protective order issued in favor of his spouse, Rebecca Jane Kiersch. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Natalie H. Cronk of Law Offices of Natalie H. Cronk, Iowa City, for appellant. Rebecca Kiersch, Iowa City, pro se. Considered by Eisenhauer, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ. 2 EISENHAUER, C.J. Scott Hunter Kiersch appeals a civil domestic abuse protective order issued in favor of his wife, Rebecca Jane Kiersch. He contends the district court’s finding he committed domestic abuse assault is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence. Scott argues there was insufficient evidence he performed an act “intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.” See Iowa Code §§ 236.2(2), 708.1(2) (2011). On our de novo review of the record, we agree. Rebecca’s petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Nancy A. Baumgartner, Judge. Scott ... domestic

business, Mary filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse, alleging Timothy had threatened her and she feared for ... physical care of the children. On June 8, a contested hearing was held on the petition for relief from domestic abuse. The ... SCHUMACHER AND MARY SCHUMACHER Upon the Petition of TIMOTHY WAYNE SCHUMACHER, Petitioner-Appellant/Cross-Appellee

. Also on December 6, 2012, at 12:02 p.m., Vileta filed a verified petition for relief from domestic abuse, stating ... boyfriend of hers,” which Rhoads intended to introduce as evidence in the hearing on Vileta’s petition for protection from domestic violence. The following day, December 8, Rhoads again emailed watchdawg4, stating: “If you got my previous email do not answer to that address as Lisa has hacked into it. Respond to this new address or call [me]. I need to speak with Jim Schico before my hearing with Lisa on Dec 20th.” Rhoads received his first response from the watchdawg4 account later that day, asking, “What is it that you want to know about Lisa Vileta[?]” Unbeknownst to him, the watchdawg4 account belonged to Vileta. In an exchange of emails over the course of the next few days, Vileta—as watchdawg4—purported to be Schico. On December 11, 2012, Vileta sent an email from the watchdawg4 account that hinted at a murder-for-hire plot: I called into [Vileta’s place of work] today. They gave me her work schedule. I have resources to make this go away once and for all. She works late every Friday night until 9. I have a private contractor that will help aid in getting rid of Ms. Vileta. This Friday he will come in as a customer, a good looking man, in his 50’s[,] wandering throughout the store close to closing time. [Beforehand], Ms. Vileta[’]s car will have been tampered with, little silver car, needing help, he will be in the parking lot ready to assist her. After that, Ms. Vileta will no longer be a problem for you or I. Rhoads reported the message to the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI), which eventually determined Vileta to be the owner of the watchdawg4 account. At trial, Rhoads testified he never verbally threatened Vileta, physically assaulted her, or touched her in an unwanted fashion. He described an incident in which Vileta, who was intoxicated, attempted to provoke him into a physical confrontation, but he testified that he took action to prevent the situation from 6 escalating. Rhoads then summarized a conversation he had with Vileta the next day, in which he explained to her the seriousness of the situation: I made it very clear to her that the very worst thing that can possibly happen to a law enforcement officer is any allegations of domestic assault. I made it very clear to her that once an officer has the allegation, they lose their gun typically, which means they lose their job. Rhoads also denied ever telling Vileta that he would use his position to make her regret talking back to him or that he would use his position as a deputy sheriff to do her any harm. Rhoads further testified Vileta’s claim that he had contacted Schico was false because at the time she made that statement, he had never spoken to Schico and the email he sent to watchdawg44 was undeliverable. Rhoads testified that, despite what Vileta had told him, he never believed the person he was emailing to be Schico; he thought the account “possibly [belonged to] a private investigator.” Vileta admitted at trial that Rhoads never physically abused her. However, she testified that when she filled out the petition for relief from domestic abuse, she ... . 2. The oath or affirmation was made in an Iowa Code Chapter 236 Relief from Domestic Abuse Petition filed in Tama County District Court. 3. The Defendant made a statement(s) of material fact. 4. The statement(s) was false when it was made. 5. Defendant knew the statement(s) was false. In order to find Vileta guilty of Count II of perjury, the jury was instructed that the State was required to prove: 1. On or between December 6 and December 7, 2012, the Defendant was under oath or affirmation. 2. The oath or affirmation was made in a Tama County Sheriff’s Voluntary Statement Form. 3. The Defendant made a statement(s) of material fact. 4. The statement(s) was false when it was made. 5. Defendant knew the statement(s) was false. The jury found Vileta guilty of both counts of perjury as charged. Vileta appeals. She argues there is insufficient evidence to support her convictions because the evidence does not support a finding she knew the material statements she made—that Rhoads had contacted Schico—were false at the time she made them. II. Scope and Standard of Review. We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law. See State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa 2016). In reviewing a sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim, we view the record in the light most favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from it. See id. We uphold the verdict if it is supported by substantial evidence. See id. “Evidence is substantial when ‘a rational trier of fact could conceivably find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. (citation 8 omitted). Evidence is not substantial if it raises only “suspicion, speculation, or conjecture.” Id. (citation omitted). III. Sufficiency of the Evidence. Vileta does not dispute that she made false, material statements, but she instead challenges the sufficiency of the evidence showing she knew the statements she made were false. Specifically, she argues that at the time she made the petition for relief from

filed a dissolution petition. Michelle Taylor countered with a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The district ... . TAYLOR AND MICHELLE L. TAYLOR Upon the Petition of TODD M. TAYLOR, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning ... the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M. Alpers, Judge. Todd Taylor appeals the entry of a temporary

district court’s entry of a domestic abuse protective order. REVERSED. Norman L. Springer Jr. of McGinn, McGinn, Springer & Noethe, Council Bluffs, for appellant. Matthew V. Stierman of Stierman Law Office, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellee. Considered by Sackett, C.J., Mahan and Potterfield, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, J. I. Background Facts & Proceedings On October 12, 2007, this court affirmed a final domestic abuse protective order involving these same parties. Owens v. Owens, No. 07-667 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 12, 2007). The order prohibited Jerry Owens from committing further acts of abuse or threats of abuse, and from having any contact with Charlotte Owens. That protective order granted a December 27, 2006 petition for relief from ... abuse under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005) in which Charlotte Owens alleged Jerry Owens had been physically abusive to her prior to the parties’ separation in May 2006. Her petition stated Jerry had, in the past, assaulted her by hitting her with his fists, and had dragged her into a room and confined her there against her will. She further alleged Jerry had “thrown her around,” blackened her eyes, and knocked out teeth. She alleged that on the morning of December 27, Jerry had followed her car on the interstate, and this was frightening to her. In a hearing in the chapter 236 action on February 5, 2007, Charlotte was asked if Jerry had done anything to her in the “last several months,” while the divorce was pending, to make her fear him. She testified Jerry got in her face and said, “Do you want to know what a real beatin’ is like? Let me give it to you.” During Jerry’s testimony he was asked, “Have you ever threatened her physically since December of 2006?” He answered, “no,” but in effect admitted to earlier assaultive behavior. On appeal Jerry contended there was insufficient evidence that he had committed an assault, which would support a finding of domestic abuse. We 3 concluded there was substantial evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that Jerry committed domestic abuse, relying in part upon Charlotte’s unrefuted testimony that Jerry had gone face to face with her and threatened to beat her. We found that Jerry did an act intended to place Charlotte in fear of immediate physical contact which would be painful or injurious, and there was apparent ability to execute the act. The first protective order expired on February 5, 2008. Charlotte did not seek an extension of the order. See Iowa Code § 236.5(2)(e). On July 7, 2008, Charlotte again filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Charles L. Smith, Judge. Defendant appeals the

from entry of a final domestic abuse protective order. VACATED AND REMANDED. Steven E. Goodlow, Albia, for appellant. Meagen Rochelle Barra, Albia, appellee pro se. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ. 2 MCDONALD, Judge. Wesley Everett appeals from a final domestic abuse protective order issued pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2015). Our review is de novo. See Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). Meagen Barra filed her petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, Lucy J. Gamon, Judge. Defendant appeals ... domestic

celebrated his first birthday in March of 2009. On November 18, 2009, Niki filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse alleging ... in her petition for relief. She further acknowledged that the birthday party was in March of 2009 and she did not seek any relief from that alleged event. Niki’s sister, Kristy Kappelman, testified she saw Jeffrey shake her sister at the birthday party but had not seen similar behavior since. Heidi Lohne, also Niki’s sister, testified she saw Jeffrey grab Niki by her arms and jerk her. Jeffrey testified. He denied he threatened to pull Niki by her hair. He said he had not thrown things in Niki’s direction, or made threats that indicated his intention to hurt Niki, nor did he shake her at their son’s birthday party. Jeffrey’s mother testified that she had not heard Niki express any fear of Jeffrey and while at the birthday party, did not see Jeffrey put his hands on Niki. Kenneth Robertson, Jeffrey’s father, who is part of the Ringgold County Sheriff’s Posse, testified he was at the birthday party and Jeffrey and Niki interacted as a loving couple, he had no concern about Jeffrey’s behavior, and did not see Jeffrey put his hands on his wife and shake her but they did hug. Following the close of the testimony the district court made oral findings. Noting that the testimony about the birthday party incident was conflicting, the court found there was more credible testimony the incident occurred and it would 4 constitute an assault under Iowa Code section 708.1. The court concluded the alleged hair pulling incident was more a verbal altercation and that the evidence did not support a finding domestic abuse assault ... 708.1(1) or (2). The court specifically found Jeffery had committed domestic abuse assault and he represents a credible threat to the physical safety of Niki and the court entered the protective order. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Civil domestic abuse cases are heard in equity and, thus, deserve a de novo review. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001); see Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We review the record in its entirety and formulate our own opinion. In re Marriage of Beecher, 582 N.W.2d 510, 512-13 (Iowa 1998) (“We examine the entire record and adjudicate anew rights on the issues properly presented.”). Respectful consideration is given to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but those findings are not binding upon us. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. DID TWO ASSAULTS OCCUR? Jeffrey’s contention is that there is no evidence to support a finding that an assault or assaults occurred. He contends the district court erred in concluding that he committed domestic abuse at the birthday party. He contends that Niki’s testimony and that of her two sisters did not provide substantial information as to where in the home and at what point in the birthday party the incident occurred. He notes that his parents testified they 5 witnessed no such incident and his father testified Niki and Jeffrey were loving towards each other at the birthday party and that they provided a description of Niki’s home. He argues it is implausible such an incident could occur without more people seeing it happen, given the fact the home where the party was held was small and there were a number of people there. Jeffrey asks why, if it were as serious as Niki claimed, she did not call the police or report the incident before the day of the hearing and why she failed to mention the incident in her petition for relief from

McDonald, JJ. 2 MCDONALD, J. Tom Arens appeals from a final domestic abuse protective order issued pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2013). The challenged order limits Tom’s contact with his spouse Crissy Arens. On appeal, Tom challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that he committed domestic abuse assault against Crissy. We affirm. I. On August 2, 2013, Crissy filed her petition for relief from ... committed domestic abuse assault when Tom grabbed Crissy’s arms and/or spit in her face. II. We review a civil domestic abuse proceeding tried in equity de novo. See Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We examine both the law and the facts, and we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and presented for appellate review. See Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). We give weight to the district court’s findings, particularly its credibility 6 determinations, but our obligation to adjudicate the issues anew means that we will not rubber stamp what has gone before. A party seeking a protective order pursuant to chapter 236 must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a domestic abuse assault occurred. See Iowa Code §§ 236.4(1), 236.5 (providing that relief is available “[u]pon a finding that the defendant has engaged in domestic abuse”); Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 596 (stating that the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence); Knight, 525 N.W.2d at 843. “Domestic abuse” means “committing an assault as defined in Iowa Code section 708.1” where the victim and assailant have a relationship governed by chapter 236, such as an assault involving “family or household members” or the “parents of the same minor child.” Iowa Code § 236.3(2). As relevant here, Iowa Code section 708.1(2) defines assault as follows: 2. A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following: a. Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. b. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Our supreme court has held that assault under section 708.1(2) requires proof of specific intent. See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Iowa 2010); State v. Bedard, 668 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 2003). Specific intent is present when it is shown from the circumstances that the assailant subjectively desired the prohibited result. See Fountain, 786 N.W.2d at 264. To support a finding of assault, there thus must be sufficient proof that the defendant acted with the intent: (1) to cause pain or injury; (2) to make insulting or offensive physical 7 contact; or (3) to make the victim fear immediate painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive physical contact. Id; see Wyatt v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Svcs., 744 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2008). “Intent is a state of mind; it may be established by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn from that evidence.” State v. Nance, 533 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Iowa 1995). In an assault allegation, the focus “is on the offender’s intent, not the victim’s expectations.” Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1997). Whether the victim was afraid is not dispositive; “the focus of the assault statute is on the defendant, not the victim.” State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 535 (Iowa 2006). We begin our discussion by noting that we do have concerns regarding Crissy’s credibility and her motivation in seeking relief under chapter 236. See Cooper v. Cooper, No. 03-0324, 2004 WL 61106, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2004) (Zimmer, J., concurring) (suggesting that motivation for filing chapter 236 petition was ... and filing a petition for dissolution of the parties’ marriage. The petition for relief from domestic abuse is

Iowa District Court for Sac County, Gary L. McMinimee, Judge. Defendant appeals a final domestic abuse protective order entered by the district court. AFFIRMED. James R. Van Dyke of Eich, Van Dyke & Werden, P.L.C., Carroll, for appellant. Charles A. Schulte of Schulte & Graven Law Firm, P.C., Sac City, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mullins, J., and Huitink, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2011). 2 HUITINK, S.J. S.E.H. appeals from the trial court’s final protective order entered in Iowa Code chapter 236 (2011) proceedings. S.E.H. contends the record is insufficient to support the trial court’s determination he committed domestic abuse assault against his estranged wife, H.K.H. More specifically, S.E.H. argues the evidence fails to show he had the specific intent to commit the underlying assault required for an adjudication of domestic abuse. Because a preponderance of the evidence of record establishes S.E.H. committed domestic abuse assault against H.K.H., we affirm. I. Background Facts & Proceedings. H.K.H. filed a petition for relief from ... domestic ... abuse

does not support a finding of domestic abuse or that there was any present danger to Shelly. He also claims the court erred in awarding Shelly temporary physical care. Shelly filed a petition for relief from ... domestic abuse on ... from the Iowa District Court for Chickasaw County, George L. Stigler, Judge. A husband appeals the court’s

appeals a civil domestic abuse protective order issued in favor of his ex-wife, Lisa Wiederien. REVERSED AND REMANDED. A. Eric Neu of Neu, Minnich, Comito & Hall, P.C., Carroll, for appellant. Lisa Wiederien, Bayard, pro se. Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Baker, JJ. 2 VAITHESWARAN, J. Ronald Wiederien appeals a civil domestic abuse protective order issued in favor of his ex-wife, Lisa Wiederien. He contends the district court’s finding that he committed domestic abuse assault is unsupported by a preponderance of the evidence. He specifically maintains there was insufficient evidence he performed an act “intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.” See Iowa Code §§ 236.2(2), 708.1(2) (2007). On our de novo review of the record, we agree. Lisa’s petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Guthrie County, Dale B. Hagen, Judge. Ronald Wiederien ... domestic

abuse. He also contends the district court erred in admitting the testimony of a licensed social worker concerning information obtained in counseling sessions. We find the issues moot as the protective order has expired and dismiss the case. I. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Civil domestic abuse cases are heard in equity, consequently we review de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001); Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). II. BACKGROUND. In the parties’ dissolution decree primary physical care of their daughter, Sydney, was placed with Katherine, and Ricky was granted visitation. On August 29, 2006, Ricky, following a visitation period, dropped Sydney off at Katherine’s home, and as he was hugging her good-bye he told her he was looking forward to the upcoming Labor Day weekend as Sydney was scheduled for a visit with him then. Katherine, who believed Sydney was to be with her Labor Day weekend, in front of Sydney and with no apparent concern for Sydney’s feelings, immediately started arguing with Ricky. Katherine contended that she and Ricky had an agreement that she was to have Sydney then. The child understandably became upset. What happened next is a bit confusing as Ricky, Katherine, and Sydney are not in agreement as to the events. It does appear that Katherine 3 either attempted to put a hand out to Sydney or she pushed Ricky and Ricky then either, according to his testimony, pushed Katherine’s hand away, or, according to Katherine’s testimony, smacked her hand. Ricky left. Katherine called the police. Sydney, understandably upset by her parents’ behavior, called her father and told him her mother was calling the police. Ricky was ultimately arrested for domestic abuse assault. He pled guilty to disorderly conduct and the domestic abuse assault charge was dismissed. On August 31, 2006, Katherine filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, James Q. Blomgren, Judge. Ricky L ... , L.L.P., Ottumwa, for appellant. Theodore F. Sporer and Meghan S. Hanson of Sporer & Flanagan, P.C., Des Moines, for

DANILSON, J. Mitzi McElree appeals from the district court’s dismissal of her petition for relief from domestic abuse. Because ... petition for relief from domestic abuse against her husband, Richard McElree, whom she asserted had “physically abused ... . Basically you have to establish that domestic abuse has occurred and that currently the defendant is a threat to you. From the─both the petition and from the exhibits, I cannot determine that domestic abuse has occurred, if ever, but certainly 4 not in any recent time, and I cannot therefore find as we sit here today that the defendant is a threat to you. So for those reasons, I’m going to dismiss the petition, and I’m not going to be granting a protective order. And I would just encourage you to think about the possibility of consulting with an attorney prior to filing the next on e of these, should that become necessary. And with that we’ll close the record. A written “Order re Dismissal” was filed that same date, which provides in part: “Based upon the exhibits and evidence received at the hearing as well as a review of the court file, this court also finds that the record does not show a prima facie case of domestic abuse and that the Petition should be dismissed.” Mitzi appears to have taken the court’s advice to obtain counsel to heart as counsel filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), seeking enlarged findings of facts, amended conclusions, and modified judgment. Counsel argued domestic abuse had been criminally adjudicated by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, Mitzi had shown unwanted contact, and a protective order should issue. On August 19, 2011, the district court entered a ruling on the motion to enlarge and amend. The court noted it had “carefully reviewed the Plaintiff’s exhibits, which had nothing to do with domestic abuse.” The court then “question[ed] the ability to amend or enlarge a dismissal order,” but assuming it could do so, concluded the petitioner “failed to meet her burden of proof.” Mitzi now appeals, contending the district court improperly dismissed her petition. An amicus curiae brief was been filed by the Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence in support of Mitzi’s appeal. Richard has filed no brief with this court. 5 II. Scope and Standard of Review. We review civil domestic abuse cases tried in equity de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). The party alleging domestic abuse bears the burden of proving abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Iowa Code § 236.4(1) (2011). We give weight to the fact findings of the district court when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by those findings. Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(g). III. Discussion. The district court was essentially correct in informing Mitzi, “Basically you have to establish that domestic abuse has occurred and that currently the defendant is a threat to you.” See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 596 (noting the person seeking a protective order must prove the occurrence of domestic abuse by the preponderance of the evidence); see also Iowa Code § 236.3(2) (“If the factual basis for the alleged domestic abuse is contested, the court shall issue a protective order based upon a finding of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.”). Here, Mitzi told the court she was in the process of divorcing Richard, who had been imprisoned for assaulting her and holding their children hostage. Richard did not deny he committed domestic abuse assault. Consequently, domestic abuse was not contested. The district court apparently believed a recent act of abuse was required, but our supreme court has stated, “Iowa Code chapter 236 has no provision that requires a petition to be filed within a specific time after an alleged assault.” Smith v. Smith, 513 N.W.2d 728, 731 (Iowa 1994). 6 “Upon a finding that the defendant has engaged in domestic abuse . . . [t]he court may grant a protective order” ordering that “the defendant stay away from the plaintiff’s residence, school, or place of employment”; and “awarding . . . temporary custody of or establishing temporary visitation rights with regard to children under eighteen.” Iowa Code § 236.5(1)(b); see generally Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 10 (Iowa 2001) (noting a protective order “does not attempt to impose a personal judgment against the defendant”; but “merely order[s] the defendant to ‘stay away from the protected party’ and not assault or communicate with her”). In Smith, a case involving a pre-answer motion to dismiss, our supreme court stated: [A]n elapse of time between an alleged assault and the filing of the petition may have a bearing on what specific relief a

Iowa District Court for Woodbury County for relief from domestic abuse, pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2011), against her former husband, Ted Ball. She gave a mailing address in Sioux City, Iowa, and also stated Ted’s address was in Sioux City. Although the parties were divorced in 2005, they had been living together until they separated at some point prior to the present proceedings. The case proceeded to a hearing on January 19, 2011. Under oath, Toby testified her address was in Sioux City, Iowa. Toby testified to an incident on May 15, 2010, where she alleged Ted punched her in the nose and mouth, causing bleeding. She asserted this occurred in their vehicle as they were driving to their home in Homer, Nebraska. She also testified to an incident which occurred on January 1, 2011, where Ted shoved her into a shelf at their home in Nebraska. At the close of Toby’s testimony, Ted made an oral motion to dismiss based on jurisdictional grounds. He pointed out that both of the incidents of alleged abuse occurred in Nebraska. He also asserted that Toby lived in Nebraska, rather than Iowa. He pointed out that in her petition Toby ... court should have granted his motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because no acts of domestic abuse occurred in Iowa and both parties resided in Nebraska. Our review of a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss is for the correction of errors at law. Duder v. Shanks, 689 N.W.2d 214, 217 (Iowa 2004). The court’s factual findings are binding on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. The reviewing court is not bound, however, by the court’s conclusions of law. Id. In Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 2001), the wife alone had moved to Iowa, and the husband lived in another state when she filed a petition for a protective order. The case does not mention any incidents of domestic abuse that occurred in Iowa. The court concluded Iowa courts did not have 4 personal jurisdiction over the defendant but could enter a protective order against him. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d at 6. The supreme court stated: We believe the district court’s finding of insufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction is supported by substantial evidence . . . . Nevertheless, we affirm the legal conclusion by the district court that, under these circumstances, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is not required for a court to enter an order preserving the protected status afforded Iowa residents under chapter 236. Id. The court noted “[t]he interstate nature of many abusive relationships, and the concomitant need for protection extending beyond the borders of a particular state.” Id. at 9. Based upon the ruling in Bartsch, the district court did not lack authority to issue a protective order when the incidents of domestic abuse took place outside of Iowa even without personal jurisdiction over Ted. In addition, section 236.3(1) provides, “A person, including a parent or guardian on behalf of an unemancipated minor, may seek relief from ... abuse by filing a verified petition in the district court. Venue shall lie where either party resides.” We also observe Bartsch held that an Iowa court could enter “an order protecting a resident Iowa family from abuse.” Id. at 10 (emphasis added). In her petition Toby gave her address and that of Ted as being in Sioux City, Iowa. Furthermore, at the hearing, when asked for her address Toby gave an address in Sioux City, Iowa. Also, when Ted was asked for his mailing address, he testified he currently had an address in Sioux City, Iowa. While there was evidence the parties had previously lived in Homer, Nebraska, the district court could properly find the parties were currently residing in Iowa. Given the fact both parties gave an Iowa address, the court could conclude Iowa was the proper venue for Toby’s petition for relief from

from the district court’s determination that he committed domestic abuse assault. AFFIRMED. Michelle Mackel-Wiederanders of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellant. Scott D. Fisher of Fisher Law Firm, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, J. Shawn Kromminga appeals from the district court’s issuance of a permanent protective order against him in favor of Paula Shimer. He contends insufficient evidence was presented to support the issuance of the protective order. We affirm, finding sufficient evidence existed to support the finding of domestic abuse. I. Facts and Proceedings. Paula Shimer and Shawn Kromminga were involved in a domestic relationship until approximately January 2012. During and after the relationship Kromminga exhibited aggressive or harassing behavior. Shimer filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Union County, Sherman W. Phipps, Judge. Shawn Kromminga appeals ... domestic

. 1 Mummau’s petition for postconviction relief from his conviction for third-degree sexual abuse was denied by the district court and on appeal. See Mummau v. State, No. 16- 1909, 2017 WL 3535294, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 16, 2017). 3 Kraus’s deposition in the civil action was taken on October 3, 2013. Her attorney stated evidence of Kraus’s sexual conduct with persons other than Mummau, the person who committed the sexual abuse, was not subject to discovery under section 668.15, and instructed Kraus not to answer questions on the issue. Mummau’s attorney stated, “[W]e’ll move on and deal with it later.” Kraus was asked if she had been the defendant in any civil suits. She was not questioned about whether she had been a plaintiff in a civil action or had filed any complaints against anyone other than Mummau for sexual improprieties. The district court determined Mummau’s conviction for third-degree sexual abuse was res judicata as to all elements of sexual battery and sexual abuse, except for the issue of damages. Mummau waived his right to a jury trial and a trial to the court was held in April 2014. On May 8, 2014, the district court found Kraus had been diagnosed with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder after the incident. The court awarded Kraus $153,750 in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages, for a total of $163,750. Mummau did not appeal the district court’s decision. On April 27, 2015, Mummau filed a petition to vacate the judgment, pursuant to rule 1.1012(2) (irregularity or fraud), (5) (unavoidable casualty), and (6) (newly discovered evidence). He claimed Kraus’s deposition testimony in August 2011 was untruthful because on April 2, 1996, she filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse ... filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse from her boyfriend, Irons, which included allegations of sexual ... extrinsic fraud and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his petition to vacate the civil judgment

abuse.” See Iowa Code § 236.4(1) (“[T]he plaintiff must prove the allegation of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Iowa Code § 236.5(1) (providing that relief is available only “[u]pon a finding that the defendant has engaged in domestic abuse”). “‘Domestic abuse’ means committing an assault as defined in Iowa Code section 708.1” where the victim and assailant have a domestic relationship as set forth in chapter 236. See Iowa Code § 236.2(2). Once a protective order has been entered, the protected party may apply for an extension of the protective order. The petitioning party must show by a preponderance of the evidence “the defendant continues to pose a threat to the safety of the victim, persons residing with the victim, or members of the victim’s immediate family.” Iowa Code § 236.5(2); see Iowa R. App. P. 6.904(3)(f) (establishing burden of proof). The number of extensions is not limited. See Iowa Code § 236.5(2). Mead first contends the extension order should be vacated because the district court did not make a finding of domestic abuse as a prerequisite to issuance of the protective order or the extension order. Mead is correct in his assertion that there has been no finding he committed domestic abuse. Wendt filed her petition for ... had been no previous finding of domestic abuse “and that continues to be the position of the court.” 4 The original protective order and the extension order are defective in two respects. First, neither order was predicated on a finding of domestic abuse. A finding of domestic abuse “is a prerequisite to any relief afforded under chapter 236.” Huntley v. Bacon, No. 16-0044, 2016 WL 3271874, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. June 15, 2016). Second, Iowa Code section 236.20 provides a court “shall not issue mutual protective orders against the victim and the abuser unless both file a petition requesting a protective order.” Mead never filed a petition requesting a protective order. The district court was thus without authority to enter the mutual protective order. Neither of the above-stated defects entitles Mead to any relief. The identified defects in the order of protection and extension implicate the district court’s authority to act and not its jurisdiction. “[A] court’s lack of authority is not conclusively fatal to the validity of an order.” Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 2006). An order entered without authority is voidable rather than void. See id. The distinction is critical. Unlike a question of jurisdiction, which can be raised at any time, a question of authority must be timely raised and preserved for appellate ... relief from domestic abuse, but the matter was not resolved following a contested hearing. Instead, the district court entered a mutual protective order upon stipulation of the parties. The mutual protective order did not contain a finding of domestic abuse. The district court did hold a contested hearing on Wendt’s petition to

appeals from a domestic abuse protective order entered under Iowa Code section 236.5 (2001). AFFIRMED. Jessica A. Millage of Sporer & Flanagan, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant. Stacey N. Warren of Babich & Goldman, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Doyle, J., and Miller, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2011). 2 MILLER, S.J. Michael Abarr appeals from the district court’s final domestic abuse protective order, entered under Iowa Code section 236.5 (2011), finding he committed domestic abuse against his wife, Sheri Abarr. He contends: THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT AN ASSAULT OCCURRED AND THEREFORE IN ENTERING THE FINAL PROTECTIVE ORDER. I. SCOPE OF REVIEW. Citing Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994), Michael asserts our review is de novo. Also citing Knight, Sheri points out that our review is determined by the how the matter was tried in the district court, asserts the court ruled on objections, and concludes our review is thus for correction of errors at law. Our review of those portions of the hearing transcript included in the appendix shows that on two occasions early in the domestic abuse hearing the trial court reserved ruling on objections by stating that the proposed answers would be received “subject to the objection.” These two rulings are consistent with a trial in equity. However, those same portions of the transcript show that on three prior occasions and twelve subsequent occasions the trial court sustained or overruled objections, consistent with trial as a law action. As the overwhelming majority of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings are consistent with trial as a special action at law, we conclude our review is for correction of errors at law. See, e.g., Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997) (“This 3 [domestic abuse] case was tried in the district court as a law action. The court ruled on objections as they were made. Our review is therefore at law.”). II. MERITS. Sheri filed a petition for relief from ... to having “poked [Sheri] with my right index finger.” “’Domestic abuse’ means committing assault as defined in ... domestic abuse. The trial court made no finding that these alleged incidents did or did not occur. We therefore focus only

. On June 1, 2011, Karen filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. On June 2, 2011, Karen filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse in ... PELLETIER AND PAUL JEFFRY PELLETIER Upon the Petition of KAREN ANN PELLETIER, Petitioner-Appellee, And ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Ian K. Thornhill, Judge. Paul Pelletier appeals the

appeals from the issuance of a final domestic abuse protection order against him. AFFIRMED. Gary Papenheim, Parkersburg, for appellant. Evelyn Ocheltree of Iowa Legal Aid, Mason City, for appellee. Tammie Wolters, Rudd, IA, appellee pro se. Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, P.J. Monte Wolters appeals from the issuance of a final domestic protection order against him in favor of his former wife, Tammie Wolters. He argues sufficient evidence did not support the finding of domestic abuse. We affirm, finding sufficient evidence to show that Monte committed domestic abuse. I. Facts and proceedings. Tammie and Monte were married until a dissolution decree was filed in November of 2011. They have two children who were visiting with Monte when the disagreement leading to the protective order began, culminating in an altercation when he returned the children on Sunday, October 28, 2012. Tammie’s friend, Bradley Gentz, drove her to meet Monte for the exchange at a local gas station. Gentz and Monte had been communicating by text message and phone during the previous evening while Gentz and Tammie were together in a social situation; the exchanges between Gentz and Monte were provocative. This resulted in threatening text messages sent from Monte to Tammie’s phone but directed to Gentz. At the time of the exchange of the children, Monte pulled in to the parking lot very quickly, slamming the vehicle into park. He began screaming and cursing at Tammie and Gentz to get out of the car. Monte also pounded on the driver’s window where Gentz was sitting with a gun visible in his lap, and tried to open Gentz’s door. Tammie left the vehicle to retrieve the children from Monte’s car while Monte screamed at them to stay put. Once the children were in her vehicle, she locked the door and Gentz attempted to leave; however, Monte stood in front of 3 the vehicle to prevent their departure. Monte called law enforcement, and the parties were interviewed by deputies the following day. Tammie filed a petition for relief from ... abuse on October 29, 2012, and requested a protective order be entered against Monte to prevent him from contacting her or coming near her at work or home. Her description of “the most recent injury” on the petition form was a description of the events of the visitation exchange; she included in “any other injuries” several events during her marriage with Monte, the most recent of which occurred just over a year prior. A temporary protective order was entered, and a hearing was held in November. Tammie and Monte testified at the hearing, as did Monte’s wife and Gentz. In addition to the October 2012 incident, Tammie testified to incidents of violence between her and Monte during their marriage, including him pinning her in a corner, putting his hands around her throat, punching through the bathroom door, and throwing a glass of milk at her head. Monte admitted to the bathroom door and glass of milk incidents—though he claimed to be aiming the glass of milk at the wall behind her head. Monte also testified that his recent behavior was in response to Gentz pointing a gun at him. Tammie and Gentz admitted Gentz had a gun, but contended that he never pointed it at Monte. The court entered a final domestic abuse protective order to remain in effect for one year. The court noted it made credibility findings in favor of the protected party, there were assaults in prior incidents, and there was a continuing threat to safety as demonstrated by ongoing communications. Monte appeals. 4 II. Analysis. This case was heard in equity; therefore our review of this appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in a civil domestic abuse case is de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001) (citing Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994)). Monte claims no assault occurred between him and Tammie to support a finding of domestic abuse. To establish domestic abuse under Iowa Code chapter 232, a plaintiff must prove an assault as defined in Iowa Code section 708.1. Iowa Code § 236.2(2). Assault can be committed in several ways. The two alternatives most pertinent to the facts here provide: A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following:(1) Any act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. (2) Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Bacon on Behalf of Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997) (quoting Iowa Code §§ 708.1(1), 708.1(2)). “We note initially that chapter 236 is protective rather than punitive in nature. We place upon the statute ‘a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.’” Christenson v. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Iowa 1991) (quoting Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Iowa 1980)). Civil domestic abuse proceedings are less formal than criminal proceedings and often include past along with recent allegations of abuse. Knight, 521 N.W.2d at 843. 5 The court credited Tammie’s testimony and found she had proved her claim for injunctive relief by ... put his hands around her throat. In February 2011, he threw a glass of milk at her head. While a petition for a

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. Eric G. Borseth of Borseth Law Office, Altoona, for appellant. F. John Spellman of Spellman Law Office, Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ. 2 DOYLE, J. Scott Steffes appeals from the district court’s final protective order entered in Iowa Code chapter 236 (2013) proceedings, contending the record is insufficient to support the district court’s determination he committed domestic abuse assault against his estranged girlfriend, Debbie Dierenfeld. Because a preponderance of the record evidence establishes Scott committed domestic abuse assault against Debbie, we affirm. I. Background Facts & Proceedings Debbie and Scott lived together from the early months of 2012 until July 2013. They have one child together, born in April 2012. Debbie filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert A. Hutchison, Judge. Scott Steffes ... domestic

appeals the district court’s ruling finding he committed domestic abuse assault against the plaintiff. AFFIRMED. Scott E. Schroeder of Schroeder Law Office, Burlington, for appellant. Jill Hittle, Burlington, pro se. Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Vogel and Miller, JJ. 2 SACKETT, C.J. Defendant, Charles Hester, appeals from the district court’s ruling finding that he committed domestic abuse assault upon the plaintiff, Jill Hittle, and imposing a permanent protective order pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2007). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND. Charles and Jill met in August of 2007 and dated off and on until July 11, 2008, the day of the alleged abuse. At the time, Jill was living with Charles at his house but by both accounts, they were not on friendly terms. In fact, Charles had given Jill a thirty-day notice to vacate the premises three days before the alleged incident of abuse. Nonetheless, while Jill was still living there, they continued to share a bed. Jill testified on the night of July 11, 2008, Charles came into the bedroom and dumped a glass of water on her and said, “oh sorry, that was an accident.” Then when they were lying in bed, she claimed Charlie moved on her side of the bed, pushing her with his knees. He refused to move over even when she asked him repeatedly. Fearing she would fall on the floor, she made an effort to crawl over Charles without making contact to get to the other side of the bed where there was more room. She contended in the process, Charles shoved her off the bed and she landed on a trash can. Both called the police after the incident but no charges were filed. Charles left the house and stayed with his brother. Three days later, on July 14, 2008, Jill filed the petition for relief from ... abuse, and Charles was arrested and charged with domestic abuse 3 assault. The criminal charge was later dismissed at the request of the State. Charles sought to dismiss the petition denying he committed an assault against Jill. The matter came on for hearing on July 28, 2008. At the trial, Charles denied ever dumping water on Jill. He did agree that on the night of the alleged abuse, they were lying in bed bickering about how the other was encroaching on his or her side of the bed. Charles claimed Jill fell on the floor because there was no room on his side after she crawled over him. He testified he rolled at the same time as her so as to avoid bearing her full weight and there was contact between them. However, he claimed he had no intent to harm, offend, scare, or intimidate her when it happened. Following the hearing, the district court issued a final domestic abuse protective order, finding defendant did commit domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code chapter 236. Charles appeals. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW. Charles contends our standard of review is de novo because the case was tried in equity. In reviewing the record, we note the court ruled on at least one objection, and therefore the action was tried at law and our review is for errors at law. See Bacon ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997). In this action, the court’s findings of fact are binding on our court if supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R. Civ. P. 6.14(6)(a). Evidence is substantial when a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Land O’ Lakes, Inc. v. Hanig, 610 N.W.2d 518, 522 (Iowa 2000). 4 III. MERITS. When a court finds a defendant has engaged in domestic abuse, it may issue a protective order and grant other relief. See ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Cynthia H. Danielson, Judge. Defendant

, Judge. George Frampton appeals from the district court’s decision finding he committed domestic abuse assault under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005), and the district court’s award of attorney fees. AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART. Bernard Spaeth of Whitfield & Eddy, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant. Alexander Rhoads, Des Moines, and Jolie Juckette of Nelissen & Juckette, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ. 2 ZIMMER, J. George Frampton appeals from the district court’s entry of a domestic abuse protective order following a hearing on a petition for relief from ... IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 7-552 / 06-1920 Filed September 6, 2007 Upon the Petition of MICHELE L ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Don C. Nickerson

filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The district court issued a civil protective order but cancelled the ... order after a hearing. Meanwhile, McMullen filed a petition for custody of the child. The district court granted ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Marsha Bergan, Judge. A mother appeals a district

appeals the entry of a final domestic abuse protective order pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (2009). REVERSED. Anthony DeLisle Sr., Des Moines, pro se. Melissa DeLisle, Des Moines, pro se. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Mansfield, J., and Schechtman, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2009). 2 MANSFIELD, J. Anthony DeLisle Sr. appeals the entry of a final domestic abuse protective order on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a finding of domestic abuse. We agree with Anthony and, therefore, reverse. I. Facts and Prior Proceedings On January 5, 2009, Melissa DeLisle filed a pro se form petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D. Huppert, Judge. Appellant ... domestic

., filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse in October 2009, alleging her husband, R.M., had assaulted her ... the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Constance Cohen, Associate Juvenile Judge. A father appeals the ... termination of his parental rights to his child. AFFIRMED. Edward Bull of Bull Law Office, P.C., Des Moines, for

. Fautsch, Judge. Dale Manders appeals from the district court’s grant of Renee Manders’ petition for relief from domestic violence. AFFIRMED. Robert L. Sudmeier, Jenny L. Harris, and Amanda L. Elkins of Fuerste, Carew, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C., Dubuque, for appellant. Kimberly C. Roddick of Reynolds & Kenline, L.L.P., Dubuque, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Eisenhauer and Danilson, JJ. 2 DANILSON, J. Dale Manders appeals from the district court’s grant of Renee Manders’ petition for relief from domestic violence. Dale argues Renee did not meet her burden of proving that he committed domestic abuse because ... ruling in part on an allegation not listed in Renee’s petition for relief. Upon our de novo review, we find a preponderance of the evidence supports the district court’s conclusion an assault was committed by Dale. We affirm the district court’s entry of a protective order for Renee. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Dale and Renee Manders have been married for eleven years and have no children. Dale is fifty-one years old; Renee is forty-eight years old. Renee filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on January 8, 2010. The parties attended marriage counseling, reconciled, and Renee withdrew her petition on April 9, 2010. On July 12, 2010, Dale filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On July 15, 2010, Renee filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse pursuant ... court entered a written order, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Dale committed a domestic abuse assault: [Dale] on a number of occasions committed an act which was intended to place [Renee] in fear of immediate physical contact which could be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. On one occasion Dale restrained Renee on a bed. Recently Dale threw thistles at Renee. The court’s order prohibited Dale from having any contact with Renee. Dale now appeals. 6 II. Scope and Standard of Review. Because this civil domestic abuse case was heard in equity, our review is de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). The allegations of domestic abuse must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We give respectful consideration to the district court’s factual findings and credibility determinations, but those holdings are not binding on appeal. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. III. Merits. “Domestic abuse” occurs when a person commits an assault as defined in section 708.1 under certain circumstances, such as assault between family or household members who reside together at the time of the assault. Iowa Code § 236.2(2)(a). Section 708.1 states, in relevant part: A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following: . . . . 2. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. Dale argues Renee did not meet her burden of proving that he committed domestic abuse because he did not intend to place her in fear, and she “failed to prove a threat, much less an overt act.” Our supreme court announced in State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010), that assault includes an element of specific intent. Specific intent has been defined as: “Specific intent” means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind. Because determining the defendant’s specific intent requires you to decide what the defendant was thinking when an act was done, it is seldom capable of direct proof. Therefore, you should 7 consider the facts and circumstances surrounding the act to determine the defendant’s specific intent. You may, but are not required to conclude a person intends the natural results of his or her acts. See Iowa Crim. Jury Inst. 200.2 (2004). The intent element required by the statute “may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the defendant.” State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006) (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law § 128, at 214-15 (1998)); State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 132-33 (Iowa 2004). Renee is assisted in meeting her burden of proof on this element “by the principle that an actor will ordinarily be viewed as intending the natural and probable consequences that usually follow from his or her voluntary act.” Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 132. We acknowledge Dale’s version of some of the events, if believed, would support a dismissal of Renee’s petition. However, Renee also described several events that support granting the petition. We give weight to the district court’s credibility assessments, particularly as it had an opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. Dale concedes he punched the dashboard while irritated with Renee when she was driving a vehicle. Indeed, Renee testified that Dale’s actions in punching the dashboard made her “very afraid” of him. We find this is a natural and probable consequence of someone acting in such a manner. See id. We do not suggest the act of pounding on a vehicle’s dashboard constitutes an assault in every situation, even though such an act may be offensive to other occupants. However, in these circumstances, Dale was irritated with Renee, Dale and Renee were in the midst of an argument, Dale was seated directly beside Renee, 8 and Dale had the apparent ability to commit physical contact upon Renee. The record in this case supports the finding that Dale intended to make Renee fear immediate physical contact when he punched the dashboard while sitting beside her in the car. Dale also acknowledged throwing thistles towards Renee, but contended he did not know she was in his near vicinity. The court was not required to give weight to Dale’s explanation nor do we. Dale’s actions in throwing thistles at Renee causing Renee to be uncomfortable and afraid of Dale, supports the finding that Dale intended to place Renee in fear of physical contact that would be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive. Dale claims the court erred in relying in part on the alleged bedroom incident (in which Dale got on top of Renee and restrained her) because it was not listed in Renee’s petition for relief. On

domestic abuse.1 Two days after Sandra filed her petition for relief from domestic abuse, Ray filed a petition for ... from the Iowa District Court for Monona County, Mary Jane Sokolovske, Judge. The defendant appeals a district ... court judgment quieting title to real estate in the plaintiff. AFFIRMED. Joseph Halbur, Carroll, for appellant

bruising.” On August 1, 2011, the mother filed a chapter 236 petition for relief from domestic abuse against the ... , threatened, and harassed her. 3 On September 1, 2011, unrelated to the domestic abuse petition, the mother ... father, which she subsequently withdrew. On August 16, 2011, the mother filed another chapter 236 domestic abuse

.” On August 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. Among her complaints were allegations ... Rebecca had “failed to prove that [Vincent] committed domestic abuse assault” upon her. Despite Rebecca’s objections, Vincent enrolled Andrea in the East Union School District. Vincent also wrote a letter to the school stating Rebecca was not to visit with or take Andrea from the school without his permission because he had primary custody and “the schedule that was made . . . is no longer in effect 5 due to the fact that it creates both an unstable and unrealistic environment.” The letter further advised the school that Vincent had contacted the sheriff’s office, and the school was to call the sheriff’s office if they had “any trouble” with Rebecca. Andrea started school at East Union on August 22, 2005. Rebecca drove to Afton to get Andrea because Vincent had not returned her pursuant to the visitation agreement. Vincent refused to allow Rebecca to see or talk to Andrea. When Rebecca went to the school, school officials and the Union County Sheriff would not allow her to leave with Andrea. They requested she leave the school, and Rebecca complied. On August 24, 2005, Rebecca reported to law enforcement officials that Vincent broke into her home, held a knife to her throat, and told her that if she did not drop the child custody issue, she would never see the children again. Police investigation revealed that, at the time Rebecca claimed Vincent was at her home, he was with co-workers on his way to work. On August 31, 2005, Rebecca filed a petition for relief from ... . GOODLIFFE AND REBECCA E. GOODLIFFE Upon the Petition of VINCENT J. GOODLIFFE, Petitioner-Appellant, And

2015, the parties separated, and Abby filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In August 2015, Abby filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse, and ... that agreement, the August 2015 petition for relief from domestic abuse and temporary order were dismissed. Leading up ... AND WILLIAM MICHAEL NABER Upon the Petition of ABBY HOEGER NABER, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning WILLIAM

wanted to get divorced. They attended counseling sessions. Linda was angry and “blindsided”; she filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on January 5, 2016. Two days later, Linda filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse,2 ... Daniel went back to Goodwin Tucker. 2 Despite having filed a petition for dissolution of marriage two days prior, Linda answered “No” to the question, “Has there ever been any court case concerning custody of the minor children you have in common with the defendant . . . .” 3 In December 2015, Linda told her therapist Daniel had been abusive toward her; the therapist reported the allegation to DHS, and a child protective services family assessment was initiated. The assessment did not result in any further action taken on behalf of the agency. 4 permission. Daniel was awarded visitation Sunday afternoons and Tuesdays after school until 8:00 p.m. until he got an apartment, at which time he was awarded visitation every other weekend and one night during the week. The temporary order also contained a “mutual order of restraint” between the parties. As a result of that agreement, the petition for relief from domestic abuse and ... ROSSOW AND DANIEL MICHAEL ROSSOW Upon the Petition of LINDA ELIZABETH ROSSOW, Petitioner-Appellant, And

entry of a protective order against him. We affirm. On September 11, 2015, Dawn Marie Clemens filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea J. Dryer, Judge. James Walter Clemens ... Law Office, P.L.L.C., Waverly, for appellant. Christina M. Shriver, Waterloo, for appellee. Considered by

. Ottesen, Scott County Domestic Abuse Special Prosecution Program, Davenport, for appellant. Matthew A. Leddin of Gallagher, Millage & Gallagher, P.L.C., Davenport, for appellee. Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ. 2 ZIMMER, J. Jessie Clark appeals following the district court’s denial of her request for a permanent protective order. We affirm the district court. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Jessie Clark and James Dau are the unmarried parents of two children. On May 17, 2006, Clark filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, David Schoenthaler, Judge. Plaintiff ... appeals following the district court’s denial of her request for a permanent protective order. AFFIRMED. James L

from a final domestic abuse protective order entered under Iowa Code section 236.5 (2007). REVERSED. Andrew P. Nelson of Meyer, Lorentzen & Nelson, Decorah, for appellant. Dale L. Putnam, Decorah, for appellee. Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer and Miller, J.J. 2 MILLER, J. Marvin Kajese appeals from a final domestic abuse protective order entered under Iowa Code section 236.5 (2007), finding that he committed domestic abuse assault against Karina Klug. We reverse. I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS. Kajese and Klug are the parents of Kundayi Kajese, who in May 2007 was fifteen months of age. The parties were never married, but they resided with one another and their son for approximately a year and a half in a house they jointly leased in Decorah, Iowa. On May 4, 2007, Klug filed a petition for relief from ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winneshiek County, Lawrence H. Fautsch, Judge. Marvin Kajese appeals ... domestic

separated on August 2, 2010. After Todd threatened Melissa’s boyfriend, she filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse on ... January 4, 2011. A domestic abuse protective order was entered by consent on February 9, 2011. Todd owns a ... AND MELISSA STRAWHACKER Upon the Petition of TODD STRAWHACKER, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning MELISSA

. Rene filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on August 30, 2010. During this same time period, Rene filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse under ... safety of the children, and whether there is a history of domestic abuse. Iowa Code § 598.41(3). The district court appropriately weighed these factors before granting joint legal custody and physical care to Arnie. The court recognized Rene had been the primary caretaker of the children through the marriage and acknowledged that A.K. and M.K. expressed a strong desire to live with their mother. On the other side of the fulcrum, the court found Rene demonstrated by her words and actions that she could not support Arnie’s relationship with the children, and in fact, fostered an attitude of disrespect toward him. The court credited Arnie’s testimony that the girls are growing more comfortable in his care. The court also found it significant, as do we, that the girls’ attendance at school improved markedly while they have been living primarily with their father. 8 Because the district court serves as our eyes and ears on the ground, we choose to defer to its detailed factual findings reached after six days of observing the parties at trial. In doing so, we address three particular concerns raised by Rene on appeal. 1. Custody Evaluation Rene offers a strong critique of the district court’s reliance on the report of the custody evaluator. She contends the report was “flawed” and the evaluator developed “a bias in favor of Arnie during the evaluation process.” She relies on In re Marriage of Rebouche, 587 N.W.2d 795, 801 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998) and In re Marriage of Pothast, 539 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) for the proposition that the evaluation should have had little sway over the court’s deliberations. Our court has recognized the value of having an independent psychologist make a recommendation regarding the physical care of the children. In re Marriage of Harris, 499 N.W.2d 329, 331 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993). While a custody evaluator’s view is not controlling, it can be given “considerable weight” when the expert has met with both parents and gathered information concerning their caretaking abilities. Id. The district court’s consideration of Dr. Brown’s evaluation differs from the situation in Rebouche and Pothast. The record does not support Rene’s assertions that Dr. Brown lacked neutrality in reaching his opinions regarding custody. Dr. Brown followed a protocol designed to eliminate the threat of bias, including undertaking in-depth interviews with both parents, all four daughters, and other individuals recommended by the parties’ attorneys. 9 The report was thorough and balanced. Rene’s dissatisfaction with the recommendation does not prove the method of evaluation was flawed. Moreover, the district court did not cede its decision to the evaluator; it considered the report as one factor in its determination of physical care. 2. Domestic Abuse Rene contends Dr. Brown failed to consider she had been the victim of domestic violence when he relied on her MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) to conclude that she exhibited “maladaptive personality patterns.” Her contention is belied by the record. Dr. Brown testified he did consider the reported episodes of physical aggression during the marriage, but did not find strong evidence to support Rene’s characterization of Arnie as a domestic abuser. Moreover, while the district court mentioned the evaluation’s personality assessment of Rene, those findings were not central to the court’s ultimate physical care decision. Rene also asserts placing physical care with Arnie is not in the children’s best interests because of his domestic violence toward her. Rene does not argue that Arnie’s conduct amounts to a “history of domestic abuse” as that term is used in Iowa Code section 598.41, but nevertheless contends his abusive behavior “disqualifies him as a parent who can best act in his children’s long term best interests.” We are troubled by Arnie’s reference in his appellate brief to his act of domestic violence toward Rene as a “technical assault.” Such a reference minimizes the seriousness of his conduct and runs counter to Judge 10 Bauercamper’s determination in issuing the October 2010 protective order that Arnie represented “a credible threat to the physical safety” of Rene. Our court has noted that “spousal abuse discloses a serious character flaw in the batterer, and an equally serious flaw in parenting.” In re Marriage of Daniels, 568 N.W.2d 51, 55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). The district court stated in the decree: “each party physically assaulted the other during the course of the marriage.” It is true the evidence showed Rene “jammed” a pen into the back of Arnie’s neck in 1997. But we are hesitant to equate that isolated event fourteen years earlier with the more recent aggression perpetrated by Arnie against Rene, as described in her September 2010 statement in support of the petition for relief from ... KRIENER AND ARNOLD CONRAD KRIENER Upon the Petition of RENE LEIGH KRIENER, Petitioner-Appellant, And

now married to Annette Kaster. On December 18, 2009, Fettkether filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse against ... Human Services’ (DHS) child abuse findings against Kaster for denial of critical care. She further argues the appellate ... her safety. See Iowa Code § 236.4(1) (“[P]laintiff must prove the allegation of domestic abuse by a preponderance of

until January 20, 2012, when Melanie filed an independent petition for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code ... entered granting both of her requests. A hearing on the final order of domestic abuse was set for February 3. Daniel was ... contemporaneous with the hearing relative to the final domestic abuse order. The issues raised by the application

times throughout their marriage for domestic disturbances, although the testimony is conflicting as to precisely how many times this occurred. Ronda testified James had threatened her with physical harm on several occasions. On cross-examination, James admitted he had verbally threatened to do bodily harm to Ronda. He also admitted he had called Ronda and faked his own suicide. This involved James calling Ronda, threatening suicide, and then cocking a gun 3 and firing it so she could hear it over the phone. He testified, however, that he never actually contemplated suicide. Ronda testified James struck her on at least three separate occasions. James denied ever striking her. The parties separated in approximately August, 2003, reconciled briefly at Christmas time in 2003, and then separated again. James was arrested for operating while intoxicated in January 2004. He successfully completed after- care requirements and testified he now attends AA meetings regularly. James was subsequently arrested for driving while his license was suspended. Ronda filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on February 9, 2006. Ronda filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse under ... without hearing. A hearing on the petition was scheduled for July 20, 2006. On the date of the hearing the parties ... LOWRY AND JAMES SCOTT LOWRY Upon the Petition of RONDA LOUISE LOWRY, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning JAMES

final domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. A. Eric Neu of Neu, Minnich, Comito & Neu, P.C., Carroll, for appellant. John P. Loughlin of Loughlin Law Firm, Cherokee, for appellee. Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Danilson, JJ. 2 POTTERFIELD, J. K.K. appeals from the juvenile court‟s issuance of a final domestic abuse protective order. She contends the district court erred in not dismissing the action, and the juvenile court incorrectly found she had committed a domestic abuse assault against Crouch. The district court was required to “waive its jurisdiction over the action to the juvenile court” pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (Supp. 2009) and had authority to continue the hearing, which was scheduled and commenced within the statutory deadline. Because Crouch proved by a preponderance of the evidence that K.K. committed a domestic abuse assault, we affirm the issuance of the protective order. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On November 1, 2010, Zachary Crouch filed a petition for relief from ... abuse against K.K. alleging that on October 31, I was attack [sic] from behind when taking family picture by [K.K.] when I was knock down to the ground with [B.C.] in my arms, Tanya Webb then took [B.C.] and gave him to [K.K.] and then ran back to the truck and left, she assaulted my sister Ashley Crouch scratch [sic] her arm up and she was hit in the stomach, she is 4 months pregnant. We took pictures of the marks she left the police where [sic] called to the house and took pictures of the marks that were left on [Crouch] and Ashley Crouch. In the petition, Crouch indicated that K.K. was “17 years or younger” and that the plaintiff and defendant were the parents of the same minor. A temporary protective order was entered by Judge David Lester in which he granted temporary custody of B.C. to Crouch. A hearing on Crouch‟s petition was scheduled in the district court on November 15, 2010, before the statutory deadline. 3 K.K. served a motion to dismiss on November 9, 2010, noting she was a seventeen-year-old minor and, [p]ursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (final paragraph), “[i]f the person against whom relief from domestic abuse is sought is seventeen years of age of younger, the district court shall waive its jurisdiction over the action to the juvenile court.” At the November 15, 2010 hearing, K.K.‟s attorney argued there was a statutory time frame in which such hearings must be held; it was “now too late” to have the hearing within the statutory time frame; and “I filed a motion to dismiss because I didn‟t see how jurisdictionally it was going to be able to be transferred to the juvenile court.” The district court stated it would “do what the statute says” and “waive our jurisdiction and to bring this promptly to the attention of the juvenile court.” The district court found the cited terms of section 236.3 were mandatory. It continued the hearing to comply with the requirement that the case be heard in juvenile court. Upon receipt of the district court‟s order, the juvenile court scheduled the continued hearing for November ... Following the hearing on November 30, 2010, the juvenile court entered a final domestic abuse protective order1 on the prescribed form, which contains the pre-printed findings that K.K. was (1) “personally served with the copy of the petition and temporary protective order containing notice of this hearing”; (2) “committed a domestic abuse assault against the protected party named above”; (3) “represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the protected party”; and (4) the parties “meet the definition of intimate partners.” Crouch was granted temporary custody of B.C. and K.K. was granted visitation. K.K. now appeals, contending the district court erred in not dismissing the action and the juvenile court incorrectly found she had committed a domestic abuse assault against Crouch. II. Scope of Review. We review civil domestic abuse cases de novo. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). We give weight to the fact findings of the trial court, especially when considering the credibility of witnesses, but are not bound by them. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(g). III. Merits. A. Relevant legal principles. The domestic abuse chapter, chapter 236 of the Iowa Code, is meant to be protective rather than punitive in nature; it is to be given a reasonable or liberal construction, which would best effect its purpose. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 596. 1 Form 4.2: Protective Order Following Adjudication of Domestic Abuse (Section 236.3 Petition)─Final Domestic Abuse Protection Order. 6 Iowa Code section 236.3 sets forth the procedure for initiating an action for a domestic abuse protection order. The statute lists the identifying information to be contained in the petition and provides further: 1. A person . . . may seek relief from

claims of abuse surfaced. When she filed the petition for dissolution that led to this appeal in August of 2004 she requested, among other things, that the court grant temporary and permanent joint legal custody of their child to herself and Hadi and that she be granted temporary and permanent physical care. Hadi responded to Tracy’s custodial requests with a request for temporary and permanent joint legal custody and joint physical care of his son. A hearing on issues of temporary custody and support was set for January 12, 2005. On December 10, 2004, the parties and their attorneys met for a pretrial conference and filed stipulations as to assets and liabilities. Hadi, who came from out of town, was unhappy that the law firm4 he had engaged had sent a new associate to represent him and did not agree with certain proposals Tracy made. After Hadi and his attorney left the Johnson County courthouse, according to Tracy’s testimony, she and her attorney went to the office of the clerk of court in the same courthouse. There, Tracy filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse under ... on July 27, 2004, prior to the parties’ separation and prior to her filing the petition for dissolution, had physically abused her and that in 1998 he hit her. Tracy further contended Hadi had threatened to harm or kill her if she took his son. She noted on the petition that the abuse occurred “Throughout marriage and since separation on March 22, 2002 to present.” Before 12:30 in the afternoon of that day, a district court judge signed a temporary protective order granting Tracy 4 He had different representation at trial and on appeal. 5 In filing the dissolution petition Tracy identified her husband as Hadi Shaaban while in the petition for relief from domestic abuse ... hearing on the domestic abuse petition for December 21, 2004. The domestic abuse petition was subsequently dismissed

3 harassed her. She filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005) on ... . HYNICK AND BRADLEY L. HYNICK Upon the Petition of HOLLY A. HYNICK, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning ... from the Iowa District Court for Mahaska County, Daniel P. Wilson, Judge. Bradley Hynick appeals from the child

therapist. 3 In August 2008, Jennifer filed a petition in Polk County for relief from domestic abuse pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2007), alleging Todd had physically and sexually abused her and threatened her safety. A temporary protective order was issued and Jennifer was granted temporary care of the children. On September 15, 2008, Todd filed a petition to ... history of domestic abuse and a no-contact order violation, and (3) erred in determining Todd could provide the children stability. 5 The best interest of the children is our standard for deciding child custody. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(o); In re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999). Our objective is to place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity. Murphy, 592 N.W.2d at 683. In considering what custody arrangement is in the best interest of the children, we consider statutory factors. Iowa Code § 598.41(3). All these factors bear upon the “first and governing consideration” as to what will be in the best long-term interest of the child. In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Iowa 1984). These statutory factors and the factors identified in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Iowa 1974)1 are appropriately considered in determining the award of physical care. In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). 1 These factors are: 1. The characteristics of each child, including age, maturity, mental and physical health. 2. The emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. 3. The characteristics of each parent, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health. 4. The capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. 5. The interpersonal relationship between the child and each parent. 6. The interpersonal relationship between the child and its siblings. 7. The effect on the child of continuing or disrupting an existing custodial status. 8. The nature of each proposed environment, including its stability and wholesomeness. 9. The preference of the child, if the child is of sufficient age and maturity. 10. The report and recommendation of the attorney for the child or other independent investigator. 11. Available alternatives. 12. Any other relevant matter the evidence in a particular case may disclose. Winter, 223 N.W.2d at 166-67. 6 A. Marital residence. We first consider Jennifer‟s claim the court gave too much weight to the fact Todd resides in the marital home. The district court noted the following facts in determining which parent could better minister to the children‟s healthy physical, mental, and social maturity: Todd lives in the marital home which is a large five-bedroom, two-bath farm house and has been the marital residence since Jayna was approximately four years old. The farm house had previously been his grandfather‟s and Todd and Jennifer took advantage of purchasing the property because of the family connection. The farm home allows the children access to their pets, is close to the school district, and close to friends. . . . . . . . . . . The court believes that the marital residence of the parties, the farm home which the children have known most of their lives [and] provides access to friends and school as well as access to pets appears to be the more stable and wholesome environment. In contrast to Todd‟s residence, Jennifer moved into a store front that has a residence above it. She runs her Tae Kwon Do school out of the first floor. It was not improper of the court to consider the residences of the parties as a factor in determining custody. The children stated their preference to live with Todd based on the factors enumerated by the court. Considering the children‟s preference was permissible under section 598.41(3)(f) as the children were nine, fourteen, and fifteen years of age respectively at the time of the trial. Jennifer‟s main argument is the weight the court gave this evidence is inappropriate in light of the fact there was a no-contact order pursuant to chapter 236 that gave Todd temporary possession of the home. Accordingly, we next consider Jennifer‟s argument the court failed to consider Todd‟s history of domestic abuse and a no-contact order violation. 7 B. No-contact order. This court has recognized domestic abuse is a factor in determining which parent should be granted child custody. In re Marriage of Daniels, 568 N.W.2d 51, 54 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). This is because domestic abuse can have ravaging and long-term consequences on children. Id. at 54-55. Spousal abuse discloses a serious character flaw in the batterer and an equally serious parenting flaw. Id. at 55. Consequently, we believe evidence of untreated domestic battering should be given considerable weight in determining the primary caretaker, and under some circumstances even foreclose an award of primary care to a spouse who batters. Domestic abuse is, in every respect, dramatically opposed to a child‟s best interests. Id. The district court did give consideration to whether a history of domestic abuse existed. In the decree, the court states: A 236 action was commenced in Polk County, Iowa, and a temporary protective order was issued against Todd. This matter was dismissed with the parties‟ temporary stipulation entered on March 9, 2009. The DHS reports are attached as part of the pleading in the court file and introduced as exhibits at trial. The reports allege an incidence in which Todd is alleged to have used a choke-hold to discipline Kathryn; that may have caused her to lose consciousness temporarily. The report is not confirmed and the incidence was denied by Jayna and Kathryn. We conclude Jennifer‟s allegations of domestic abuse are not substantiated by the record. The first allegations were made in August 2009 in the petition for relief from ... AND JENNIFER BRECHWALD Upon the Petition of TODD BRECHWALD, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning

alleged, among other things, that the parents had separated, that the mother had filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse, and ... from the Iowa District Court for Hamilton County, James A. McGlynn, Associate Juvenile Judge. A mother appeals ... from the order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED. Douglas E. Cook of Cook Law Firm, Jewell, for

parties’ relationship has been marked by domestic abuse. In December 2010, Zachary pushed Sophia to the ground, breaking her arm; he was charged with domestic abuse assault and pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct. After the relationship ended, Zachary broke down Sophia’s front door and a few days later broke her window, prompting Sophia to file a petition for relief from ... IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 3-849 / 13-0592 Filed October 23, 2013 Upon the Petition of SOPHIA MAE ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Crawford County, Gary E. Wenell

petition for dissolution of marriage on October 8, 2004. Following an incident between the parties during the early morning hours of October 13, Marilee filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse pursuant ... . DONATH AND FREDERICK D. DONATH Upon the Petition of MARILEE S. DONATH, Petitioner-Appellee/Cross-Appellant ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Lawrence H. Fautsch, Judge

daycare in October. Weston sold his cattle and farm equipment. In September, Weston filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The ... alleged domestic abuse occurred in front of the daycare children. During a conversation about Brianne receiving text messages from her high school friend Matt, Weston started to walk away from Brianne. In order to stop him, Brianne grabbed Weston’s shoulder or neck. Weston’s petition for relief was ... finish her scheduled daycare. Weston dismissed the petition for relief from domestic violence before the permanent protective order hearing. On October 8, 2012, Brianne filed for dissolution of marriage. Brianne then briefly moved to Montezuma. On October 21, at the end of a weekend visitation in Montezuma, Brianne told Weston she would not return the children to him. Two days later, Weston filed an application for an ex-parte temporary 5 custody order on October 23, 2012. The court ordered Brianne to return the children to Weston and assigned temporary parenting time. In November, the court temporarily awarded the parties joint legal custody, Weston physical care and the marital home, and Brianne reasonable visitation. The order provided that if Brianne moved to Warren County, then her visitation would include every other weekend and Wednesdays overnight. Brianne moved to Norwalk in Warren County so she could see the children more often. The district court held trial on the dissolution petition in July 2013. The court awarded the parties joint legal custody, Weston physical care, and Brianne liberal parenting time. Brianne appealed. II. Standard of Review We review dissolution of marriage cases de novo. In re Marriage of Fennelly, 737 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2007). We do, however, give weight to the trial court’s factual findings, especially determinations of credibility. Id. Appellate attorney fee awards are discretionary. In re Marriage of Ask, 551 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Iowa 1996). III. Analysis A. Physical Care Brianne argues the trial court erred when it awarded Weston physical care of the children. Brianne asserts she was the children’s primary caregiver before the separation, the children would be stable if she were the primary caretaker, and Weston is the reason for Brianne’s prior employment and residence instability. 6 Physical care means “the right and responsibility to maintain a home for the minor child and provide for routine care of the child.” In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 690 (Iowa 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If joint physical care is not warranted, the court must choose the primary caregiver who will be responsible for the child’s routine care. Id. at 691. The parent who is not the primary caregiver will generally be given visitation rights. Id. Physical care is determined by what is in the best interests of the child. Id. at 695. The court’s objective is to “place the children in the environment most likely to bring them to health, both physically and mentally, and to social maturity. Id. To determine the children’s best interests, we consider the following Iowa Code section 598.41(3) (Supp. 2012) factors: a. Whether each parent would be a suitable custodian for the child. b. Whether the psychological and emotional needs and development of the child will suffer due to lack of active contact with and attention from both parents. c. Whether the parents can communicate with each other regarding the child’s needs. d. Whether both parents have actively cared for the child before and since the separation. e. Whether each parent can support the other parent’s relationship with the child. f. Whether the custody arrangement is in accord with the child’s wishes or whether the child has strong opposition, taking into consideration the child’s age and maturity. g. Whether one or both the parents agree or are opposed to joint custody. h. The geographic proximity of the parents. i. Whether the safety of the child, other children, or the other parent will be jeopardized by the awarding of joint custody or by unsupervised or unrestricted visitation. j. Whether a history of domestic abuse, as

filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. The named defendant was Quiles’s husband, Lucio Perez Munoz (Perez ... appellee. Amber L. Markham of Iowa Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Des Moines, for amicus curiae ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Duane E. Hoffmeyer, Judge. Yecika Quiles

. ________________________________________________________________ Certiorari to the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Gary McKenrick Judge. Petition for writ of certiorari challenging the district court’s dismissal of her petition for an order of protection. WRIT SUSTAINED AND REMANDED. James L. Ottesen, Davenport, for appellant. Kendra Mills-Arnold, Drake Legal Clinic, Des Moines, for appellee. Heard by Miller, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ. Vogel, J. takes no part. 2 EISENHAUER, J. In April 2006, petitioner-appellant Jane Doe filed an application for an order of protection against her husband, the defendant, in the Iowa District Court for Scott County. At the time the petition was filed, petitioner had recently moved to Iowa. The defendant resides in Wisconsin. There is no indication in the record that the defendant has any contact with Iowa except that his former wife lives here. The petitioner alleged three instances of abuse, all of which occurred outside Iowa while petitioner and the defendant were residing in Pennsylvania or Florida. On the same day the petition was filed, as is customary, it was presented to the district court for issuance of a temporary protective order. The district court wrote on the face of the petition “denied no jurisdiction constitutionally”. Petitioner started this certiorari action, claiming the district court erred in dismissing petitioner’s application. The Iowa Supreme Court granted certiorari. Our review in an original certiorari proceeding is for correction of errors of law. Sorci v. Iowa District Court for Polk County, 671 N.W.2d 482, 488-89 (Iowa 2003). Under Iowa’s Domestic Abuse Act, a plaintiff may seek relief from ... abuse by filing a petition for an order of protection in a civil action. Iowa Code §236.3 (2005). The statute does not specify personal jurisdiction requirements. However, the Iowa Supreme Court discussed this issue in depth in Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa 2001). The facts in Bartsch are substantially similar to those in this case. See id. at 5. In that case, the wife requested an order of protection against her husband. Id. The district court 3 found the husband did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa for personal jurisdiction. Id. It nevertheless granted the wife an emergency protective order. Id. The husband filed a motion to dismiss challenging the order for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. The district court denied his motion. Id. On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was not required in the proceedings to grant a protective order. Id. at 6. The supreme court reasoned that, just like a marriage-dissolution or a child custody action, adjudication on a protective order is a status determination. Id. The forum state has such a strong interest concerning these matters that its courts may consider the petition even when one of the parties does not have sufficient minimum contact with the state. Id. at 7. Although there are some factual differences, we conclude Bartsch is applicable to the present case and the district court’s dismissal of the petition is contrary to the law as set forth in Bartsch. WRIT SUSTAINED AND REMANDED. Miller, J. concurs specially. 4 MILLER, J. (concurs specially) The plaintiff’s petition sought, both on an ex-parte temporary basis and as a final order following hearing, orders that the defendant stay away from the plaintiff’s home, work, and school, and that the defendant not contact the plaintiff either personally or through another, by telephone, writing, or any other way. I agree with the dissenting opinion in Bartsch that the orders sought would (1) go beyond a status determination and constitute a grant of injunctive relief against ... DISTRICT COURT FOR SCOTT COUNTY, Defendant

. On August 9, 2004, Ana filed a petition for child custody, child support, and visitation in California. When Jose was served with notice of the action in 3 Iowa, he filed his own custody action in Iowa on August 25. The California case was dismissed when the California court determined jurisdiction of the custody action would be more properly addressed in Iowa. Jose sent money to Ana in November for the return trip to Iowa. When Ana and Jacqueline returned, they stayed with Jose in Marshalltown for approximately one month. Jose dismissed his child custody petition without prejudice on November 10 because he believed Ana and Jacqueline were going to stay with him in Iowa. A short time later, Jose discovered Ana had obtained airline tickets to return to California with Jacqueline. Jose filed a petition for injunctive relief on November 17 in an effort to prevent Ana from leaving the state with Jacqueline. The district court entered an order that same day enjoining Ana from leaving the state with Jacqueline. Jose subsequently filed a motion to set aside the voluntary dismissal of his petition to establish custody. He alleged he had been misled into seeking a dismissal of his petition by Ana. Ana filed a response stating she did not resist the motion to set aside the dismissal. On December 10 the court reinstated Jose’s petition for custody and support. On that same date Ana went to Jose’s home and started packing her clothing and Jacqueline’s clothing. Jose feared Ana was going to take Jacqueline to California, so he took Jacqueline to his parents’ home without Ana’s permission. This prompted Ana to file a petition for relief from domestic abuse, and ... IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 6-497 / 05-1751 Filed November 16, 2006 Upon the Petition of JOSE LUIS ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County

, Judge. Appellant appeals from a domestic abuse protective order issued pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 236 (2013). REVERSED AND REMANDED. Angela H. Kayl Of Kayl Law Office, Sioux City, for appellant. Frank Cal Tenuta of Iowa Legal Aid, Sioux City, for appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ. 2 MCDONALD, J. Troy Schultzen appeals from a final domestic abuse protective order issued pursuant to Iowa Code Chapter 236 (2013) and the district court’s ruling and order denying Schultzen’s motion to reopen the record and reconsider the protective order. The challenged protective order limits Schultzen’s contact with protected party Michelle Landhuis, Schultzen’s former spouse. The challenged protective order also modifies the parties’ decree of dissolution of marriage, granting Michelle temporary custody of the parties’ two minor children and granting visitation to Troy. On appeal, Troy contends there is insufficient evidence he committed an assault, a finding prerequisite to issuance of a chapter 236 protective order. He also contends the district court lacked jurisdiction to modify the parties’ custody arrangement. Finally, he contends the district court’s ex parte interview of Troy’s minor son over Troy’s objection violated Troy’s constitutional right to due process. I. The parties formerly were married and are the parents of two minor children. Troy resides in Van Meter, and Michelle resides in Cherokee. The distance between Van Meter and Cherokee is approximately 160 miles. Pursuant to a stipulation and agreement to modify the parties’ decree of dissolution of marriage, the parties have joint legal custody of the children, and Troy has physical care of both children. Michelle was granted visitation, including two weeks’ summer visitation. 3 On July 10, 2014, Troy and Michelle spent several hours arguing over the phone and via text message about whether Michelle could pick up the children that night to commence either a weekend visitation or her two-week summer visitation. Troy decided that he would not allow Michelle to pick the children up that night because she would not be at his house until 11:00 p.m., which meant that the children would not be back at Michelle’s house until 2:00 or 3:00 a.m. Troy testified that Michelle said in response, “Well, I’m going to come there, break into the house, take the kids and kill you.” Michelle denied making this statement, testifying she said she was merely going to drive to his house and honk the horn to signal for the children to come out. Troy hung up the phone and ended the conversation. After that phone call, Michelle called Troy again. According to Troy, Michelle once again threatened that she was going to drive to his house that night, take her children, and kill Troy and his wife and their son, B.S. Troy testified that he replied, “If somebody breaks into my house, I will have my 40 cal out.” Michelle and her friend, who was listening on speaker phone, testified that Troy said, “I’m going to put an F’ing bullet between your F’ing eyes” or something similar. The parties dispute who hung up the phone, but it is not disputed the telephone call terminated at this point. At some point later in the evening, the parties spoke or texted again and made arrangements to exchange care of the children the next day. The next day, the parties met in Harlan to exchange care of the children. The exchange occurred without incident and without the involvement of law 4 enforcement. Michelle filed her petition for relief from ... abuse on July 16, 2014, six days after the phone call and five days after the exchange. The district court issued a temporary protective order and then the final domestic abuse protective order at issue in this appeal. The final domestic abuse protective order modified the stipulated physical care arrangement by granting Michelle temporary physical care of the parties’ children. II. We review a civil domestic abuse proceeding tried in equity de novo. See Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We examine both the law and the facts, and we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and presented for appellate review. See Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). We give weight to the district court’s findings, particularly its credibility determinations, but our obligation to adjudicate the issues anew means that we must satisfy ourselves the petitioning party has come forth with the quantum and quality of evidence sufficient to prove the statutory grounds for issuing a protective order. See id. at 594. A party seeking a protective order pursuant to chapter 236 must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a domestic abuse assault occurred. See Iowa Code §§ 236.4(1) (“[T]he plaintiff must prove the allegation of domestic abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.”), 236.5 (providing that relief is available “[u]pon a finding that the defendant has engaged in domestic abuse”); Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 596 (stating the burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence); Knight, 525 N.W.2d at 843 (same). “Domestic abuse” means 5 “committing an assault as defined in Iowa Code section 708.1” where the victim and assailant have a relationship governed by chapter 236, such as an assault involving “family or household members” or the “parents of the same minor child.” Iowa Code § 236.2(2). As relevant here, Iowa Code section 708.1(2) defines assault as follows: 2. A person commits an assault when, without justification, the person does any of the following: . . . . b. Any act which is intended to place another in fear of immediate physical contact which will be painful, injurious, insulting, or offensive, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act. At issue is whether Michelle proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Troy intended to place Michelle in fear of “immediate physical contact” and that Troy had the “apparent ability to execute the act.” In this context, “immediate” means “occurring without delay; instant.” Black’s Law Dictionary 751 (7th ed. 1999). The ability to execute the act must be apparent to the offender, not the victim. See Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 418 (Iowa 1997). The apparent ability to execute the act means “that his expectations of placing another in fear must be reasonable.” State v. Braggs, 784 N.W.2d 31, 37 (Iowa 2010) (citing State v. Jackson, 305 N.W.2d 420, 423 (Iowa 1981)). On de novo review, we conclude there is insufficient evidence Troy committed an assault, within the meaning of chapters 236 and 708. Initially, it is hotly contested whether Troy ever made the alleged threat. Troy contends that it was Michelle who threatened him and that he responded by telling her he would call the police. Troy’s version of the parties’ conversation on the evening in question is corroborated, in part, by contemporaneous text messages. Michelle’s 6 version of the parties’ conversation suffers from several inconsistencies. Michelle is also the less credible of the two witnesses. Troy holds steady employment and has physical care of the children. Michelle lacks steady employment, lacks stable housing, and has been convicted of several theft offenses. At the time of this incident, she had not seen the children in over two months. At the time she filed her chapter 236 petition, she ... IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA No. 14-1447 Filed March 25, 2015 Upon the Petition of MICHELLE LEE LANDHUIS

three times. Keith was arrested for domestic abuse assault and pled guilty to serious misdemeanor assault. Glenda filed a petition seeking relief from ... domestic abuse pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.3 (2009). On April 8, 2009, the parties agreed to a protective order; Glenda was given physical care of the children and remained on the farmstead, while Keith moved to an apartment in Nashua and received regular visitation with the children. The order also provided Keith was only to be on the farmstead when necessary to perform work and was prohibited from having direct contact with Glenda. The order was formally cancelled on October 31, 2011. In August 2011, Glenda and the children moved to a home in Clarksville. At that time, Keith returned to the farmstead. On February 5, 2010, Glenda filed a petition to dissolve the parties’ marriage. A hearing was held in November 2011. On May 31, 2012, the district court entered the decree dissolving the marriage. It granted Glenda physical 4 care of the parties’ two minor children subject to Keith’s visitation rights. As to the marital property, the court awarded Keith roughly half of the real estate, including the farmstead, as well as several vehicles. Glenda was awarded the other half of the real estate, several investment and retirement accounts, and her vehicle. The court divided the grain in storage between the parties. The court calculated the net worth awarded to Keith to be $3,381,847 and the net worth of property awarded to Glenda to be $3,049,127. Finally, it awarded Glenda $10,000 in trial attorney fees. Both parties filed post-trial motions asking the court to revisit its fact findings and modify its ruling. The court denied the motions. Keith filed a timely notice of appeal. II. Scope and Standard of Review. We review dissolution cases de novo. In re Marriage of Becker, 756 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa 2008). We give weight to the district court’s findings of fact, although we are not bound by them. Id. III. Child Custody. Keith first contends the district court erred in granting physical care of the parties’ minor children to Glenda. He argues he can provide the children with the environment that will most likely bring them to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity. The best interest of the children is our standard for deciding child custody. Iowa R. App. P. 6.14(6)(o); In re Marriage of Murphy, 592 N.W.2d 681, 683 (Iowa 1999). Our objective is to place the children in the environment most likely to 5 bring them to healthy physical, mental, and social maturity. Murphy, 592 N.W.2d at 683. In considering what custody arrangement is in the best interest of the children, we consider the statutory factors found in Iowa Code § 598.41(3) (2009). All these factors bear upon the “first and governing consideration” as to what will be in the best long-term interest of the child. In re Marriage of Vrban, 359 N.W.2d 420, 424 (Iowa 1984). In addition to the statutory factors, we consider the factors identified in In re Marriage of Winter, 223 N.W.2d 165, 166-67 (Iowa 1974) in determining the award of physical care. In re Marriage of Will, 489 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Iowa 1992). These factors are: 1. The characteristics of each child, including age, maturity, mental and physical health. 2. The emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. 3. The characteristics of each parent, including age, character, stability, mental and physical health. 4. The capacity and interest of each parent to provide for the emotional, social, moral, material, and educational needs of the child. 5. The interpersonal relationship between the child and each parent. 6. The interpersonal relationship between the child and its siblings. 7. The effect on the child of continuing or disrupting an existing custodial status. 8. The nature of each proposed environment, including its stability and wholesomeness. 9. The preference of the child, if the child is of sufficient age and maturity. 10. The report and recommendation of the attorney for the child or other independent investigator. 11. Available alternatives. 12. Any other relevant matter the evidence in a particular case may disclose. Winter, 223 N.W.2d at 166-67. 6 Keith argues he should be granted physical care of the children, citing difficulties in Glenda’s admittedly strained relationship with their two adult children and what he refers to as “serious lapses in Glenda’s parental supervision and control.” The latter refers to Glenda’s alleged drinking problem. Glenda claims Keith mischaracterized her use of alcohol. The court was free to choose which party’s testimony it believed. Furthermore, Glenda testified she stopped using alcohol in July of 2011 and there is no evidence to the contrary. We find the evidence at trial reveals no present concerns about Glenda’s alcohol use. Glenda cites to Keith’s domestic abuse as an impediment to his ability to parent the children. Because of the “ravaging and long-term consequences” domestic abuse can have on children, this court has recognized it as a factor in determining which parent should be granted child custody. In re Marriage of Daniels, 568 N.W.2d 51, 54-55 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Spousal abuse discloses a serious character flaw in the batterer and an equally serious parenting flaw. Id. at 55. Consequently, we believe evidence of untreated domestic battering should be given considerable weight in determining the primary caretaker, and under some circumstances even foreclose an award of primary care to a spouse who batters. Domestic abuse is, in every respect, dramatically opposed to a child’s best interests. Id. Keith admits to striking Glenda in the face three times in March 2009 when he became angry with her. As a result, criminal charges were filed against Keith, Glenda filed a petition for relief from ... . LOVRIEN AND KEITH ALAN LOVRIEN Upon the Petition of GLENDA R. LOVRIEN, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning KEITH

. R.J. and D.J. appeal an order denying their petition for appointment of an involuntary guardian. AFFIRMED. Chad Primmer, Council Bluffs, for appellants R.J. and D.J. Karen Dales, Council Bluffs, for appellee G.O. DeShawne Bird-Sell, Glenwood, guardian ad litem. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Doyle and Mansfield, JJ. 2 MANSFIELD, J. Randy, the maternal grandfather of Maddison, and his wife Denise appeal the district court order denying their petition for involuntary guardianship. On appeal, Randy and Denise assert the district court erred in finding that Maddison‟s father, Garrett, is a suitable parent and that it is in Maddison‟s best interest to remain in his care. We affirm. I. Background Facts and Proceedings Maddison was born August 2006 to Garrett and Kim. At the time, Garrett and Kim did not have sufficient means to support themselves. Therefore, they lived with Kim‟s father and stepmother, Randy and Denise, in Salisbury, Maryland. Following Maddison‟s birth, there was discussion about Randy and Denise becoming guardians of Maddison in order to give Garrett and Kim “a chance to get their life in order, a place to live and steady jobs.” However, no formal guardianship was executed. Rather, in November 2006, Garrett and Kim decided to take Maddison and move to Iowa. Upon arriving in Iowa, Garrett and Kim were able to find their own housing, but continued to struggle to find consistent employment. Their relationship was also very volatile. In August 2007, Kim filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. In ... prescription medications. In the week following Kim‟s death, Randy and Denise filed this petition for the guardianship of ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, James S. Heckerman, Judge

entry of a domestic abuse protective order. AFFIRMED. Andrew B. Howie of Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., West Des Moines, for appellant. Phillip F. Van Liew of Babich Goldman P.C., Des Moines, for appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Mullins, JJ. 2 MULLINS, Judge. Randycurtis Bruske (Randy) appeals the entry of a domestic abuse protective order pursuant to Iowa Code section 236.5(1)(b) (2017). He contends the district court’s conclusion that he committed domestic abuse assault against his wife, Theresa Bruske, is not supported by substantial evidence. He specifically contends “[t]here is insufficient evidence to prove that [he] specifically intended to assault Theresa or that she was placed in fear by any of his actions as she alleged.” Theresa requests an award of appellate attorney fees. I. Background Facts and Proceedings We make the following findings of fact based upon the evidence which we find credible. The parties have been married for seven years. Their marriage has produced two children. On, January 31, 2017, Theresa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On February 1, Theresa called Randy while he was at work and informed him of the pending dissolution action. That evening, Randy was visibly upset when he returned home from work. Randy went out while Theresa stayed home with the children. Randy returned home at approximately 10:45 p.m. after being gone for roughly four hours. He went straight to bed. At approximately 11:45 p.m., as Theresa was washing dishes, Randy, who was heavily intoxicated,1 came out of his room, approached Theresa, pulled down her pants, and tried to initiate sexual intercourse. Theresa initially resisted but reluctantly consented to the contact and requested that the encounter take place in the bedroom so the children would not be awoken. 1 Randy conceded at trial that, after finding out about the divorce, he did “indulge a little extra” in his alcohol consumption on the evening in question. 3 The ensuing intercourse was aggressive on the part of Randy and he continued such aggressiveness, directing Theresa to “Take it!” several times, despite being advised by Theresa that he was hurting her and she wanted him to stop, as well as her unsuccessful effort to force Randy off of her. Specifically, during the encounter, Randy forced penetration more than once, pulled her hair, slammed her head into the mattress several times, and dug his fingers into Theresa’s neck. Theresa was finally able to end the encounter. Theresa then went to her daughter’s room to sleep. The next morning at approximately 4:30 a.m., Theresa awoke to Randy ripping her pants off and forcing penetration, all while the parties’ daughter was asleep in the same room, approximately eight feet away. Theresa declined consent to the encounter, but ultimately relented so the child would not be awoken. Randy “got up and stormed out of the room” a few minutes later. Theresa testified she feared for her safety during both of these encounters. Randy testified at trial that he believed both encounters were completely consensual. He conceded, however, that Theresa advised him on February 2 that his aggressive actions hurt her—he apologized for his conduct. Later that morning, Randy removed all the money from and closed the parties’ joint checking accounts and cancelled their credit cards. On February 5, the parties argued in relation to Theresa having previously hidden the magazines and ammunition for Randy’s firearm. Randy left the home with his firearm and Theresa, frightened by what Randy might do with it, called her father who, in turn, called the police. Randy testified at the trial that he left the home at this time, a Sunday evening, to go to work. When the police arrived, 4 Theresa advised them of the argument and the events that occurred on February 1. Theresa took the kids to her parents’ home, switched vehicles, and then stayed in a motel “under someone else’s name.” On Tuesday, February 7, Theresa filed a petition for relief from ... Review “District courts hear civil domestic abuse cases in equity, and we review them de novo.” In re Petition of ... actions that were taken by [Randy] on those two days definitely rises to domestic abuse as the Court has read into the

of bruising. On January 31, 2008, Erickson filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse. After a trial, the ... for service.” When Erickson took the children and Auggie to Saks‟s house the next week, pursuant to the custody ... provisions of the dissolution decree, she told Saks that he “should have Auggie” because she could not afford to pay for

, David filed a petition seeking to dissolve the parties’ marriage. In February of 2005, Jennifer filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse and ... . STEVENS AND JENNIFER L. STEVENS Upon the Petition of DAVID L. STEVENS, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Bobbi M. Alpers, Judge. The petitioner appeals from the child

several occasions between February and December 2005. On December 2, 2005, Tracy filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse against ... Rockas. On December 8, 2005, Ventling filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. Ventling ... the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza Ovrom, Judge. Plaintiff appeals the grant of summary judgment

district court’s ruling finding he committed domestic abuse assault against Sadie Wasmund. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Nicholas J. Herbold of Pendleton & Herbold, L.L.P., Iowa City, for appellant. Courtney Thomas-Dusing of Iowa Legal Aid, Iowa City, for appellee. Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Doyle, JJ. 2 DOYLE, J. Joseph Wasmund appeals from the district court’s final protective order entered in Iowa Code chapter 236 (2013) proceedings, contending the record is insufficient to support the district court’s determination he committed domestic abuse assault against his former spouse, Sadie Wasmund. Because a preponderance of the record evidence does not establish Joseph committed domestic abuse assault against Sadie, we reverse and remand for dismissal of the protective order. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. The parties formerly were married and are the parents of one minor child. On May 27, 2014, Sadie filed a petition for relief from ... ] back. Accordingly, the court finds that [Joseph] committed domestic abuse assault against [Sadie] by having physical contact [with Sadie] which is offensive to [Sadie]. In addition to [Sadie’s] testimony that such contact was offensive, [Joseph] admitted in his testimony that his intention was to block [Sadie] from reaching the parties’ minor child. As such, such contact was meant by [Joseph] to be offensive to [Sadie]. Joseph subsequently filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2), asserting Sadie failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he “had the specific intent to cause an offensive contact with [her].” He requested the court amend or enlarge its order to dismiss Sadie’s petition and its final domestic abuse protective order. Sadie resisted Joseph’s motion, and the court denied his motion. Joseph now appeals. II. Scope and Standards of Review. The trial court ruled on objections during the trial. Consequently, the parties disagree upon the correct standard of review we are to employ here. Ordinarily, civil-domestic-abuse proceedings are tried in equity, and our appellate 5 review of equitable proceedings is de novo. See, e.g., Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001); Knight v. Knight, 525 N.W.2d 841, 843 (Iowa 1994). We generally “consider and review a case in the same manner as the district court tried the case.” Molo Oil Co. v. City of Dubuque, 692 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Iowa 2005). When the “case was tried in the district court as a law action” and it “ruled on objections as they were made,” our appellate review is for correction of errors at law. Bacon ex rel. Bacon v. Bacon, 567 N.W.2d 414, 417 (Iowa 1997). Though an important consideration, the district court’s ruling on evidentiary objections alone does not determine whether the case was tried in law or equity. See Passehl Estate v. Passehl, 712 N.W.2d 408, 414 (Iowa 2006). Where “the objections were minor and did not have a significant effect on the proceedings” and the “district court ultimately used its equitable powers to order specific performance and to issue an injunction,” it may be concluded the case “was fully tried in equity.” Id. In Sille v. Shaffer, 297 N.W.2d 379, 380-81 (Iowa 1980), the supreme court concluded that the case would be reviewed de novo despite the fact that the district court ruled on objections during trial. The court stated: Upon a de novo review it would be impossible, where we disagree with a trial court’s evidentiary ruling, to consider necessary evidence which would be absent from the record. We have no such problem in this case. We have carefully read the transcript and find few instances in which evidence was excluded from the record. In none of these situations do we disagree with the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. Sille, 297 N.W.2d at 381. We have carefully reviewed the transcript in this case and find few instances where the court excluded evidence from the record based on its 6 evidentiary rulings, and such exclusions in this case do not impact our review of the facts and record of this case. The trial judge clearly sought to manage the courtroom during the trial of a case for which the judge was under time constraints.1 The court’s rulings on those objections were efforts at effective trial management. They were not rulings on objections that denied this appellate court an opportunity to review the admissibility of evidence such that the objects of a de novo review were somehow thwarted.2 Considering all the facts and circumstances in this case, we conclude that the mode of trial was more akin to an equitable proceeding and that ruling on the few objections made did not convert this case to one at law. Consequently, our review is de novo. On de novo review, we examine both the law and the facts, and we adjudicate anew those issues properly preserved and presented for appellate review. See Wilker, 630 N.W.2d at 594. We give weight to the district court’s findings, particularly its credibility determinations, but our obligation to adjudicate the issues anew means that we must satisfy ourselves the petitioning party has 1 Trial was scheduled to start at 9:00 a.m., and three hours were allotted for the trial. A delayed start was necessitated as a result of discussions held in chambers with counsel. The trial started at 9:41 a.m. and concluded at 12:25 p.m. The trial judge made at least three references to time limitations during the trial. 2 In one instance, the court sustained a hearsay objection to an exhibit. Sadie had already testified as to its contents. In another instance, during a witness’s narration, counsel objected on relevancy grounds. The court responded, “Do you have more questions on this subject matter?” Counsel said, “No.” Without ruling on the objection, the court suggested counsel, “Go ahead with your next question.” The court sustained an objection to certain testimony based upon finding the question posed was leading. Examining counsel said the information was in the petition and then went on to ask a non-leading question about the same subject matter. In response to another relevancy objection, the court mentioned the time-constraints and sustained the objection. Responding to a compound-question objection, the court asked counsel to rephrase his question. Counsel did. The remaining objections were overruled. 7 come forth with the quantum and quality of evidence sufficient to prove the statutory grounds for issuing a protective order. See id. at 594. III. Discussion. To obtain relief under ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen B. Jackson Jr., Judge. Joseph Wasmund appeals the

about November 1, 2008. Matthew filed a petition for dissolution of marriage November 4, 2008. After about a week, Daphne moved back in with Matthew, and they lived together in a very tense atmosphere for the next few months. In February 2009 Daphne filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse and ... BERNARD AND DAPHNE BERNARD Upon the Petition of MATTHEW BERNARD, Petitioner-Appellant, And Concerning DAPHNE ... District Court for Marshall County, Carl D. Baker, Judge. Matthew Bernard appeals from the custodial and

prior domestic abuse, his repeated violations of the protective order, and the confirmed report of child abuse naming Robert as the perpetrator, we conclude the child‟s interests are best served by awarding Christina primary physical care. We therefore modify the decision of the district court ordering joint physical care and order physical care of the child with Christina, and remand to the district court to award liberal visitation to Robert. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Robert and Christina were married in December 2007. They had one child together in May 2008. Christina‟s two older children, ages two and nine, from different fathers, also lived with the family during the parties‟ marriage. The parties agreed that Christina would be a stay-at-home mother for the children. Robert was employed by Determann Industries as an equipment operator, where he worked from about 5:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. In October 2008, Robert stopped working for Determann Industries, the parties purchased a semi truck, and Robert became a truck driver for CNRD Trucking, L.L.C.1 The marriage was mostly stable until an incident in March 2009 at a fireman‟s fundraiser in Buffalo. Apparently Christina was not ready to leave 1 Robert testified at trial that he made $45,000 per year as a truck driver. However, the district court found that Robert “was less than forthcoming about his income,” and noted that the record showed Robert‟s gross income in 2009 to be $63,200. 3 when Robert wanted to, and Robert grabbed Christina‟s arm in an attempt to force her to leave, leaving bruises on her arm. Another incident occurred in April 2009, when Robert became upset with Christina‟s oldest child, chased the child upstairs to his bedroom, and threw him onto his bed, causing him to strike the wall. Robert denied that he threw the child onto the bed, but admitted that he grabbed the child by the leg and turned him over. Robert then forced Christina to get out of the shower and yelled at her to discipline the child. The incident resulted in a confirmed but not registered child abuse report by the Iowa Department of Human Services. Based on this altercation, Christina gathered the children and their clothing, left the family‟s home in Camanche, and moved in with Christina‟s parents in Davenport. Christina soon rented an apartment in Davenport where she lived with the children. As a result of these incidents, Christina filed a petition for relief from ... permanent protective order finding that Robert committed a domestic abuse assault against Christina. The order also ... . Meanwhile, Christina also filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In July 2009, the court entered an order setting

, Jennifer filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse, alleging threats of physical harm perpetrated by Leonard and ... , Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR WAPELLO COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Myron L. Gookin, Judge

prior domestic abuse, his repeated violations of the protective order, and the confirmed report of child abuse naming Robert as the perpetrator, we conclude the child‟s interests are best served by awarding Christina primary physical care. We therefore modify the decision of the district court ordering joint physical care and order physical care of the child with Christina, and remand to the district court to award liberal visitation to Robert. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Robert and Christina were married in December 2007. They had one child together in May 2008. Christina‟s two older children, ages two and nine, from different fathers, also lived with the family during the parties‟ marriage. The parties agreed that Christina would be a stay-at-home mother for the children. Robert was employed by Determann Industries as an equipment operator, where he worked from about 5:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. In October 2008, Robert stopped working for Determann Industries, the parties purchased a semi truck, and Robert became a truck driver for CNRD Trucking, L.L.C.1 The marriage was mostly stable until an incident in March 2009 at a fireman‟s fundraiser in Buffalo. Apparently Christina was not ready to leave 1 Robert testified at trial that he made $45,000 per year as a truck driver. However, the district court found that Robert “was less than forthcoming about his income,” and noted that the record showed Robert‟s gross income in 2009 to be $63,200. 3 when Robert wanted to, and Robert grabbed Christina‟s arm in an attempt to force her to leave, leaving bruises on her arm. Another incident occurred in April 2009, when Robert became upset with Christina‟s oldest child, chased the child upstairs to his bedroom, and threw him onto his bed, causing him to strike the wall. Robert denied that he threw the child onto the bed, but admitted that he grabbed the child by the leg and turned him over. Robert then forced Christina to get out of the shower and yelled at her to discipline the child. The incident resulted in a confirmed but not registered child abuse report by the Iowa Department of Human Services. Based on this altercation, Christina gathered the children and their clothing, left the family‟s home in Camanche, and moved in with Christina‟s parents in Davenport. Christina soon rented an apartment in Davenport where she lived with the children. As a result of these incidents, Christina filed a petition for relief from ... permanent protective order finding that Robert committed a domestic abuse assault against Christina. The order also ... . Meanwhile, Christina also filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. In July 2009, the court entered an order setting

Ami filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse under Iowa Code section 236.3 (2005). Randall consented to a ... rights, which included alternating weekends and one weekly three-hour visit during the week. Randall filed a petition for ... KREAGER AND AMI DEEANN KREAGER Upon the Petition of RANDALL CHARLES KREAGER, Petitioner-Appellee, And

Domestic Abuse Special Prosecution Program, Davenport, for appellant. Robert H. Gallagher of Gallagher, Millage & Gallagher, P.L.C., Bettendorf, for appellee. Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ. 2 DOYLE, J. The State of Iowa, on behalf of Roslyn McClure, appeals the district court’s dismissal of its application to show cause why Luke McClure, Sr. should not be held in contempt. Because we find the district court’s factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the record, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Roslyn McClure filed for dissolution of her marriage to Luke McClure, Sr. in 2010.1 The following year, on October 28, 2011, Roslyn filed her petition for relief from ... criminal charge for domestic abuse” between the parties. On December 6, the day before the scheduled hearing, the ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark J. Smith, Judge. The State

present during some of Dayne’s abusive outbursts. A petition for relief from domestic abuse was filed and later ... . ________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mitchell County, Colleen D. Weiland, Judge. The father appeals from ... Sutton Law Office, Charles City, for appellant. Kristy B. Arzberger of Arzberger Law Office, Mason City, for

for relief from domestic abuse in April 2013. Stephanie moved to her mother’s home. On April 12, 2013, Joseph ... so Joseph would drop his claim regarding domestic abuse. 2 At trial, Joseph testified that he had attempted to get ... yelled at him and had pushed him one time. He testified he agreed to dismiss the domestic abuse case if Stephanie

. Concluding there was a history of domestic abuse, the trial court rejected Brad’s request for joint physical care and instead awarded primary physical care to Holly. Brad was allowed visitation of one evening a week, alternating three-day weekends and holidays, and three weeks in the summer. The district court’s judgment also ordered Brad to have no contact with Holly for one year. 3 Brad appealed, claiming it was in Garisin’s best interest that the parties be awarded joint physical care. The case was transferred to the court of appeals. A divided panel of that court modified the district court decree to provide that Brad and Holly would have joint physical care of Garisin. We granted Holly’s application for further review. We review the district court’s decision de novo. See In re Marriage of Sullins, 715 N.W.2d 242, 247 (Iowa 2006). “ ‘Although we decide the issues raised on appeal anew, we give weight to the trial court's factual findings, especially with respect to the credibility of the witnesses.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768, 778 (Iowa 2003)). II. Underlying Facts. When the parties married in 2001, Holly had completed a year of college and Brad, who has a GED, was employed. Holly completed her degree in May 2004 and took an advertising and marketing job with a local radio station. Brad was the primary income producer while Holly was in school. Holly was Garisin’s primary caretaker. At trial, both parties highlighted past conditions and conduct of the other. The evidence showed Holly had counseling in high school for a possible eating disorder. She had also suffered from episodes of depression since marrying and was being treated for a major depressive disorder at the time of trial. Holly’s psychiatrist testified she was in full remission, however, and had no mental health issues that would affect her ability to parent. The evidence showed that prior to marrying Holly, Brad had had several run-ins with the law, including possession of alcohol by a minor, violation of the open container law, possession of methamphetamine, and operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. He had no criminal record after 2000, however, until charges of domestic abuse were filed by Holly after the parties separated. Notwithstanding Holly’s and Brad’s problems and 4 shortcomings, the trial court found, and we agree, that both were good parents to Garisin. We turn now to the allegations of domestic abuse. Holly decided to leave Brad in February 2005; Brad did not want the marriage to end. The parties agreed to share physical care of their son by each parent living in the marital home with Garisin on an alternating schedule. When Holly was not in the parties’ residence, she initially lived with Deb Patterson, a person unknown to Brad. Patterson was the mother of Jason Hewitt, a friend of Holly. Brad suspected that Holly was having an affair with Hewitt, an allegation that Holly denied then and continued to deny at trial. On February 26, 2005, Holly came to the parties’ house to see Garisin. Brad began questioning Holly about where she had been and with whom she had been. Rather than answering Brad’s questions, Holly decided to leave. The parties’ explanations of what happened as Holly tried to walk out vary, but it is clear Holly wanted to leave and Brad wanted her to stay and talk. As Holly attempted to go out the door, Brad put his foot in the doorway to stop her, and Holly ended up with a bruise on her knee where her leg was hit by the door. As a result of this incident, Holly obtained a temporary no-contact order under Iowa Code chapter 236 (2005). Rather than pursue a permanent no-contact order, Holly filed for divorce on March 7, 2001. The parties agreed to a temporary order allowing shared physical care of Garisin. Brad did not handle the pending dissolution of his marriage well, and he was quite bothered by his suspicions that Holly was involved with another man. On March 26, he learned that Holly was with Hewitt at a third person’s home. Brad went there and pounded on the door, shouting for Holly. Holly was scared and called the police. The officers who 5 responded spent several minutes talking with Brad before convincing him to leave. On June 5, Brad called Holly to talk to her about the divorce. After speaking with him at length, Holly eventually hung up. Brad then came to her apartment and started pounding on the door. Holly told him to leave and threatened to call the police, but he kept knocking on the door. Holly finally called law enforcement, but Brad left before the officers arrived. While the officers were at Holly’s apartment, Brad called her. She gave the phone to an officer who told Brad to leave Holly alone. Nonetheless, later that day, Brad called Holly again, trying to talk her out of the divorce. Holly considered Brad’s phone calls not only harassing, but also threatening, as he asserted in his calls that he was not going to let her go through with the divorce. In this same time frame, another incident occurred that eventually led Holly to seek a second no-contact order. Holly was at the home of Brad’s parents to pick up Garisin when Brad arrived. While inside the house, Brad pulled down Holly’s slacks and demanded to know when she stopped wearing underwear. He then went outside to Holly’s vehicle and began looking through it. As she was trying to leave, Brad said something to the effect that, if he gave Holly a gun, would she just shoot him, that that would make the whole situation easier. On June 7, 2005, Holly filed a petition for relief from ... physical care for two reasons: (1) Brad’s alleged abuse of her, and (2) the parties’ inability to communicate ... domestic

. Appellant challenges the venue of the district court that issued a domestic abuse protective order against him. AFFIRMED. Thomas A. Hurd of Glazebrook, Moe, Johnston & Hurd LLP, Des Moines, for appellant. Michelle R. Mackel-Wiederanders of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellee. 2 WATERMAN, Justice. This appeal presents two issues of first impression: (1) whether our court’s order closing the clerk of court’s public window at 2:30 p.m. triggered Iowa Code section 4.1(34) (2011) to allow a one-day extension of the deadline to file a notice of appeal, and (2) whether a person fleeing domestic abuse who relocates to live in a new county satisfies the residency requirement for venue under Iowa Code section 236.3(1) in an action for a domestic abuse protective order. Plaintiff fled her marital home in Decatur County to escape her abusive husband, taking their children with her. She found a safe house 250 miles away in Howard County, near her parents’ residence, and filed for an order of protection within two days of her arrival. The defendant husband moved to transfer venue from Howard County to Decatur County. The district court denied his motion and entered the protective order. The husband filed his notice of appeal thirty-one days later. The Howard County clerk’s public window had closed at 2:30 p.m. the day before, pursuant to a cost-saving order of our court that reduced the normal hours the clerks’ offices were open to the public. We apply Iowa Code section 4.1(34) to hold this appeal was timely filed, and we rescind our court’s December 2, 2009 supervisory order that stated this Code section was inapplicable under such circumstances. Our court has constitutional and statutory authority over the judicial branch, including the power to set the office hours of the clerks of court. However, we may not reduce the time allowed to file a notice of appeal without legislative authorization. On the merits, we hold plaintiff satisfied the residency requirement for venue under Iowa Code section 236.3(1) to obtain a domestic abuse protective order when she relocated to live in a new county to escape 3 abuse and obtain the support of her family living nearby. Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm the venue ruling and protective order entered by the district court in Howard County. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Teri Root and Talton Toney were married in April 2009 and lived together in a farmhouse in Decatur County near the Missouri border. They have three children together, and Teri has two more children. On October 7, 2011, with three of the children watching, Talton put a belt around Teri’s neck and choked her. Teri immediately phoned the Crisis Intervention Center, which in turn called the police. The police came to the couple’s home. Talton was arrested after he admitted to police that he choked Teri. Both the police and Teri’s domestic abuse victim advocate advised Teri to leave the family home, which was owned by Talton and his parents. Talton’s parents came to the house that evening, took Teri’s house keys and cell phone, and told her to “get the hell out.” Teri took the children and drove 250 miles northeast to Howard County, just across the border from her hometown of Preston, Minnesota. Teri testified she wanted to be close to her parents so that she would have their support during her separation from Talton and their assistance caring for her five children. Teri found a temporary safe house upon her arrival in Howard County through the local domestic abuse center. Teri visited the emergency room in Howard County the next day, where she received care for her neck injury. On October 10, Teri filed a petition for relief from ... conclusion that Teri satisfied the residency requirement for venue under the Domestic Abuse Act when she moved to Howard County to live there for family support and to escape Talton’s abuse. Iowa Code chapter 236 does not define the term “resides” or “resident.” “When the term ‘resident’ is undefined in the statute, it becomes an ambiguous term requiring statutory construction to determine its legal meaning.” Kroblin, 461 N.W.2d at 177–78. We are to “seek a reasonable interpretation . . . that will satisfy the objectives of the statute.” Id. at 178. The domestic abuse chapter is intended to protect Iowa residents from abuse. See Christenson v. Christenson, 472 N.W.2d 279, 280 (Iowa 1991). This intent is manifest throughout the chapter: 14 Our domestic-abuse statute evidences a special solicitude for potential abuse victims. It allows a petition to be filed without payment of costs, Iowa Code § 236.3(7); forms are provided for pro se filing, Iowa Code § 236.3A(2); and the county attorney may assist the plaintiff in all stages of the proceeding, Iowa Code § 236.3B. Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Iowa 2001). We give the domestic abuse statute “ ‘a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.’ ” Christenson, 472 N.W.2d at 280 (quoting Shidler v. All Am. Life & Fin. Corp., 298 N.W.2d 318, 321 (Iowa 1980)). With these principles in mind, we consider the meaning of “resides” in section 236.3(1). In Kollman, we distinguished between “legal” and “actual” residency. 240 Iowa at 1333, 39 N.W.2d at 303. We noted actual residence “may be more temporary in character,” but that a person must be more than “a mere temporary sojourner.” Id. We held the actual residency test applies under the general venue statute for personal actions, which expressly provides for venue where the defendant “actually resides.” Id. at 1332, 39 N.W.2d at 303 (quoting Iowa Code § 616.17) (1946) (emphasis added). Talton argues Kollman is distinguishable because Iowa Code section 236.3(1) (2011) omits the qualifier “actually” to provide for venue where “either party resides.” Talton advocates for a more stringent “legal residence” standard, relying on our precedent under chapter 598 governing marital dissolutions. Talton notes the venue provisions in chapter 236 and chapter 598 both contain the phrase, “where either party resides.” Compare Iowa Code § 236.3(1), with id. § 598.2. Talton specifically relies on Hinds v. Hinds, which interpreted “residency” under the marital-dissolution statute to mean “a legal residence, not an actual resid[ence] alone” and equated residency with domicile. 1 Iowa 36, 49 (1855). That case, however, is 15 distinguishable. In Hinds, the wife had lived in other states, but lived for only a few months in Iowa, and the husband had never lived in Iowa. The 1855 Iowa Code included a six-month minimum residency requirement to obtain a divorce. Id. at 38 (citing Iowa Code § 1488 (1855)). This minimum residency requirement guards against interstate forum shopping and protects Iowa decrees against collateral attack. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406–07, 95 S. Ct. 553, 561, 42 L. Ed. 2d 532, 545 (1975) (“Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish to become a divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as short a time as appellant . . . .”); In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d 869, 877 (Iowa 1991) (equating “residency” to “domicile” for chapter 598 dissolution of marriage action). Chapter 598 currently includes a one-year, good-faith minimum residency requirement for a petitioner filing for divorce from a spouse living in another state. Iowa Code § 598.5(1)(k) (2011). Section 598.5(1)(k) provides: Except where the respondent is a resident of this state and is served by personal service, [a petition shall] state that the petitioner has been for the last year a resident of the state, specifying the county in which the petitioner has resided and the length of such residence in the state after deducting all absences from the state, and that the maintenance of the residence has been in good faith and not for the purpose of obtaining a dissolution of marriage only. Id. This more stringent legal residency requirement for chapter 598 makes sense in the context of marital dissolutions involving residents of other states, because a more lenient actual residency test would allow litigants to maintain multiple residences to evade Iowa’s minimum good- faith state residency requirement. Chapter 236, by contrast, lacks any equivalent provision imposing a minimum period or good-faith-test 16 requirement for residency within Iowa. Accordingly, the chapter 598 cases are inapposite. We conclude a more relaxed residency requirement is appropriate to effectuate the purpose of chapter 236—protecting victims of domestic abuse. Section 236.4 provides for expedited orders of protection. Id. § 236.4. By omitting a minimum waiting period in section 236.3(1), the legislature presumably intended to allow emergency injunctive relief immediately ... resolved”). A more stringent legal residency requirement would discourage victims of domestic abuse from moving away from their abuser’s home county or delay relief for those who do move to another county. As the facts of this case demonstrate, victims fleeing abuse often are required to seek temporary shelter while they are displaced and their lives are in disarray. We are not confronted with an evidentiary record showing the alleged victim filed for an order of protection in a remote county solely to gain a tactical advantage. See Froman, 755 N.W.2d at 531 (“When possible, we seek to construe venue statutes so as to minimize forum shopping.”). Actions for a domestic abuse protective order are equitable 17 proceedings. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 2001). Our district courts have discretion to fashion relief based on the equities. Specifically, defendants may challenge venue on forum non conveniens grounds when “the relative inconveniences [are] so unbalanced that jurisdiction should be declined on an equitable basis.” Silversmith v. Kenosha Auto Transp., 301 N.W.2d 725, 727 (Iowa 1981) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Hoth v. Sexton, 539 N.W.2d 137, 139 (Iowa 1995) (“We have viewed the doctrine as a self-imposed limit used to avoid unfair, vexatious and oppressive actions in a forum away from the defendant’s domicile.”); In re Marriage of Kimura, 471 N.W.2d at 879 (“Whether to apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens lies in the sound discretion of the district court.”). This is not such a case. The district court rejected Talton’s forum non conveniens argument, and he has not challenged this discretionary ruling on appeal. Applying the broad definition of “reside” to the facts of this case, we agree the district court correctly found that Teri resided in Howard County. Teri provided a compelling reason for fleeing to Howard County: her parents lived nearby and she needed their support. Teri lived in a safe house in Howard County for two days prior to filing her petition and

pursue criminal charges. The day after Lisa filed her initial report with DHS, she filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse alleging ... domestic abuse on the part of Ryan and 6 requested the entry of protective order ... same day. Lisa filed a petition for dissolution of marriage approximately one week later. Therein, she requested, among

. This appeal is from a district court’s ruling on a petition for judicial review of an administrative agency decision. The Iowa Department of Human Services dismissed an application to correct a child abuse report on grounds of issue preclusion. The district court affirmed. Upon our review, we reverse the district court judgment and remand for further proceedings. I. Background Facts and Proceedings Robert Grant and Linda Jensen had a tumultuous, rollercoaster relationship. They were married in 1991, followed by periodic episodes of discontent and reconciliation. In November 2000, Robert filed for divorce for the second time, and a custody battle ensued over their two sons, Robert Jr. and Samuel. Robert Jr., known as Bo, was born in 1995. Samuel, known as Sam, was born in 1997. He has Down syndrome. The dissolution trial was eventually scheduled for July 2002. In August 2001, during the pendency of the dissolution, Linda filed a petition for relief from domestic abuse ... . ________________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Mark J. Smith, Judge. Appeal from district ... REMANDED. Natalie Hope Cronk of Johnston & Nathanson, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant. Thomas J. Miller

civil petition for relief from domestic abuse.” She acknowledged that she should have withdrawn and self-reported her ... Elizabeth Quinlan, Des Moines, for complainant. David L. Brown of Hansen, McClintock & Riley, Des Moines, for ... . The commission recommended the attorney’s license be suspended for thirty days. Upon our de novo review, we

2009 after an incident that resulted in each party filing a petition for relief from domestic abuse and obtaining a ... MICHAEL BATES AND LAURA KAY BATES Upon the Petition of ADAM MICHAEL BATES, Petitioner-Appellee, And Concerning ... from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Kurt J. Stoebe, Judge. Laura Bates appeals from the custody

the district court erred in ruling that he was required to file a petition for postconviction relief before being able to modify the injunction. REVERSED AND REMANDED. Timothy Braunschweig of Braunschweig Law Firm, Algona, for appellant. Richard Meyer of Fillenwarth & Fillenwarth, Estherville, for appellee. Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield, J. and Robinson, S.J.* *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2007). 2 VAITHESWARAN, P.J. Dennis Schneider appeals the denial of his motion for summary judgment in an action to modify an injunction. I. Background Facts and Proceedings This case has a lengthy and convoluted procedural history, only some of which is relevant to the ruling that is challenged here. Dennis Schneider and Debra Rodgers divorced in 1998. Several months after the dissolution decree was entered, Rodgers applied for a permanent injunction against Schneider to prevent a claimed pattern of harassment. The application was filed under the same caption as the dissolution matter even though the dissolution decree contained no injunctive relief. Following a hearing, the district court issued an injunction directing Schneider to have no contact with Rodgers. The order was dated April 1, 1999. Schneider did not appeal the order. A state district court subsequently found Schneider in contempt for violating the injunction and sentenced him to thirty days in jail. Schneider petitioned a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal district court focused on whether Schneider exhausted state court remedies before proceeding to federal court. The court concluded that a state court needed to determine whether a state postconviction relief action was a cognizable means of challenging a finding of criminal contempt. The court stated, If the state courts determine that a postconviction relief application will not lie from a conviction for criminal contempt, then it will be clear that Schneider has both attempted to exhaust state remedies and that the State’s postconviction relief process is “ineffective” to protect his rights. 3 Schneider’s federal court petition was ultimately dismissed without prejudice. Meanwhile, Schneider filed a state court petition to modify and clarify the April 1, 1999 injunctive order. This petition, like the injunction that it challenged, was filed under the caption of the dissolution action and alleged several grounds for dissolving the injunction, including changed circumstances. Years after filing the petition, Schneider moved for summary judgment. He asserted that the 1999 order was actually a chapter 236 (1999) domestic abuse injunction ... petition for habeas corpus ordinarily must first present those claims to the state court and must exhaust state remedies.”). The habeas corpus action was not a direct challenge to the 1999 injunctive order. This action, in contrast, is an action to modify the 1999 injunction. Setting aside the question of whether Schneider could attack the 1999 order by filing a petition to modify the injunction years after it was issued and the appeal deadline had expired,1 we find no authority requiring challenges to injunctive orders such as this to be made in a postconviction relief action. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1) (2001) (stating statute applies to “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense”). Therefore, we reverse the district court’s ruling denying Schneider’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that he was required to challenge the injunction via a postconviction relief action. Schneider also argues that the 1999 order was in fact a domestic abuse order ... . RODGERS AND DENNIS A. SCHNEIDER Upon the Petition of DEBRA R. RODGERS f/k/a DEBRA R. SCHNEIDER, Petitioner